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Abstract 
In deriving a new definition of disability, it was first necessary to examine disability 
from an independent perspective which, while it took into account previous medical and 
social definitions, did not start from the basis of either. Thus, disability was considered first 
as a generally purposive term, and then examined in its application to humans. In this 
application, though social factors and the thinking of the medical profession were addressed, 
it was concluded that disability was an intrinsic state of the self, which could be distinguished 
as independent from social interactions. This state was characterized by its effect upon the 
disabled person’s ability to fulfil desires, both in terms of its direct preclusion of some 
desires, and its ability to make other desires require extra effort. The question of normality 
was then addressed, and it was concluded that disability could be defined organically as any 
involuntary state of a person’s biological or psychological self that resulted in detrimental 
effects upon desire fulfilment as compared to other individuals in a similar environment.  
The question of individuals with cognitive impairments and others unconscious of 
their disabled state was then addressed, and, though there has been comparatively little 
written about such individuals, their lives and ability to fulfil desires were examined in detail. 
It was concluded that people who are cognitively impaired should be considered as 
temporally impaired, and thus possessing the status of children when the definition was used 
to consider the fulfilment of their desires.  
The desire based definition was then used to address several issues common to the 
practical experience of disability including accessibility: the use of environmental adaptations 
and non-human aids for the fulfilment of desires, human or animal assistance, and the 
problems inherent in the power relations between disabled and non-disabled individuals. The 
question of when desires could legitimately be modified to make their fulfilment possible 
under the conditions of disability was then also considered, which led finally into a 
discussion of social attitudes to disabled people;since, though according to the desire based 
definition disability was not identical with such attitudes, it could be heavily affected by 
them.  
Some recommendations for the consideration and conduct of disabled and non-
disabled individuals were suggested. These began with a discussion of a disabled individual’s 
need to develop competency in dealing with their disability, and a corresponding problem of 
society’s insistence upon perceiving disabled individuals as intrinsically different beings. It 
was suggested that the possible establishment of independent adjudication, in cases where the 
assessment of a disabled individual’s capabilities was subject to bias, would help to alleviate 
this damaging social perception.  
Finally, it was affirmed that disability, though a negative state, was not an uncommon 
one; it constituted a basic relationship between a person’s involuntary physical or 
psychological makeup, their desires and the world, and one which most people would at some 
time experience. Thus it was recommended that the concept of disability needs to be 
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considered as no longer a specialist one, but one that should be part of our usual, everyday 
relations to our environment, our desires and their fulfilment. 
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Chapter 1: Defining disability with respect to quality of life 
 
Introduction 
 
Before the 1970's, what constituted disability was held to be a comparatively simple 
matter. If a person had an illness or injury such that they lost the ability to see, hear, move 
freely, etc., they were disabled. What form the disability took, and what individual words 
were used to describe it were simply a matter of semantic difference and medical 
convenience, describing symptoms of a disease or injury, the way that infections of the liver, 
kidneys or other bodily organs, though requiring slightly different treatments, were all 
essentially similar in that they were all categorized as forms of infection. Indeed, as Swain 
argues, medical definitions of this time were rarely concerned with the effects of symptoms, 
merely that the symptoms existed.1 Thus, you could measure a person’s “remaining vision” 
but such a measurement was held to be simply a statistic revealing how damaged a person’s 
visual organs were. It made as little sense to ask why the nature of this damage, i.e. “being 
blind”, was a bad thing, as it would be to ask why the symptom of physical pain produced by 
an organ infection was a bad thing.  
 
When such "defects" could not themselves be corrected medically, the recommended 
(and often followed) course of action in dealing with people so injured was held to be 
medical care. A person with such a condition could not live “normally" in society, so needed 
to exist in an environment where their condition could be "cared for", either at home or in 
state-run institutions. “Disability” therefore differed comparatively little from any other long 
lasting, incurable medical condition such as cancer, and required a similar answer.  
 
Then, in the 1970's and 80's, various academics, particularly sociologists, began to 
take exception to this view.2 They argued that just as prejudices, such as racism or sexism, 
were based upon a "normal" ideal that being of a certain race or gender was automatically 
better, more normal and more desirable, the medical idea that being "disabled" equated 
automatically to an obviously bad medical symptom was a form of "ableism”. The social 
model, as this became known, is founded upon the idea that the problems experienced by a 
person who is diagnosed as disabled, are in fact simply imposed by the prejudicial beliefs and 
social practices of the able bodied majority. People with hearing impairments for instance, as 
Silvers mentions, only experience difficulties in communicating because the majority of 
people communicate aurally, rather than visually.3 
                                                          
1 John Swain, Sally French and Colin Cameron, “Chapter 1: What’s in a Name?” Controversial Issues in a 
Disabling Society, (Buckingham: Open University Press, 2003). 
2 Ibid, “Introduction”. 
 Also: John Harris “Is There a Coherent Social Conception of Disability?” Journal of Medical Ethics, vol. 26, 
(2000), pp 95-100. 
3 Anita Silvers, “Judgement and Justice: Evaluating Health Care for Chronically Ill and Disabled Patients”, The 
Blackwell Guide to Medical Ethics, ed. Rosamond Rhodes, Leslie P. Francis and Anita Silvers, (Maldan, MA: 
Blackwell, 2007), pp 354-373. 
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This model’s chief focus, as Swain notes, is therefore how the non-disabled 
population interact with groups of people who are characterized as disabled, on a political, 
individual, and cultural level. It is therefore unsurprising that many of the advocates and 
writers in the social model are disabled themselves, and often seek to articulate their 
experience of "participating in" the cultural identity of a disabled group, and clarify to the 
non-disabled majority how the experience of those possessing that identity can be improved.  
 
Having lived with visual disability myself, I do have sympathy for this project. On a 
level of daily experience, it is certainly true that people make assumptions and judgements 
about me, my capabilities, preferences or desires because it is perceived that I am “blind” 
with no other data: this is a prejudice in the most literal sense, i.e. a pre-judgement, and it is 
certainly true that the nature of this pre-judgement has caused me to directly experience 
exclusion, ignorance, cruelty and other forms of harm.  
 
Equally, however, it does not seem I can automatically lay all the experiences I have 
related to blindness solely at the door of my interactions with society, nor is it frequently 
possible, when comparing my experience to those of other blind people, to say that I am 
"participating in" any kind of group identity or shared culture; indeed, often my experiences 
are as naturally different from those of other blind people as they would be from those of any 
other unique individual.  
 
For instance, if, while writing this chapter, I desired a glass of water, I need to first 
locate the glass using tactile scanning and (if close enough) my remaining vision, then walk 
to the tap, maintaining the memory of my current environment and any possible obstacles I 
might encounter in the way, then fill the glass from the tap, with my finger over the edge to 
prevent the water overflowing. A person with normal vision could accomplish this task far 
more easily than I can, not requiring either use of memory or concentration with their direct 
visual perception of the world, however it certainly doesn't seem correct that this disparity in 
accomplishment is the fault of society, or a part of a larger group identity, since the only 
person currently in control of my environment is myself, the only person with the desire for a 
glass of water is myself, and the only person involved in the difficulties fulfilling that desire 
is myself. Indeed, other blind people may follow significantly different practices in attaining 
this desire, for instance relying upon another person’s assistance, or using electronic liquid 
indicating devices or tactile markers, and may be more or less successful in fulfilling all the 
components of this desire than I am, purely as a matter of their individual circumstances, 
choice and environment. 
 
Just as the social model criticizes the medical model for looking at all disability 
simply through the lens of symptom, illness and cure, I find myself thinking that perhaps the 
social model is guilty of a similar lack of perspective in attempting to characterize and 
encompass all disability relations only by virtue of interactions between specific social 
groups or indeed, with society as a whole.4,5 There is then the related problem of what 
                                                          
4 A similar concern is indeed raised by Chappell, who notes that the majority of commentators in the social 
model are overly occupied with the "body image" of society and the validity, or otherwise, of the experiences of 
those wit physical disabilities, whereas for those with learning disabilities, there is neither a "body image" nor 
an opportunity to articulate their own life experience. I will return to Chappell's thoughts on learning disability 
in the second chapter. 
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precisely links my experiences to those of a deaf person (who would find pouring a glass of 
water as easy as a fully sighted person), or indeed someone with learning disabilities, mental 
illness, or paraplegia, even though we all fall under the broad umbrella categorisation of 
disability.  
 
Much of the literature on this topic does not address these questions directly but 
tacitly assumes that some form of the social model is correct, and spends significant amounts 
of time arguing on its precise nature, or on the nature of those medical classifications of 
disability which led to the formulation of the model in the first place. This is unsurprising 
since a good amount of the literature is written from the point of view of sociologists or 
political activists, who naturally have a vested interest in the interaction between groups of 
people, i.e. disabled and non-disabled, us and them, or “normal” versus “abnormal”.  
 
These views may be of help sociologically or politically, but it is my belief that just as 
a purely medical view of disability, as merely the symptoms of a disease or injury, fails to 
capture the full essence of a disabled person’s experience due to its uniquely medical context, 
the social model fails because of its almost exclusive focus upon social interactions. For this 
reason I believe it is necessary to step back to first and original principles. Rather than 
starting with any existing definitions of disability, or even the theoretical lens of medical or 
legal terminology by which disability should be characterized, I believe it would be most 
helpful to begin from as wide an angle as possible, and, as Socrates might have done, start by 
asking the question of what the word "disability" actually means. From such semantic and 
theoretical concerns, I will attempt to create a workable definition of disability from the 
ground up. After the basic semantic and ethical question is considered, I can then move on to 
address points related to individual experience, social interactions and the nature of the body, 
leading to a consideration of the previous models, but from a viewpoint not committed to 
either. 
 
I hope that such a definition will be able to take into account the medical state of a 
person’s body and its functions, and also the better aspects of the social model, without being 
forced to put all the definitional eggs into one sociological basket. Thus I will attempt to 
create a flexible enough definition that will provide knowledge of how to classify a given 
condition as a disability and identify in what ways such a condition influences the life of 
someone experiencing it. In clarifying these aspects, I believe such a definition can then be 
used to more accurately discuss important concepts like the status of those with learning 
difficulties, accessibility, the nature of human assistants and their relationship to a disabled 
person, and what part social prejudice does in fact play in influencing the lives of disabled 
people even when we assume that the disability itself is not simply identical with such 
prejudices. Therefore, I will first attempt to reach a concrete and useable definition of 
disability, beginning with the uses of the word "disability" and moving on to the basic quality 
of a person’s life, and how disability may be defined with respect to its effects upon that 
quality of life. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
5 Anne Louise Chappell, “Still Out in the Cold: People with Learning Difficulties and the Social Model of 
Disability”, The Disability Reader: Social Science Perspectives, ed. Tom Shakespeare (London: Continuum, 
1998), pp 211-221. 
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In Section A I will discuss disability as a purposive term, and how this relates to the 
common medical understanding of disability as an abnormality which affects our well-being. 
I will contrast the bad effects of disability on well-being with the irreducibly unpleasant 
notion of medical conditions that cause physical pain, and in what ways the notion of 
disability seems to differ from this basic standpoint of harm.  
 
In Section B I will attempt to establish the precise location and scope of the harm 
done to well-being by a disabling condition, whether it is (as contended by theorists in the 
social model) purely a matter of a judgement made of certain individuals by society, rather 
than being integral to a disabled individual’s physical or psychological self, as is commonly 
thought in the medical model. I will attempt to establish a firm grounding for the idea of 
disability, and define what may, or may not, count as disabling. I will then attempt to square 
this with social expectations, and the senses in which disability is involuntary. 
 
In Section C I will discuss the relationship between disability and the desires and 
pleasures of an individual, and introduce the notion of capacities for well-being.  
 
In Section D I will consider the relationship between disability, effort and time, and 
how the effects of disability may alter on a daily basis, and how in turn this affects a person’s 
general well-being. 
 
In Section E I will consider the notion of “normal” as a contrast to the notion of 
“disabled” and attempt thus to re-introduce a standard of normality which is compatible with 
the capacities for well-being approach I am following here. 
 
Finally, in Section F I will use the tools I develop throughout the first five sections to 
formulate a definition of disability that may be of use in practical and ethical debate. 
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Section A: Purpose and the common medical understanding of disability 
In its conventional linguistic sense, the term “disabled” seems to apply in just as 
straightforward a fashion to a group of humans as it would to any other objects, namely the 
frustration of some part of their “normal” functioning or purpose. In a computer program for 
example, a certain part of the program may be disabled which will interfere with the 
“normal” task the program is being asked to perform, and the program would generate an 
error message as a reasonable explanation as to why the task could not be performed, for 
example an E-mail client might say, “Could not download messages, internet connection 
disabled”. We accept such explanations mean that some part of the usual, causal chain of 
events that leads from the user of the program giving an instruction, to that instruction being 
carried out, has failed in some way because one or more processes necessary to carrying out 
that instruction could not be followed through, and thus the entire function is frustrated, and 
the program is not fulfilling its purpose. In all other respects, the E-mail client might work 
quite correctly, be able to display text and pictures, format E-mails, etc., however with the 
connection to the internet “disabled” the basic purpose of the program, to send and receive E-
mail messages, is no longer fulfilled. 
 
This relation to function or purpose is made even clearer when we consider, in 
contrast to disability, the word “ability”: if a thing, person or object is “able” i.e. has the 
ability to fulfil a specific function, we can assume that, other than by the intervention of 
external agencies, that function will be fulfilled, for example if it is claimed that a train is 
able (has the ability) to arrive at the station at a certain time, we would expect it to do so. In 
cases where an object does not have the ability to fulfil its purpose, we usually will require 
some explanation of either an external or internal cause as to why said purpose was not 
achieved. So in the case of the train, it might not have been able to reach the station at five 
o’clock because the tracks were damaged (an external cause), or because its electric generator 
was broken (an internal cause).  
 
The relationship between purpose and disability or ability also holds in statements 
about human intentions, such as, “I am able to meet the train at five,” and once again, if I fail 
to achieve this purpose, it would be reasonable to ask for some sort of explanation as to what 
occurred in the causal chain of events between my having the intention to meet the train, and 
my failure to arrive at the station at five o'clock.  
 
Fundamentally then, disability in this broad, conceptual sense includes the idea of 
enacting a purpose, fulfilling a function, or working towards a goal. This seems all very well 
when applied to manufactured or specifically designed objects such as computer programs, 
trains, or even human intentions to act. Such a created object is by virtue of it being the 
intentional work of its creator, designed to fulfil some kind of purpose, for example 
downloading and displaying E-mails in the case of an E-mail client, or travelling between 
stations in the case of a train.  
 
It is therefore very easy to determine when such a designed and created object, is, or 
is not,  fulfilling its purpose, by examining the initial intentions of the designer, and 
comparing the performance of the object, and the state of affairs caused by it, to the results its 
designer was intending, i.e. the purpose for which it was designed. Likewise, a human 
intention is said to be fulfilled only to the degree that the outcome of events matches the 
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original intent.6,7 If some aspect of the created object is “disabled” it’s entirely possible that 
its purpose will be only partially achieved, or not achieved at all, and we accept the disability 
of whatever aspect of the object is involved as a sufficient reason for this lack in achieving 
purpose.8 
 
When the term Disability is applied to humans however, it has a slightly different and 
much more wide ranging meaning. It seems that in its conventional use, saying a person is 
“disabled” is saying significantly more than simply identifying one aspect or feature of that 
person which causes them to be unable to fulfil some sort of purpose. Indeed, it has a far 
more judgemental overtone than the basic assessment as to whether a purpose is achieved or 
not.9 For instance, saying, “John could not read a newspaper because he is disabled,” has very 
different resonances to the apparently functionally equivalent statement: “John was unable to 
read a newspaper”, since assessing John as “disabled” implies far more about John’s  life, 
circumstances and abilities than simply whether he was or was not able to read the morning 
news. It is for this reason that Jones observes that when a person is called “disabled” it 
disproportionately alters the amount of praise or blame that person’s actions receive from 
others. 
 
Brisenden also notes the common attitude that frequently mundane actions and facts 
of the lives of disabled people, such as living alone or carrying out housework are taken as 
great achievements, while actual achievements are viewed as being carried out "in spite of”a 
person’s disability. Conversely, as Brisenden continues, in other cases a person’s actions or 
motives are judged more stringently because they are "disabled". Thus the evaluation of a 
person’s actions and their consequences subtly changes far more than a simple statement of 
lack of ability would dictate, whether or not said actions were in fact affected by the 
disability at all (a matter I will return to in Chapter 4).10 
 
                                                          
6 There is of course, a considerable debate among ethicists, outlined by Sumner, Griffin and others, specifically 
related to the desire theory of happiness, as to when, precisely, we can count a particular desire, or even a mere 
intention, as being fulfilled. For the present though, it is sufficient for our purposes to note that the term “able” 
provides a bridge between intention and result, a bridge which if cast down completely frustrates the whole 
structure of intentional desire fulfilment. The further implications of this debate, and how fulfilling our desires 
relates to the conventional understanding of disability will be discussed in Section C. 
 
7 L W. Sumner, “The Subjectivity of Welfare”, Ethics, vol. 105, no. 4, (1995) pp 764-790. 
Also: J. Griffin, “Chapter 2”, Well-being, (Clarendon Press, 1986).  
8Of course the terms “disability” and not being able (inability), have slightly different uses, since the term 
disability is intrinsic to the object or person, whereas inability may equally be extrinsic, as with the example of 
the train and the damaged tracks, and even in cases where “inability” is used as an intrinsic property of an 
object, its use differs significantly from that of the word “disability”. I will discuss the question of these 
differences further in Section B when I deal with the involuntary nature of disability. 
9  R.B. Jones, “Equality and Disability Symposium: Impairment, Disability and Handicap - Old Fashioned 
Concepts?”, Journal of Medical Ethics, vol. 27, (2001), pp 377-379. 
10  Simon Brisenden, “Independent Living and the Medical Model of Disability”, The Disability Reader: Social 
Science Perspectives, ed. Tom Shakespeare, (London: Continuum, 1998), pp 20-27. 
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This disparity in “disability” in its purely definitional sense, and “disability” in terms 
of its social and judgemental usage, is the reason many theorists, such as Shakespeare and 
Culver, make a distinction between "disability" covering group identity and social attitude, 
and impairment, i.e. what a disabled person can or cannot do.11  Here, however, I am 
concerned with the definition of disability itself, and will thus only use "impairment" as a 
purely descriptive term when discussing specific conditions of a person’s body or mind 
which are conventionally thought of as disabilities, such as physical, cognitive, visual or 
auditory impairments.  
 
So, this inequity in usage means any analysis of the term “disability” must by its 
nature be as much experiential as linguistic, since, in its application to humans, “disability” 
has far more categorical power over perceptions, desires and judgements than in the way in 
which it is applied to any created objects. Equally however, it does not seem adequate to say, 
(as theorists in the social model often do), that “disability” in its application to humans is 
only ever a term of social classification, i.e. that all that is being said when a person is 
categorized as “disabled” is that they belong to a certain predefined social group. As noted in 
the introduction to this paper, the experience of living with a disability is far more than just 
its social ramifications, and the implications and nuances of the word are far broader and 
more consequential than just its judgemental overtones within society. 
 
 This means any attempt to provide a usable definition of disability must be as much 
phenomenological and rooted in personal perception, as in purely linguistic analysis, in the 
same way gendered terms such as “female” or “male” could not be adequately analysed from 
only one context, e.g. just their biological differences divorced from their social or cultural 
influence, or just their social construction and impact separated from their concrete 
embodiment within physical bodily experience.  
 
Despite these other concerns however, statements of human disability, as well as 
whatever other judgemental overtones they may have, are still heavily attached to notions of 
purposive action and intention. I will return to the judgemental aspects of disability when 
discussing the assumptions of the social model, but for now it is simply necessary to note the 
difference in tone of the term "disabled" when it is applied to humans as compared to when it 
is applied to inanimate objects designed for a specific purpose. 
 
Of course, in the case of humans, defining any overall sense of purpose at all seems a 
much more difficult task than simply referring back to the intentions of a designer as in the 
case of a created object. In fact finding an over-arching purpose for human lives is a task 
which has occupied philosophy for over 2000 years. I will assume here, that the question of 
overall human purpose is related to living something of a good life, or, as Aristotle put it, 
eudaimonia, rather than for some other, more external idea of human purpose, such as a 
Kantian notion of exemplifying the good, or the Christian view of living life according to the 
will of God, though arguably both of those conceptions may also reduce to recommendations 
                                                          
11  Tom Shakespeare, “Chapter 1”, The Disability Reader: Social Science Perspectives, (London: Continuum, 
1998). 
Also: Charles M. Culver and Bernard Gert, Philosophy in Medicine, (Oxford University Press, 1982). 
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for some form of eudaimonia, even if a different form from Aristotle’s.  
 
In some traditions, such as that of existentialism, the question of human purpose is 
entirely left up to each individual human to define for himself/herself, whereas other writers, 
such as Alasdair MacIntyre, follow Aristotle in recommending that we each perfect certain 
virtues or excellences in our lives.12  It seems, however, that “disability” in its basic use 
automatically impacts upon a notion of a purpose that is more bound up with day to day life, 
and less of an overarching goal to aspire to, since when a person experiences disability it is 
the immediate problems of day to day living and relating to others that are most evident, not 
establishing a general plan or over-arching ethical goal for living. After all, if a person 
experiences paraplegia and cannot enact basic day to day tasks, such as dressing themselves 
or shopping, questions of human purpose will, by their nature, need to be second order 
questions. Similarly, if a person is unable to do something due to their disability and a basic 
biological restriction (a topic I will return to later) all the speculation of human self 
authenticity or virtue identification will not change that essential fact, e.g. however much a 
person with quadriplegia may wish to exemplify the virtue of bravery, they will still have 
severe trouble getting dressed in the morning, problems which any definition of their 
disability must address if it is to be of any use in quantifying and clarifying the experiences of 
those we already call “disabled” as well as letting us discuss disabilities more sensitively in 
the future. Of course, a person with quadriplegia (or a person with any disability), is quite 
free to personally pursue any conception of the good, or other life goal they may wish, 
however such a goal would be independent of their disability, not predetermined because of 
it, i.e. “Disability” is a state of a person they must deal with, not an intrinsic way of being. 
The modern tendency of certain agencies and institutions to describe a person with a 
disability as “challenged” in some way, e.g. describing a blind person as “visually 
challenged”, is perhaps a crude and somewhat facile way of recognizing this fact: that 
disability is something to be confronted by each individual or group of individuals with a 
similar disability, rather than a condemnation to reduced circumstances. So “disabled people” 
are more like soldiers than slaves, i.e. disability presents a set of unpleasant and difficult 
problems in life which a disabled person must deal with aside from all other parts of life, 
rather than having their purpose, identity and social status defined only by their capacity to 
endure a thankless set of tasks for which there is no reward. Therefore, though I will touch 
upon some more complete and general notions of overall purpose connected with disability 
later, to begin with I wish to focus on the most common definition of human purpose, and 
that which our conventional understanding of disability appears to most closely relate to: the 
notion of well-being or happiness.  
 
I will further assume here, with James Griffin, that “well-being,” in  part or in whole 
(at least as far as it relates to disability), involves the satisfaction of some  form of rationally 
attained, compatible, human desires or pursuit of goals, freely and independently determined 
by each individual.13 Though Griffin never exclusively addresses the question of disability, 
his understanding of rationally attained desires, the need to alter desires according to 
circumstances, and the necessity of individuals to have the freedom to determine their lives’ 
                                                          
12 Alasdair MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues, (Chicago: Open 
Court, 1999). 
13 J. Griffin. 
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paths for themselves, are all factors which seem to me central to the phenomenal experience, 
as well as the conceptual understanding of disability, whether in the harm caused by  
unsatisfied desires,  suffering of pain or other unpleasant states, or the need to rationally 
understand a person’s own circumstances and limitations and perhaps alter their desires 
accordingly. Griffin’s account also gives an emphasis to freedom and need for a person to 
determine their own desires through both emotional perception and rational judgement, which 
thus goes further than an account of basic desire satisfaction and also makes it a useful 
framework upon which to discuss disability and the ways in which it may affect a person’s 
life. 
 
While I will discuss the specific elements of desire satisfaction and their relevance to 
disability further in this thesis, it is worth noting, even here at the outset, that when I speak of 
happiness or well-being in connection with a human life, it is Griffin’s complex, layered 
account of happiness related to desire satisfaction that I expressly have in mind. 
 
As Clouser argues, since in the medical model disability involves the lack of, or 
malfunction of, some capacity or sense which “normal” humans possess as a matter of 
course, it directly interferes with our quality of life by impacting on either, A, our freedom or, 
B, our capacities for pleasure.14 Though accounts in philosophy would give different 
emphasis to both of these factors with respect to well-being in general, existentialist accounts, 
for example, placing greater value on freedom, while hedonistic accounts more clearly 
emphasise pleasure, both would agree that curtailing or impairing either of these factors in a 
human life would in some way automatically detract from its overall achievement of well-
being.  
 
On a basic logical understanding, this seems reasonable. A totally deaf person is 
denied both the freedom to, and pleasure of, enjoying Mozart, options for both freedom and 
pleasure which they would have open to them were they not deaf. Though there are 
undoubtedly people of “normal” hearing who may not have these options, perhaps someone 
who has never been properly introduced to Mozart, the totally deaf person is at a 
disadvantage even in this respect, because while the opportunity is always there for a person 
with “normal” hearing to listen to, and develop an enjoyment of Mozart, the completely deaf 
person is simply biologically unable to, just as it is biologically impossible for humans to 
have the ability (as Thomas Nagel famously remarks), to either understand or enjoy the sonar 
location senses of a bat.15 
 
The totally deaf individual, like Nagel with his understanding of a bat’s sonar sense, 
might very well understand the scientific properties of sound. They might know how waves 
of vibrating air molecules at different frequencies set up sympathetic vibrations in the ear 
drum which are then transmitted by electro-chemical impulses along the auditory nerve to be 
decoded in the auditory centres of the brain, but they have no ability, when compared to 
“normal” humans either to experience, or to enjoy anything related to sound on a 
                                                          
14 K. Danner Clouser, Charles M. Culver and Bernard Gert, “Malady: A New Treatment of Disease”, Hastings 
Centre Report, vol. 11, no. 3, (1981), pp 29-37. 
15  Thomas Nagel, “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?”, In The Mind’s I: Fantasies and Reflections on self and Soul, 
ed. D. Hofstadter, (1981), pp 391-414. 
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phenomenological level, they could not for example describe a sound as “soft” or “sharp” 
with any experiential surety.16, 17  Similar arguments may be made in cases of blindness, lack 
of senses of smell or taste, deadening of nerves, and paraplegia or quadriplegia with relation 
to the choice and ability to experience (and presumably enjoy) freedom of movement and the 
activities associated with it, such as running on two feet.  
 
Clouser therefore categorizes any sort of medical condition or other circumstance 
which causes these states as a malady, i.e. a source of suffering.18 By extension therefore, it 
follows that, if the purpose of life is tied to a notion of well-being or happiness, the 
“disability” must, to a lesser or greater extent, logically frustrate or diminish that purpose in 
the lives of disabled individuals as compared to the non-disabled, by decreasing the amount 
of freedom or pleasure they have access to in their lives, and thus decreasing their overall 
possible capacities for well-being. Therefore, disabled individuals might be thought of as 
suffering a similar fate to the victims of a robbery, who are no longer able to gain enjoyment 
from what was stolen from them, or even (in the case of those born with a disability), have 
the opportunity to develop such an enjoyment in the first place. 
 
Clouser’s understanding of disability is a structured statement of what other writers 
have named the medical model, since it is the understanding of disability conventionally used 
and practiced by doctors, nurses and other medical professionals. This model uses a variety of 
clinical and often statistical tests to determine whether or not an individual is or is not 
disabled, for example, visual field and distance perception tests are used to decide whether an 
individual is legally blind: defined as having a distance perception of less than 20 feet, or a 
central visual field of less than twenty degrees in optimal visibility conditions. The idea that 
disability in any way causes suffering however, is usually a tacit assumption in medical 
circles made without express reference to a person’s actual experience of the world, and 
Clouser is one of the few writers who implicitly states why any disabling condition is itself 
(to use Clouser’s phrase) a malady, and thus distinguish a medical condition that causes 
disability from some other statistically abnormal, but essentially harmless one, such as being 
born with a heart on the right side of the chest. In the medical model, a person is said to be 
disabled when they perform abnormally on various medical tests (having less than 20 feet or 
20 degrees of vision for example), and this abnormality at the same time directly causes a 
drop in their quality of life.  
                                                          
16 Tom Koch disagrees with this view on the basis that a deaf person can appreciate music via vibrations; 
however this would seem more to be a different method of appreciating music, similar to a blind person 
appreciating a statue by touch. It cannot be denied however, that even though a blind person may appreciate the 
feel of a statue, elements of its perspective, stature, colouring and contextual effect within its setting cannot be 
freely appreciated, a deaf person is similarly lacking the freedom to appreciate most aspects of music, while a 
person with normal sight and hearing is still free to appreciate both the tactile qualities of a statue and of music, 
a fact supported by the popularity of subwoofer amplifiers among those with normal hearing and their 
placement on the floors of buildings precisely so that vibrations can be transmitted through the floor and felt as 
the music is heard. 
 
17 Thomas Koch, “The Ideology of Normalcy: the Ethics of Difference”, Journal of Disability Policy Studies, 
vol. 16,(Fall 2005), pp 123-129. 
18 K. Danner Clouser, Charles M. Culver and Bernard Gert. 
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A similar definition to this one is presented by Wakefield in his discussion of illness 
as harmful dysfunction.19 Wakefield however, rather categorically dismisses disability simply 
as being that category of illness which impacts the body’s function so as to cause a sensory or 
motor impairment, i.e. when a body’s sensory system is affected in such a way as to preclude 
its “evolved function”.  He therefore relegates disability to only a comparatively small subset 
of what medical professionals deal with. I will return to the question of disability and illness 
later when discussing the question of pain, however it is interesting that Wakefield seems to 
assume that disability must only relate to some form of dysfunction of the sensory organs, 
and utterly misses the idea that a person with mental illness or muscle wastage might be 
disabled, (or indeed the idea that sensory impairments may have other effects upon life than 
just the reduction of perception). This narrowing of the use of the term “disability” to just 
cover sensory impairments, clashes significantly with the effects of certain conditions we 
normally consider to be  disabilities, especially those associated with fatigue or extra effort (a 
topic I will return to later). In general, it often seems that Wakefield is attempting to use the 
concept of illness to cover ground which our usual linguistic and purposive understanding 
would suggest should belong to disability, by  assigning the “decrease in function” to the 
term “illness”, rather than “disability”, thus categorizing someone with a muscle wasting 
disease as “ill” rather than “disabled”. 
 
Unless one accepts the evolutionary explanation of function which Wakefield and 
certain other writers adhere to, illness is not a purposive term, and is further a term with only 
tangential bearing upon desire fulfilment, since, saying a person is “ill” only implies that their 
desires are in some way frustrated in their fulfilment, while saying that a person is “disabled” 
directly invokes the concept of purpose and thus relates far more immediately to desire 
fulfilment.  
 
The statement, “John could not read the newspaper because he is ill”, does not imply 
any desire on John’s part to read the newspaper, neither is John’s “illness” a sufficient reason 
for his inability to read the paper; perhaps John was simply feeling under the weather and did 
not wish to burden himself by reading about distressing world events. The substitution of 
“disability”, however, not only automatically implies John’s inability to read the newspaper, 
but also tells us something intrinsic about John’s basic capacities, placing him in a social 
group, as well as giving information about his future prospects of fulfilling his desires.  
 
Therefore, the aspersion that “disability” may be reducible to a small subset of illness 
seems incorrect, since the term “disability” in our common usage fulfils a very different 
theoretical and linguistic function and one which could do with its own separate 
classification: indeed a classification which could assist in the future with definitions of the 
severity and related effects of illnesses, i.e. defining those illnesses which may cause 
disabilities, and those effects of illness which may be disabling, as opposed to say, an illness 
which reduces life span or simply results in an increased risk of developing other ailments.  
 
Though Caroline Whitbeck attempted to  create a desire based definition of illness, 
this largely failed due to the fact that, under our common understanding, a person who cannot 
fulfil desires may not count as ill, after all, desires may be frustrated for many reasons 
                                                          
19 C. Boorse, “Concepts of Health and Disease”, Philosophy of Medicine, ed. F. Gifford, (Elsevier, 2011) pp 13-
64. 
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external to a person’s self quite unrelated to the state of their body or organs.20 
 
While it is beyond the scope of what I am trying to do here to provide a concrete 
definition of illness (see Boorse for many interesting attempts), it is my belief that the effects 
of any given condition of a person’s body or self upon well-being and desire fulfilment is the 
difference between illness and disability, that “disability” is involved with desire fulfilment, 
while “illness” covers a far wider range of human experience.  While it is certainly true that 
an illness may cause a person to become disabled, the term “illness” itself should cover a 
much wider area. For example, it is quite possible to describe The Black Death as “A 
contagious illness that swept across Europe in the fourteenth century”, without any reference 
to symptoms, let alone anything related to well-being or “disability”.  Here, therefore, I will 
restrict myself only to the discussion of “disability”, i.e. conditions that have effects upon 
well-being, and leave the wider definition of illness to others.  
 
Even if we remove illness from the discussion and work with Clouser’s simpler 
version of the medical model, that considers “disability” only as a “malady”, i.e. a 
statistically abnormal condition that causes suffering, we still run  into some basic problems 
with this approach.21 
 
The first question we may ask relates to this notion of statistically “normal” 
individuals. While we are quite aware that there are some abilities, such as possessing a bat’s 
sonar sense, which are (outside the minds of science fiction writers), not in the least 
accessible to members of the species Homo Sapiens, even in terms of what is available to 
“normal” humans, it does not seem that the definition of “normal” versus “abnormal” can be 
so rigidly or clearly adhered to with respect to our pleasures and well-being, particularly 
when we factor in notions of suffering. 
 
In purely medical terms, “normal” refers to a basic, statistical average, usually 
established by such procedures as a standard deviation test carried out on a given sample of 
humans in a population, and then inductively assumed to be true for that entire population. 
Thus, if 80% of a given sample have characteristic X, it is inductively assumed that 80% of 
the population will also possess characteristic X, and therefore characteristic X is, for that 
population, “the norm”. In purely scientific terms such a process makes sense, and is no 
different from claiming, for example that Grey squirrels are now more common in the British 
countryside than red squirrels, simply taking a small sample of individuals and then assuming 
the distribution of characteristics in that sample are the same for a given population. 
Whatever scientific sense it makes however, we have to ask why these statistically average 
characteristics make up such an ideal moral guideline by which to say what is, and what is 
not, constitutive of “normal” capacities for well-being, especially since many of these 
characteristics may be utterly divorced from our understanding of desire fulfilment or 
happiness.   Indeed it is significant that in much of the literature on “illness” what Wakefield 
refers to as “harmful dysfunction” is  categorized more as a matter of dysfunction, i.e. 
deviation from some sort of medical standard that may, or may not, be actually experienced, 
rather than being harmful, for instance, an organ may be diseased and thus experience a “lack 
                                                          
20 Ibid. 
21 K. Danner Clouser, Charles M. Culver and Bernard Gert. 
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in functioning, however what effects this lack in functioning may have on a person’s life may 
not be either apparent, or even identifiable, without some more direct symptoms of suffering 
as a related experience. Frequently Wakefield uses “chances of reduced life span” as a 
qualifier for reductions in functioning, even though such judgements would not be apparent 
until after a person’s life has finished. Much of the literature on illness labours to decide 
whether benign tumours, or mild, age related sclerosis are in fact forms of illness or not. This 
is one reason I believe extending the concept of disability to cover those consequences of 
illness that may be characterized as affecting human well-being and desire may be an 
advantage in medical and social discourse. 
 
As J.R. Lucas has noted, all humans are not equal with respect to their capacities for 
pleasure, the objects they gain pleasure from, and their freedom to do so.22  The average I.Q. 
for example is held to be 100, i.e., this is the I.Q. which most closely resembles the scores 
held by the majority of the population.23 Currently, a person is only held to be mentally 
disabled if their I.Q. is under 80. It would seem however, that given that there are some 
individuals with much higher I.Q. scores than 100, why should the fact that there are simply 
more people with an I.Q. of 100 than an I.Q. of under 80, make it legitimate to classify those 
with an I.Q. of 80 as being disabled and thus suffering? After all, those with an I.Q. of 100 
could be said to be suffering from the point of view of someone with an I.Q. of 120, though 
they are not classified as such simply because they are more numerous.  
 
Why, therefore, should simply being more common in any given population make a 
characteristic “normal” and thus a legitimate way of evaluating the capacity for well-being 
obtained from the possession of that characteristic? After all, if a person were to receive some 
sort of brain injury which lowered their I.Q. from 120 to 100, they would seem to have some 
justification in claiming that they have had something taken from them, even though from the 
medical perspective they have only become average rather than (in definitions such as 
Clouser’s), actually disabled. 
 
This question of statistical norms forming a legitimate evaluative basis for well-being 
is one of the underlying problems with the medical perspective which has motivated the 
formulation of the opposing social model of disability, which states (as Jones notes) that 
while individuals might be said to be impaired in some way, i.e. being blind, deaf, etc., the 
actual “disability”, i.e. harmful consequence of any particular condition, is entirely a result of 
the majority’s notion of “normal” and the prevailing social practices and prejudices which 
result from that majority view.24 
 
                                                          
22 J.R. Lucas, “Against Equality”, Philosophy, vol. 40, no. 154, (Cambridge University Press, Oct. 1965), pp 
296-307. 
23 For the sake of simplicity, I use I.Q. here as a proportional indicator of possible well-being, since it is both 
easily measureable, and has a well known average score, whereas other factors involved in disability, though 
still to some extent varying throughout a population do not have as quick and simple a measureable, salient 
characteristic. The actual relationship between general intelligence and well-being however is a much more 
complex matter, and one I will return to when I discuss the difference between conscious and unconscious 
disabilities in Chapter 2. 
 
24 R.B. Jones.  
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In addition to considerations about the distribution of characteristics in a population, 
issues may arise when considering the nature and effect of the various medical conditions 
themselves on people’s well-being. There may be conditions which have complex, 
discernible effects upon our well-being, either positive or negative, that are statistically 
abnormal, but due to not being universally negative are not clearly disabilities even though 
the negativity may be just as profound as with a disabling condition. Take, for example, 
synaesthesia, a condition which affects 10% of the population according to studies carried out 
by J. Gray.25 A person with synaesthesia experiences one sensory modality in terms of 
another, thus, for example, when hearing a sound, a synaesthete might have an experience of 
colour (coloured hearing is the most common form of synaesthesia). In other cases a 
synaesthete may experience other senses in terms of smell, tactile sensation or even taste. 
According to purely statistical analyses, synaesthesia is not “normal” since it obviously does 
not affect a large percentage of the population, and in fact certain writers such as Richard 
Gray believe it to be a mental dysfunction, since it has been shown in experimental studies to 
slow down the synaesthete’s reactions and abilities to recognize certain objects or written 
words.26 
 
Ramachandran also reports some common characteristics of synaesthesia which affect 
a person’s enjoyment or suffering in life directly, including a dislike of certain sensory 
stimuli, such as specific noises or tones, due to the way they appear to a synaesthete in his or 
her experience of them in another sensory modality.27  One case, for example, involved a man 
with taste synaesthesia, who found certain words or phrases made him feel nauseous, 
particularly when in situations where his usual senses of smell or taste were required (as 
when eating a meal). It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that when this individual from 
Ramachandran’s study was at a restaurant, his synaesthesia would preclude him from gaining 
as much enjoyment from the experience as an average non-synaesthete. 
 
Synaesthesia is not however counted as a disability, despite the fact that it is 
statistically abnormal and has a definite and profound effect upon the synaesthete’s life, 
causing the synaesthete to enjoy, or find unpleasant, a wide range of experiences. 
Synaesthesia is obviously highly individualized and what is unpleasant to one synaesthete 
may be pleasant to another, however, in cases where bad effects from the synaesthesia occur, 
it does seem to follow all the standard hallmarks of a medical disability (or indeed an illness), 
since it is both statistically abnormal and has a detrimental effect on the quality of life of the 
individual who has it. Statistical significance, or lack of, therefore seems to need to be tied 
implicitly to a notion of well-being, or how the “abnormal” condition has a noticeable effect 
upon the life of the person suffering it, however such accounts are rarely, if ever, found in 
medical discussions of disability, indeed commentators like Wakefield and Boorse simply 
                                                          
25J. Gray et al., “Implications of Synaesthesia for Functionalism: Theory and Experiment”, Journal of 
Consciousness Studies, vol. 9, no. 12, (2002), pp 5-31. 
26  Richard Gray, “What Synaesthesia Tells Us About Functionalism”, Journal of Consciousness Studies, vol. 
11, no. 9, (2004), pp 64-69. 
27 V.S. Ramachandran and E.M. Hubbard. “The Phenomenology of Synaesthesia”, Journal of Consciousness 
Studies, vol. 10, no. 8, (2003), pp 49-57. 
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dismiss the idea as that subset of illness which causes sensory or motor impairments.28,29 
 
A further problem with the medical model and its assessment of the “normality” of 
certain conditions, as noted by Culver and Gert, is the fact that its classification of some 
conditions as disabling, particularly mental illness, has a basically subjective, and indeed 
somewhat cyclic quality.30 Medically, a condition such as depression or paranoia is deemed 
disabling if it interferes with the “normal” functioning of a person. However, a certain 
amount of depression or fear is “normal” in experience of life. Medically therefore, such a 
condition is only counted as “clinical”, and therefore a disability, when it either seriously 
affects a person’s physical health, as in the case of anorexia, or their “normal” everyday 
functioning on a more general lifestyle based level.31 
 
Even leaving aside the well known problem associated with the subjectivity of the 
diagnosing clinician in deciding whether her or his patient is functioning “normally” or is 
disabled, a further and more serious problem occurs when considering the criteria used to 
classify conditions such as depression as disabling in the first place, the problem of 
independent reference. As has been stated, in the medical model a condition is defined as “a 
disability” when it is statistically abnormal, and causes some sort of unusual amount of 
suffering. Given that anyone’s life thought of in general terms will logically contain a certain 
amount of fear, depression, frustration, unfulfilled desires and other forms of mental or 
emotional suffering, beyond what point precisely can it be said that this suffering, even when 
apparently associated with a medical condition becomes such that it counts as a “disability", 
and therefore abnormal?  
 
The usual medical practice, and that often adhered to in governmental legislation, is to 
set up some sort of average standard and assess whether a condition is disabling based upon 
this. This is often done with a crude tick box system, i.e. can an individual dress himself or 
herself, commute to work, cook a meal, drive a car, etc.? Thus when individuals were 
campaigning to have a condition such as M.E. (Chronic Fatigue Syndrome) classified as a 
disability, i.e. a condition which interferes with normal functioning, their only recourse was 
to detail the ways in which living with such a condition interferes with their functioning, and 
hope that the assessing authorities deem this to be abnormal, which is of course based upon 
the assessor’s notion of what “normal” functioning is with respect to those activities, a fact 
which could be open to subjective or cultural bias. For example, a person with M.E. may be 
able to get out of bed, dress themselves and travel to work, but only after sleeping for 16 
hours a day and doing nothing else with their time. 
 
As J.R. Lucas notes, a condition such as chronic ugliness may have profound effects 
on a person’s life, her or his interactions with others and inter-personal relationships, 
                                                          
28J. Wakefield, “Disabilty and Diagnosis: should role impairment be eliminated from DSM/ICD diagnostic 
criteria?”, World Psychiatry, vol.8, no. 2 (2009), pp 87-88 
. 
29 C. Boorse.  
 
30  Charles M. Culver and Bernard Gert.  
31 Stephen Tyreman, “It’s Illness, but is it Mental Disorder?”, Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology, vol. 14, 
no. 2,  (June 2007), pp 103-106. 
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especially compared to the point of view of someone with film star good looks.32 When 
however, does a condition such as ugliness, depression, fatigue, anxiety or lack of 
intelligence count as disabling, as opposed to “normally” dysfunctional? As Jo Wolf notes, 
this very logic has been used by plastic surgeons to justify their occupation as a legitimate 
medical practice relieving a genuine life problem on a par with more conventional surgeons 
performing operations such as hip replacement surgery.33 I will return to further questions of 
this sort in Section D when discussing disability and effort. 
 
Such subjective medical judgements are only further complicated by the fact that the 
effects of some conditions are difficult to classify as entirely positive or negative. In the case 
of synaesthesia for example, defining whether its effects are good or bad seems a highly 
complex matter, since Ramachandran reports several beneficial aspects to synaesthesia, such 
as improved memory or musical understanding.34 But even with traditional examples of 
conditions labelled as “disability,” though the vast majority of their effects upon the 
individuals involved will be detrimental to their overall happiness, not everything is quite as 
one way as it initially appears. People with a visual impairment, for example, have been 
shown to often possess improved memory, spacial-orientation and increased auditory 
awareness. While it would seem incredibly insensitive to say that these possible benefits 
automatically qualify such conditions as not being in any way disabling, it does present a 
serious issue for attempts to define disability with any precision with respect to quality of life, 
since even the obvious effects seem far more complex in their relations to well-being than 
they might initially appear, thus a basic gross benefit/harm model, without making reference 
to what the harms and benefits actually consist of, will not be of much use in discourse.  
In the medical model as has  been outlined, the basic bad effect proposition for any 
statistically “abnormal” condition also seems problematic in the way that Clouser and others 
have argued, in defining precisely what form is taken by the harm or suffering which befalls 
individuals with disabilities, since “suffering” is such a hard concept to quantify.35 There are 
some medical conditions, such as migraines, and the nausea of the synaesthete in 
Ramachandran’s study, where some physically unpleasant sensation occurs, i.e. the 
experience of pain or discomfort. As Elizabeth Telfer and Derek Parfit note, such basic 
sensations of pain are indeed generally irreducible, and there is little need to enquire why any 
particular individual would wish not to experience such sensations since pain is, by its 
definition, unpleasant and something which individuals would always wish to avoid.36 
Though there are of course cases where people might trade off a certain amount of unpleasant 
sensation for some sort of benefit, such as going through an arduous exercise routine for the 
                                                          
32 J.R. Lucas.  
33 Wolff, Jonathan. “Disability Among Equals”, Disability and Disadvantage, ed. K. Brownlee and A. Cureton, 
(Oxford University Press, 2009), pp 114-137. 
34 V.S. Ramachandran and E.M. Hubbard. 
35  K. Danner Clouser, Charles M. Culver and Bernard Gert. 
36 Elizabeth Telfer, “Chapter 1”, Happiness, (Macmillan, 1980). 
Also: Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons,(Oxford: Clarendon, 1984). 
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purpose of physical activities like playing sport or for increased fitness; such a trade off does 
not seem quite as plausible in cases of medical conditions which cause profound physical 
pain like migraines, since there seems little benefit to be derived from enduring such a 
condition. A moving example of this is the story of Johnny Kennedy, a lifelong sufferer of 
Epidermolysis Bullosa, (E.B.), a hereditary skin condition in which the slightest pressure or 
concussion causes the skin to blister, crack and become damaged, resulting in constant and 
excruciating pain.37 
 
An opposing view of the status of physical suffering is offered by John Ozolins, who 
argues that profound experiences of suffering, such as that of victims of the Shoa (holocaust), 
give people the opportunity to develop very specific forms of courage, fortitude and moral 
virtue, and though certainly not pleasant or even helpful, and undoubtedly always to be 
avoided if possible, are not necessarily always absolutely bad for the individual who 
suffers.38 Though it does seem to be true that individuals, like Johnny Kennedy,  who live 
with profoundly painful medical conditions, have shown this level of outstanding moral 
courage, (indeed Johnny Kennedy’s biography, detailing as it does his ability to gain 
enjoyment out of some aspects of life such as music and natural beauty, despite his constant 
pain, is held up as an  “inspirational story of suffering”) this admiration does not seem in any 
sense a legitimate basis to assess the value of suffering in general, still less the well-being of 
those who live with such suffering or the conditions that cause it. 
 
While there are undoubtedly occasions where “tough love” or “being cruel to be kind” 
i.e. allowing another person to experience (or in certain cases, even causing someone to 
experience) some sort of harm in order that they attain a greater overall benefit might be a 
moral action, to believe that all suffering, and for purposes of the present discussion, 
particularly lives lived under medical conditions which cause extreme physical pain, should 
be treated in this way would seem to make such reasoning as Ozolins’ meaningless, not to 
mention profoundly insensitive to the wishes and feelings of those involved, since though the 
sufferer themselves may personally have derived some insight or benefit from their suffering, 
to claim that such an insight compensates for that suffering (particularly when the claimant 
has not themselves experienced it), seems extremely tactless. It would also seem not to fully 
capture our admiration at those who have gained insights or happiness despite suffering, since 
if the suffering itself is merely reduced to the level of a method to gaining such insights, then 
all the sufferer has done is enacted a course of action working through the necessary steps to 
gain a predetermined goal, rather than gain that goal despite their suffering. Yet, it would 
seem that our intuitions would suggest that someone like Johnny Kennedy who was able to 
achieve a degree of well-being in his life in spite of the intense and constant pain his 
condition caused him, is far more worthy of respect than someone who achieves the same 
level of well-being without such suffering. 
 
So there is little doubt that there are medical conditions such as migraines and E.B. 
involving the experience of physical pain or other unpleasant sensations, which cause the 
individuals who experience them to suffer denigration in their quality of life directly due to 
such irreducibly unpleasant sensations. Needless to say (given that most of us are lucky 
                                                          
37The Boy Whose Skin Fell Off, Channel 4, 25 March 2004, Television. 
38 John Ozolins, “Suffering: Valuable or Just Useless Pain?”, Sophia, vol. 42, no. 2, (2003), pp 53-77. 
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enough to experience lives comparatively free from such levels of pain), they are also 
obviously “abnormal”. 
 
 In the case of a “disabling” condition however, there is usually more involved than 
merely the experiencing of some kind of unpleasant sensation, and even in conditions such as 
E.B., it is not merely the fact that they are painful, even when the pain is long lasting and 
constant, that seems, according to our conventional usage of the term, to qualify them as 
“disabling”. We do not, for example, regard an individual with some temporary painful 
condition which otherwise does not affect their well-being, such as a broken little toe, as 
being temporarily disabled in the same way an individual with a broken ankle would be 
temporarily disabled. 
 
There are also obviously many conditions we do commonly regard as disabilities such 
as visual, auditory or motor impairments, where there may be no directly associated 
unpleasant physical sensation at all, so it is clear that the suffering involved in disability must 
be of a different category than simply the experiential. Conversely however, there are 
conditions regarded as disabilities such as migraines or chronic juvenile arthritis, whose chief 
defining characteristic is pain. In these conditions, it does not merely seem to be the fact that 
the individual experiences pain at intervals which legitimizes them as disabling, but that, as 
with a broken ankle on a temporary basis, the pain affects other aspects of their well-being 
such as their freedom of movement, experiences of pleasure and generally speaking ability to  
fulfil desires. A visually impaired person unable to read a newspaper is not experiencing pain, 
but they are experiencing a lack of freedom and a frustration of one of  their desires, and 
while an arthritic person, who cannot hold a book in his or her hand for long periods without 
experiencing pain, experiences a similar frustration, it is the nature of that desire frustration 
rather than whether such a frustration involves pain that seems to be the defining 
characteristic of conditions that rank as disabilities, a factor I will discuss in more detail in 
Section C.   
 
This distinction between the suffering caused by desire frustration and the suffering 
caused by pain may also be a defining factor in the differences between the scope of the 
terms “disability” and “illness”, given that there are illnesses such as appendicitis which do 
not cause disability directly but may cause pain (though whether the pain might also be 
disabling is a matter I will return to later).  
 
So the essence of what disability is, appears to involve conditions which may be in 
some sense abnormal, though in a fashion which cannot be quantified by a basically 
irreducible tick box system, but more importantly have complex effects upon a person’s well-
being that do not break down simply to irreducibly unpleasant physical sensations of 
suffering, but which may involve such sensations as part of their experience. 
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Section B: The location of the bad effects of disability 
 
As Jones notes, the term “disability” in its standard usage has an implicitly evaluative 
overtone.39 It is not merely a description of an individual’s mental or physical state, even in 
the way that describing a person as being in pain would be. It is, as stated in the previous 
section, a purposive term reflective of how life is lived, and (in Jones’ opinion), a prejudicial 
one, implying that the individual involved is lacking something which most other humans 
possess, and, in the medical model, it is assumed that this lack automatically detracts from the 
quality of life of the disabled individual in some way. More specifically, followers of the 
social model of disability such as Harris or Newell argue that the medical model’s 
categorizations of disabling conditions as automatically causing some sort of lack or 
diminution in the quality of what might otherwise have been “normally” happy lives, is itself 
extremely damaging for individuals who have those conditions.40 Jones argues it is in fact a 
self-fulfilling prophecy that condemns those categorized as disabled to living less happy, 
broken lives, as they will have grown up with and internalized negative beliefs about 
themselves and their abilities to fulfil desires, and attempts to “fix their broken bodies" by 
members of the medical profession, as Shakespeare notes.41,42  Writers working in the social 
model of disability are concerned with how the  deficiencies in the well-being of disabled 
people’s lives are a result of society’s prejudicial beliefs and practices and the disabled 
individual’s own learned beliefs about himself or herself and how these deficiencies may be 
alleviated by altering their beliefs, the perceptions which motivate them and the practices 
which result from them. 
 
Thus, for the advocate of the social model, it is the overall conditions of society and 
its effects upon those categorized as disabled which are the cause of their inability to live an 
eudaimon life as easily as members of the non-disabled population, rather than something in 
the essential nature of the disabled individuals themselves. Several theorists working in the 
social model have noted thought experiments, or real life examples, about particular societies 
in which the effects of certain conditions on the quality of life of individuals who have them 
are reduced or negated altogether. Silvers, for example argues that in a society composed of 
paraplegics, all areas would be ramped, and thus the mobility issues associated with using a 
wheelchair would not occur.43 Similarly, Koch notes the real world example of Martha’s 
Vineyard, an island where 1 in 55 children was born deaf, rather than 1 in 600 as in the 
United States.44 All islanders therefore made extensive use of sign language, thus profoundly 
reducing the communication and isolation issues normally implicit to deafness.  
                                                          
39 R.B Jones.   
40 Christopher Newell, “The Social Nature of Disability, Disease and Genetics: a response to Gillam, Persson, 
Holtug, Draper and Chadwick ”, Journal of Medical Ethics, vol. 25(1999), pp 172-175. 
  Also: John Harris. 
41 R.B Jones.   
42 Tom Shakespeare.  
43Anita Silvers. 
44 Thomas Koch. 
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While both lack of communication and mobility do appear to be things that would 
affect our well-being, establishing a similarity between these two issues under the single 
umbrella of “disability” does not seem quite as straight forward a task as the social theorist 
suggests. Since the experiences of people with different disabilities, for example a deaf 
person and a person with paraplegia, will be different, any accessibility related solutions to 
their respective conditions may be different, even diametrically opposite, such as would occur 
in providing information for both deaf and blind individuals. Yet the social theorist holds 
that, despite an often wildly different nature and effect, all these distinctions are entirely 
caused by, and can be corrected through, changes in social circumstances, and alterations in 
the judgements made about the lives of disabled people by society as a whole, “it is not their 
problem, it’s society’s problem”: this assumption seems extremely strange, after all the fields 
of communication and mobility are vastly different areas of human experience, encompass 
very different activities, and involve very different social conventions and beliefs, since a 
person with paraplegia would have no problem speaking on a telephone and a deaf person 
would have no problem walking up a flight of stairs. 
 
The social model, despite noting that “disabled” is a judgemental and not merely (as 
in the medical model), a descriptive term, does not actually broadly state an overall category 
for the deficiencies of well-being in the lives of disabled people, or how they differ from the 
lives of the non-disabled beyond claiming that those reductions in well-being have their 
source in social prejudice. According to the social model, these perceptions of difference and 
categorization are caused entirely by the attitudes of society and the beliefs in the medical 
model, and the majority of problems a disabled individual may in fact experience are mostly 
the result of these influences, and we should concern ourselves with the causes of the 
problems and not the problems themselves (Swain, Newell and Darke all express highly 
structured formulations of this view).45 
 
Allan Colver in his international study (The SPARCLE Project), a study of the lives 
of children with cerebral palsy, concludes that it is "participation in the environment" which 
is the direct cause of such children’s lack of aneudaimon life.46 Thus it is the environment, on 
a physical, social and personal level which must be altered, not the children’s physical or 
mental capacities themselves other than altering any internalized assumptions the children 
have picked up from that environment. Davis indeed, goes as far as claiming that society has 
an “ablest human paradigm”, i.e. not just an environment, but an entire culture and pattern of 
thought structured around only those with“perfect human bodies”46a. It is also for this reason 
                                                          
45 John Swain, Sally French and Colin Cameron.  
Also: Paul Darke, “Understanding Cinematic Representations of Disability”, The Disability Reader: Social 
Science Perspectives, ed. Tom Shakespeare (London: Continuum, 1998), pp 181-198. 
And: Christopher Newell.  
46 Allan Colver,  SPARCLE – The Study of Participation and Quality of Life of Children with Cerebral Palsy Living in 
Europe, (Funded by European Commission, 2010). 
46aH.J. Eysenck,Race, Intelligence and Education (London: Temple Smith in association with New Society, 
1971). 
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that the social model often draws parallels between disability and other forms of damaging 
social categorization and prejudice such as sexism or racism. However, it seems that the 
effects on well-being involved with disability are significantly different from those of being 
born of a particular racial group or a particular gender, and the types of strategy which both 
disabled and non-disabled individuals must employ in the name of equality are likewise of a 
far different sort. It took a change of law and attitude to alter race segregation on American 
buses in the mid 20th century, whereas allowing a person with paraplegia onto a bus would 
require physically modifying the buses themselves, not just the thoughts of the people who 
ride them and the laws that govern them.47 Indeed, I have experienced this phenomenon 
myself, since even though in this country everyone has the right to vote in an election, the 
government still expects voting to be done in print, a medium that I, as a visually impaired 
person, cannot access. Despite the fact that there is no legal prohibition or other reason that 
stops me from voting, the nature of the physical environment itself and the existing process is 
what is prohibitive, and altering this prohibition would require physical, rather than simply 
legal intervention. 
 
The social model, though also purporting to hold all disabilities under a unique banner 
of segregation, also fails to provide any answers in cases where the disability’s effects on 
well-being are so profoundly personal that claiming any sort of social cause seems absurd, as 
in the case of clinical depression. Though there are undoubtedly allowances society could 
make in terms of work hours and pressure (not to mention an alteration in the negative overall 
judgements made against people with mental illness),48 to reduce the detrimental effects of 
such a condition, the most profound effects will still be completely individualized, often felt 
entirely in private, and will once more be of a very different form from those experienced by 
someone with a physical impairment.49,50 
 
There is thus no information in the social model on defining precisely what the 
detriments to well-being implicit in disability are, even though it is acknowledged that 
categorizing someone as disabled is in fact making an evaluative judgement about their well-
being. As Shakespeare and Barnes note, disabled activists for the social model still discuss 
the more personal, and everyday occurrences of disability and its effects on their lives, “the 
aches and pains and urinary tract infections”, behind closed doors.51 
                                                          
47 Many social model theorists draw analogies between disability and other forms of discrimination such as 
sexism, both Goering and Davis for example, however, while such comparisons are in some cases helpful, often 
I believe relying upon them too much misses fundamental facts about the nature of disability, for reasons I will 
discuss further. 
48 Thomas Szasz, The Myth of Mental Illness: Foundations of a Theory of Personal Conduct, (first published 
1974, republished by Perennial, 2003). 
49 Though a very few writers such as Chappell have discussed learning disabilities on occasion, very little is said 
by those working in the social model about mental illness, indeed, many writers seem to imply that it is another 
area of ethics entirely. In English law under the Disability Discrimination Act, however, mental illness is very 
definitely stated to be a form of disability, a view with which I agree entirely, (see Section D). 
50 Anne Louise Chappell. 
 
51  Colin Barnes, Geoff Mercer, and Tom Shakespeare, Exploring Disability: A Sociological Introduction, 
(Cambridge Polity Press, 1999). 
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Turning to the medical model itself, as noted in Section A, even in more explicit 
writers like Clouser, the specific nature of this lack or deficiency from normality is never 
precisely defined either.52 Though, as noted above, saying someone is “disabled” is held to be 
an evaluative term, it is simply left up to our intuitions precisely why lacking a certain level 
of mobility, hearing, sight or various mental attributes like intelligence is automatically bad 
for us, just as it is irreducibly understandable why physical pain is bad. In medical circles, 
there is little point explaining why it is better to have full 180 degree vision than only 20 
degree vision; this is held to be simply obvious. Just as we would not ask why it is necessary 
to treat a painful infected abscess, we should automatically also attempt to correct any 
disabling condition (a contention which has often been challenged by writers in the social 
model).53 Thus the statistically normal, average or above average on all tests individual, free 
from physical pain is, according to the medical model, a potentially ideal standard of well-
being. Social theorists would again challenge this as simply another prejudice similar to the 
Nazi belief that being part of an “inferior race” produced a worse overall quality of life, and 
indeed several Nazi doctors during the Shoa conducted research supposedly aimed at 
instilling Aryan characteristics in non-Aryan people, though of course not with the view that 
such characteristics would improve the lives of the people who had them. 
 
As noted earlier with relation to the deaf person and Mozart, however, the relationship 
between having a “normally” functional body and well-being does seem to be in some sense 
a legitimate one rather than an artificially created ideal whose effect on well-being is purely 
due to the prejudices of people who possess it, such as the Nazi view of the perfect Aryan. 
Even if this intuition of a perfect standard to which we can compare “disabled” people is 
more than a prejudice, it may however not be quite as clear cut as medical theorists would 
have it. There are several things, even things as integral to our bodies as eyes, ears, and 
nerves, that we may happily do without and yet would not experience any noticeable change 
in our well-being: our appendix (once used to digest cellulose in our evolutionary past but 
now completely dysfunctional), our tonsils, or several pints of blood for example. The 
obvious difference between these items, and our limbs, sensory organs and mental faculties 
seems to be simply one of noticeable effect.  
 
It would be quite possible to have such integral body parts as our appendix or tonsils 
removed secretly without our notice, indeed as shown in Section A, saying how a diseased 
organ which has no effect directly on the person’s actual well-being is a major problem in the 
definition of illness, especially for writers like Wakefield who appeal to “evolutionary 
function” rather than eudaimonia. Were any unnecessary, dysfunctional organ such as the 
tonsils removed, we would only be able to find out about such a lack by having a specialist 
perform some very specific tests such as a C scan for an appendix, or examination with a 
laryngoscope for tonsils. Though obviously there are issues surrounding privacy and bodily 
integrity involved with any sort of surgical procedure, it does not seem reasonable that we 
                                                          
52 K. Danner Clouser, Charles M. Culver and Bernard Gert.  
53 Lynn Gillam, “Prenatal Diagnosis and Discrimination Against the Disabled”, Journal of Medical Ethics, vol. 
25, (1999), pp 163-171. 
54Gerald L. Posner and John Ware,“Mengele: The Complete Story”, New York: McGraw-Hill, (1986). 
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could object to the inadvertent lack of an appendix or tonsils in and of themselves, since there 
are no ways in which they may contribute to our well-being positively, (though they may of 
course have a negative effect by becoming infected). 
 
So the first and most obvious point appears to be that disability must have a 
detrimental and noticeable effect upon our well-being in some way. Like our appendix, 
however, disability appears to be dependent upon intrinsic states of a person’s physical or 
mental self, rather than the actions of others or entirely external states of affairs. If, for 
example, I lose all my money in a robbery, I no longer possess the money, am not free to use 
it in ways that increase my well-being, and may suffer many forms of unpleasantness, such as 
calls by debt collectors. I have been unfortunate and unlucky, but am I disabled?  
 
Though the money was undoubtedly possessed by me, and lacking it causes 
detrimental effects on my well-being, the money itself was not in any sense integral to my 
physical or mental self. Even if it was my entire life savings that were stolen, and lacking 
them will have a profound effect upon my life, it still does not appear appropriate to say I 
have been rendered “disabled”.If however the burglars, for some reason of their own, rather 
than stealing my money stole some part of my body, for example a hand or eye, I would then 
have been disabled since what was taken was intrinsic to myself.  
 
On the other hand though, there do seem to be parts of myself which, though solely 
and uniquely mine and not able to be stolen separately like money or possessions, relate 
exclusively to the judgements and interactions of others: my hair or eye colour, how 
physically attractive I may appear, what accent I speak with, even, to a considerable extent, 
what racial group I belong to. Though all of these characteristics are as fundamentally 
intrinsic to myself as sight, hearing, etc, their relationship to myself, my abilities and my 
perception by others in society at large, seem rather different than the more basic relationship 
of having two hands, two eyes, two legs, working muscles and so on. 
 
Perhaps a possible acid test for whether something may or may not count as a 
characteristic which could be the bearer of “disability” could involve a thought experiment. 
In his novel A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's Court, Mark Twain imagined a man who 
was, through an unknown agency, transported from 19th century America, to 6th Century 
Britain.54 This cast him out of all social context and made facts such as his accent, social 
position, possessions and wealth, completely inapplicable to his new circumstances.  
 
Obviously, since he was still in a formal society, certain things, such as his male 
gender, did in fact still have a great impact upon how he was treated. If however we take 
Mark Twain's notion of a person taken entirely out of all social context and relation to others 
and institutions, to an even greater extent, perhaps exiling our own castaway to some desert 
island in the distant past before the evolution of humanity or to some barren planet devoid of 
life, this may provide us with a useful test of an individual’s characteristics. By asking 
whether any given characteristic ceases to affect the castaway when they are removed utterly 
from all social context and the judgements of others, and what it may be possible for the 
castaway to do, or not do, alone in exile with respect to fulfilling his/her desires and 
                                                          
54Mark Twain, A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur’s Court, (first published 1889, republished Simon & 
Schuster, 1997).  
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improving his/her well-being (a matter I will return to in the next section), we have a way of 
determining what characteristics and capacities of the castaway are dependent entirely upon 
their social setting, and what are internal to the physical or mental self and thus fitting 
candidates to count as possible sources of disability. 
 
Though this criteria for establishing the limits of disability may at first sight appear to 
side with the medical model’s view of disability as the possession of a “broken body”, it 
should be noted that merely saying that disability should be considered as being involved 
with the characteristics of the mental or physical self, is not to say that the harm caused by 
disability is always and only ever directly caused by these characteristics alone, and not 
society’s perception of them, or practices surrounding individuals who have them.  
 
After all, it is trivially true that were a victim of racism not of the race against which a 
prejudice was held, their well-being would be unaffected by it. The fact that they are of that 
race is intrinsic to them, and would not change were they in a different social setting, 
however it is the beliefs and actions of the racist society which causes this characteristic to 
become a cause of suffering, not the fact that a person has the physical characteristics of 
belonging to the race in question. Thus, a person who is dark skinned will remain dark 
skinned wherever they live, but the significance of this fact will alter according to how such a 
physical characteristic is perceived by the society in which they live. 
 
In the case of a victim of class prejudice however, if the social setting were changed, 
for example by the person going to a less prejudiced society, they will not only no longer be 
experiencing prejudice, but the very characteristic which made them a member of the 
prejudiced group in the first place will no longer exist. The person will no longer live on “the 
wrong side of town” or speak with “a lower class accent” since both of those things exist only 
within the society that holds the prejudice. 
 
On the other hand however, a person suffering one of the above mentioned conditions 
such as migraines or E.B., would seem, even before we consider whether or not conditions 
are disabilities, to already possess characteristics internal to the self which naturally result in 
a loss of well-being via increased physical pain, irrespective of any other factors, social or 
otherwise, a case which might also prove true for other forms of impairment. Thus, while the 
attitudes, practices and judgements of a society may certainly have an effect upon a disabled 
individual, it is wrong to assume that the disability is in itself constituted only by that effect, 
since the primary cause of the disability and at least some of its effects upon well-being are 
internal to the person’s self (either physically or mentally), and would still exist even when 
considering the person in utter isolation from society. 
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Section C: Disability, desires and capacities for well-being 
In the previous two sections, we have established that disability is a noticeable 
condition intrinsic to a person’s physical or mental self, which detrimentally affects their 
well-being. This detrimental effect might involve extra social elements and judgements being 
made about a person, but is not entirely caused by society, and may be related to some 
condition of a person’s physical or mental self not shared by the majority of the population, 
but is not merely identical with such a condition. But if the harm done to an individual by a 
disabling condition may not be purely reduced to either of these factors, what exactly is the 
nature of this harm? 
 
As noted previously, “disability” is both a purposive and judgemental term. When 
used of a human it appears to carry both the implication that that person is unable to fulfil 
some kind of purpose in his/her life, and that such a lack is a result of the intrinsic state of 
that person’s basic  nature. In a more literal sense, many disabilities, as noted by several 
theorists working in the social model such as Newell, reduce down to negative statements 
about a person’s deficiencies from what they deem to be perceived norms.55 Thus, a person is 
judged as “deaf” because they cannot hear, as “blind” because they cannot see, as paraplegic 
because they cannot enjoy a full range of movement, etc.  
 
In the social model of disability, such judgements themselves are automatically 
assumed to be a result of society’s and the medical profession’s prejudiced view of what an 
ideal human should be, but there does, as noted earlier, seem to be some merit to the idea in 
its basic, definitional sense, in that a person experiencing paraplegia, simply by virtue of 
possessing paraplegia, does not have a full range of movement. As noted previously, these 
various lacks must have a noticeable effect upon the person who experiences them, and more 
specifically upon their well-being.  
 
One recent example which might give an insight into the nature of these effects upon 
well-being, is that of the rugby player, Dan James.56 In 2008, Dan James campaigned to be 
euthanized after receiving a spinal injury during rugby training which left him completely 
paralyzed.57 In an interview given to The Guardian, his parents stated that being paralyzed 
had removed all of the things, such as sports and travel, which Dan James had previously 
taken pleasure in from his life. They freely admitted that other people have been able to 
experience incredibly happy and full lives with such a paralysis as Dan’s, but that a life of the 
type those people enjoyed, focused upon activities vastly different to those Dan had gained 
pleasure from previously, not to mention that the increased amount of dependence upon 
others which such a life would entail, had no appeal or value for Dan.  
                                                          
55 Christopher Newell.   
56 Robert Booth, “‘He wasn’t prepared for a second class life’: why injured rugby star went to Switzerland to 
die”, The Guardian, 18th October 2008.  Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2008/oct/18/11 
57 It is not my intention here to embark upon a debate about the general moral status of voluntary euthanasia on 
the part of disabled individuals, merely to examine the factors which Dan James considered in making the 
decision to end his life, factors implicitly tied up with his well-being and with his disability. Full discussions of 
the status of euthanasia, including euthanasia in cases such as that of Dan James have been made by many 
commentators, and though some aspects of that discussion are related to an examination of disability, many of 
the key considerations, such as the need to think about whether any condition is terminal, are not. 
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Thus, when Dan evaluated his life with paralysis as not worth living, this decision was 
motivated purely and simply by the disparity of the contents of that life, and how they 
measured up to Dan’s expectations of what he wished his life to contain, i.e. his desires.  
Thus, to take a single example, while Dan desired to play rugby, since constituents such as 
possessing the ability to run, throw a ball, etc., would seem to be necessary attributes which a 
person must possess in order to fulfil the desire to play rugby, attributes which would be 
unavailable to a person (such as Dan) experiencing quadriplegia, the desire to play rugby is 
one which such a person could not fulfil. Whether in fact these “necessary” conditions of 
fulfilling a desire to play rugby are precisely necessary, and the ways in which activities, 
states or actions might be altered is a question I will return to later in Chapter 3, since it 
relates to a critical question in disability, that of accessibility. 
 
Dan was seemingly left with desires which it was not possible to fulfil, a type of 
desires which, as Griffin, Noggle, and many other commentators note, will inevitably have a 
negative effect upon our well-being.58 Whether Dan’s response to this problem of a life filled 
with impossible desires, ending it, was a reasonable one is far beyond the scope of what I’m 
trying to achieve here, and would in any case seem to be a decision best left up to Dan 
himself. 
 
For the purposes of the current discussion, Dan’s example serves to illustrate that at 
least part of the harm involved with disability is related to both the desires of the individual 
with a disabling condition, and the mechanism by which the disabling condition frustrates the 
fulfilment of those desires. Identifying the harm of a disabling condition however, simply by 
stating that it frustrates certain desires, needs some clarification.  
 
Firstly, and obviously, as Newell notes, many disabled individuals do in fact live full 
and happy lives without significant loss of well-being caused by frustrated desires.59 Such 
people would have (in the terms of many commentators on desire theory) adapted their 
desires to suit their circumstances, and thus avoided the pain of unfulfilled desires.  
 
A totally deaf person (as noted earlier), being biologically unable to appreciate 
Mozart, would seem to be better served in their well-being by not having a strong desire to do 
so, and thus avoid a significant loss in their well-being as a consequence of an unfulfilled 
desire.  
 
This claim does indeed seem legitimate, since to attempt to assign any sort of desires 
to be “normal” onto a disabled individual would seem to be both dangerously close to the 
“normal is ideal” thinking of certain forms of the medical model, and also, in most cases, 
simply untrue according to the actual views expressed by disabled individuals themselves. In 
fact as Sobel notes, a significant component in someone achieving well-being via the 
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fulfilment of desire seems to be the practical wisdom to distinguish desires which are possible 
to fulfil from those which are not, and thus as far as possible minimize the pain felt from 
possessing unachievable desires, by discarding such desires in favour of those an individual is 
more likely to attain.60 
 
Equally however, our intuitions would seem to imply that a disabled individual, even 
one who does not feel the desire to engage in activities which they do not, due to the 
circumstance of having a disabling condition, possess the necessary attributes to undertake, 
has still suffered some sort of harm. This is borne out by the fact that while many disabled 
people who are actively biologically unable to appreciate something may be at the least 
curious about it, many people blind from birth, for example, while they could not be said to 
“miss” seeing colours, still maintain an active curiosity about the sensation of seeing, 
especially given our common sight based language. Of course such a curiosity varies between 
individuals, but that it exists at all still seems to suggest that even when an active desire is not 
felt as a detriment in a person’s life there is still a lack; I personally always feel sorry that 
with my level of vision I will never understand or be able to respond to facial expressions.  
 
It is also true that the vast majority of desires have a varying list of requirements to 
fulfil, and most of the time a disabled individual will tend to fulfil some, rather than none of 
those requirements, as in the case of a blind or deaf person wishing to watch television which, 
despite the use of the verb “watch”, contains both audio and visual elements, or a person with 
paraplegia’s desire to play table tennis where they are quite capable of using the bat and 
apprehending the ball’s position, but unable to move swiftly around the table in order to hit it. 
In these cases, the idea that a disabled individual has experienced the harm of an only 
partially fulfilled desire seems quite legitimate. 
 
Some more radical theorists, such as Germon, in the social model have suggested that 
the very idea a disabled individual is “suffering” other than via social factors such as direct 
exclusion to use buses, etc. is itself prejudiced, but this does seem distinctly problematic.61 
This can be seen if we compare a disabled person’s biological restrictions in fulfilling some 
categories of desires to another type of restriction, a political one.  
 
Suppose we consider a restriction of travel. It is, of course, perfectly possible to live a 
full and happy life without ever leaving the British Isles, and there are undoubtedly many 
people who do so. It would however, still be regarded as a great moral wrong if the 
government decided to close its borders, and not allow anyone to leave the country. Such 
action would require a very good justification, such as an extreme state of emergency like a 
desperate war or natural disaster, and the public would certainly expect such a restriction to 
be lifted once the crisis had passed. The argument that “nobody needs to leave the country to 
live a happy life” would hold no water at all, and in fact would be regarded as a frighteningly 
authoritarian one reminiscent of Orwell. Another factor of such a governmental decision is 
that it would be thought of by most people, (especially political commentators) as a universal 
wrong, whether the population agreed as a whole or not, since freedom is frequently 
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considered such a basic human necessity. Even if people brought up in a country with such a 
direct ban on travel were to claim it as reasonable, the majority of ethicists would disagree. 
Yet such restrictions pertaining to travel, either fully or in part, are placed on the shoulders of 
those with mobility related conditions, simply because of their possession of such conditions. 
 
What seems to be the common evil in all these cases, whether travel, playing table 
tennis or restriction of desires in general, is the fact of curtailed freedom of choice. In the 
case of a disabled person, whether or not they possess a desire whose accomplishment they 
are biologically restricted from seems to be only a question of how adaptable to 
circumstances they are and, to an extent, pure dumb luck in what desires they possess (had 
Dan James been an author instead of a rugby player, quadriplegia would have had far less 
effect on his desires). In terms of classifying their disability, what seems to be the important 
factor is their capacity to engage in certain activities which either form the inherent 
constituents of desires, such as a person with paraplegia’s inability to play rugby, or are 
directly identical with the desires themselves, such as a totally blind person’s inability to 
appreciate portrait painting.  
 
These capacities for well-being therefore, represent those conditions or actions which 
a disabled person is unable to perform due to their disability which restrict the amount of 
choices of desires they may fulfil, or activities they may engage in. Of course, such capacities 
must actually affect well-being directly.  An inability to roll the tongue for example would 
not seem to have any direct effect upon a person’s well-being, since there seem to be no 
situations in which it may come into play or desires it might affect. Of course, as social 
theorists claim, all too often the extent to which any given desire or activity relies on its 
constituents which may be restricted to a person without a particular capacity is entirely a 
social matter, i.e., society often sets the boundary conditions for carrying out certain actions 
or attaining certain goals. Thus (as Silvers notes), if all buildings had ramps, a person with 
paraplegia’s desire to go up stairs would not be reliant upon a capacity to walk.62 
 
However, trying to categorize all desires in this fashion seems to be too broad a 
distinction. Firstly, there do seem to be desires and constituents of desires whose nature and 
fulfilment is not in fact dependent upon social factors at all. One of these might be a person 
with quadriplegia’s decision to pick up an object not within their reach. There are 
accommodations and alternatives which society might make to afford the person with 
quadriplegia ease in carrying out desires, such as providing professional assistance or 
technology which can be operated by the person like a computer with an eye tracker to enable 
use of a mouse, however the basic desire of a person with quadriplegia to independently 
reach for and pick up an object under their own volition seems related to only the person 
themselves, and their individual desire to enjoy the experience of freedom of movement, and 
not for any value placed upon this experience by society as a whole, (I will discuss the 
question of assistance further in chapter 3). 
 
As J.R. Lucas observes, we are not in fact all equal, and thus there may also be cases 
where a person lacks a certain capacity, but normally would not be considered disabled.63One 
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of these is allergies. While a person with incredibly serious allergies may in fact (according to 
certain legal or tick box based definitions), count as disabled, a person with perhaps only one 
allergy would not seem to be. Someone for instance with an allergy to honey would seem to 
have certain dietary restrictions which prohibit them from eating some foods, but in 
comparison to someone with a gluten or lactose intolerance, the amount of food they could 
not choose to eat would be comparatively small, thus commonly in medical circles an allergy 
to honey is not considered a disability. I would argue however, that such a condition should 
in fact be counted as a disability simply due to the biological restriction it places upon a 
person’s desires, even if not a serious disability by virtue of this restriction applying to 
comparatively few possible desires, and thus requiring far less desire juggling to 
accommodate with aneudaimon life. 
 
This idea of disability as gradable, is much at odds with the social model which sees 
“the disabled” as a specifically defined social grouping such as “blacks” and thus similar to 
racism, rather than a condition with varying degrees of severity and effect, (though I will 
return to the idea of the commonly categorized “disabled” rather as a distinct group and the 
bearers of prejudice in chapter 4). However, a similarly broad set of characteristics used to 
identify disability is found in the World Health Organisation's classification, which 
characterizes disabling conditions by a deeply complex and highly stratified structure of the 
aspects of life and general health they have an effect upon, including dietary restrictions and 
indeed the possible prejudices of others (in fact, the W.H.O. criteria for a disabling condition 
does attempt to reconcile both the social and medical models by this system).64 
 
Of course, possessing the ability to see, hear or move freely are heavily involved in 
both the constituents and general form of far more desires than merely the ability to eat 
honey, and so the lack of these should indeed be recognized as appropriately more severe. 
Therefore it seems safe to suggest that the “lack” of a disabled person is not simply a lack of 
sight, hearing, etc, but a lack of the capacity to enjoy or experience fulfilling desires some or 
all of whose constituents depend upon personal characteristics affected by the internal 
condition of the self. Thus the harm done in these cases is as much a loss of freedom as that 
experienced by people living under any other enforced restriction of desires.  
 
There are however, many conditions which may need to be considered as disabilities 
but which do not seem simply to place a blanket restriction upon some classes of desires. 
What desire for instance is directly restricted by the intermittent pain of a migraine sufferer, 
the fatigue of someone with M.E., or the suffering associated with chronic depression? One 
could argue, as in fact Culver and Gert have, that such conditions contravene a basic desire to 
live a life free from pain.65 This however seems entirely inadequate, both because it is deeply 
unspecific, and because, by the very nature of life in general, everybody will experience this 
desire and have it unfulfilled. Therefore, a more subtle and adaptable schema for the types 
and nature of desires which disabling conditions frustrate would seem to be necessary. 
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Section D: Disability, effort and time 
The basic freedom/desire/fulfilment model outlined above, though perhaps of use in 
defining the activities and goals which may or may not be precluded from a disabled 
individual, does however miss a key factor in its application to disability; a lack which many 
individuals who live with disabling conditions will note immediately and one which is 
intrinsic to the definition of certain conditions, this is the issue of effort. 
 
As noted earlier, breaking the distal phalanx of the toe (the bone right at the tip), does 
not, simply by virtue of being painful count as disabling. The basic sensations of pain the 
person experiences, though undoubtedly severely unpleasant would not, in and of themselves 
be sufficient to cause a disability, and we would assume that someone with a toe broken in 
such a way would be completely free to satisfy their usual course of desires, as there seem 
few desires for which having ten whole and functional toes are a necessary constituent.  
 
Needless to say, were the toe broken at the proximal phalanx (near the foot), or were 
it a broken ankle which would make walking physically impossible, then it is easy to see how 
a wide range of activities, all those associated with mobility and freedom of movement such 
as walking, dancing or even just preparing a meal while standing, would be detrimentally 
affected. 
 
 Suffering a broken distal phalanx however, walking would be entirely possible, but 
only with a significant and noticeable amount of constant physical pain. Under these 
conditions, a person might well change their lifestyle in several ways to avoid the pain of 
walking: utilizing more public transport; allowing more time to travel between places so as 
not to have to walk more quickly and thus intensify the pain; directly refraining from 
activities involving the feet such as cycling not because they are physically impossible to 
perform, but because the pain they cause is of such a magnitude that it negates any rewards of 
pleasure, extra mobility or physical fitness which a person might gain otherwise. Also to be 
considered in such a lifestyle change, there is the large amount of time the person would have 
to spend resting from the general strain they put on the broken bone by carrying out 
unavoidable, everyday walking and standing like basic movement around their home or 
workplace. In this case, though the person’s ability to walk is not directly compromised in the 
way a person with paraplegia would be, the sufferer of the broken toe has undoubtedly felt a 
distinct lack in the usual fulfilment of any of their desires for which walking is a necessary 
component, a lack directly attributable to the intrinsic condition of their body.  
 
Of course to a large extent their usual desires may in fact be performed, but at a far 
greater cost of time, pain, and physical exhaustion than they would have been with ten 
unbroken toes. For example, regarding a journey to and from a place of work, the broken toe 
sufferer may have to set off significantly earlier, since what previously might have been a 
five minute journey is now a fifteen minute journey, and more exhausting over all due to 
constant pain and the necessity to walk in an awkward, unfamiliar way that tires the muscles. 
 
It is  likely that the person in question would not actually change his or her job to one  
closer to home (even assuming that opportunity was available), but rather simply live with 
the increased amount of time, fatigue and pain spent on such a journey. Thus, though not 
having actually suffered a frustration of their desire to perform the job in the same way, being 
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sacked, or being totally unable to attend work would frustrate that desire, the cost taken to 
fulfil that desire has increased significantly as a direct result of the injury. So, in addition to 
the impact upon their desires directly related to walking, there is also the need to rest the 
broken bone while it heals, and make accommodations for the increase in time and physical 
work involved with walking. There might also possibly be the need to actively alter desires as 
well. For example, a person interested in sports such as football or tennis may have to 
preclude themselves to a passive interest as a spectator, rather than being a participant.  
 
It is worth bearing in mind that, unlike Dan James, mentioned in the previous section, 
a person suffering a broken toe does indeed still have all the physical prerequisites required to 
play football, the ability to run, kick the ball etc., but only at what would be an extreme cost 
of effort, pain and (quite possibly, risk of further physical damage).66 We would generally 
hold such a cost to outweigh the benefits of playing football, even from the perspective of the 
most avid footballer, and, as Griffin notes, were someone expressing such a desire we would 
probably wish to dissuade them on accounts of the cost being “too high”.67 This effort factor, 
not merely the ability or inability to carry out certain desires but the accumulated cost of 
fulfilling them, is one of the most defining characteristics in the actual experience of 
everyday life with a disability, and thus is absolutely central to the practical effects of 
disabling conditions on the quality of life of individuals who have them. 
 
To further clarify this notion of abnormally increased effort, it is only necessary to 
look at conditions which are classified as disabilities not because they cause the actual 
inability to fulfil desires in the same way as paraplegia, blindness, etc. may biologically 
preclude the carrying out of those desires or the constituent parts of those desires, but because 
of the heavy toll they exact upon the price of any desire fulfilment. As noted in the previous 
section, most obviously this applies to conditions such as M.E., migraines, chronic insomnia 
and other neurological or psychological conditions, where very real and obvious exhaustion, 
physical pain or involuntary lethargy limits the freedom of an individual to carry out his or 
her desires. However, in various psychiatric resources, such as the Dictionary of Psychiatry, 
the severity of conditions like depression or paranoia and their status as “chronic” is directly 
related to the impact they have upon a person’s life and “normal” functioning, i.e. the effort 
costs required to fulfil the sufferer’s desires.68 Thus while everyone feels depressed at certain 
points in life, the psychiatric profession only holds such depression to be “chronic”, i.e. 
categorized as a disability, when it interferes with a person’s “normal” functioning and ability 
to pursue everyday interests. Though, as noted previously, there is still a significant question 
in what “normal” effort is, a matter I will return to later, it does seem significant that “effort” 
is given as the chief defining characteristic of certain disabling conditions, even when the 
definition of those conditions cannot be tied directly to the malfunctioning of a sensory 
apparatus, or other human capacity.  
 
As noted in the previous section, a similar methodology is used by the World Health 
Organisation in characterizing disabling conditions, by establishing a large and many-layered 
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tree of effects, then seeing how many and which of those effects a given condition involves.69 
Many of those effects involve the degree of time, fatigue or pain carrying out certain common 
life activities involves, even when such activities may be undertaken at all. 
 
It is easy to see how a person with chronic depression, while physically able to fulfil 
other desires, does not have the mental energy, drive, or necessary mood to do so, as a direct 
result of their condition. Thus, the commonly voiced complaint “It’s an effort to get out of 
bed in the morning” seems to have a very literal and practical meaning in its impact.70,71,72 
 
Equally, as noted previously, the characteristic disability caused by profoundly 
painful conditions such as arthritis is not merely the fact of the pain itself, but the ways pain, 
both directly and through exhaustion caused by the necessity to constantly endure it, makes a 
range of desires, while not as obviously physically restricted as those of a person with 
paraplegia, unusually difficult, i.e. costly in terms of effort, to perform.  
 
Despite being very much prevalent in the lives of disabled individuals, this factor of 
effort is one which has received little to no attention from ethicists. Those working in the 
social model, seem more concerned with absolutely restricted desires than the effort involved 
in carrying out unrestricted ones, and while medically it is recognized that certain conditions 
are characterized by the extra effort they impart to everyday life, the full extent of the issue, 
as well as any theoretical attempt to quantify it under any sort of rigorous definition of 
disability has not received as much attention as perhaps it should. Possibly this is because it is 
an issue which the social model, with its emphasis on social change as a way of 
accommodating disability, finds difficult to accept, and part of “the aches pains and urinary 
tract infections” which advocates of the theory prefer to ignore.73 If indeed, as Silvers wished, 
ramps were used instead of stairs in all locations, there still remains the less easily solved 
problem that it is generally considerably more tiring to push a wheelchair and its occupant up 
five floors worth of ramps than it would be to walk a similar amount of distance on stairs, a 
problem whose nature it is less easy to attribute to the lack of ramps in society.74 
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Part of the reason the problem of effort is such a major one in the field of disability, 
(and one which must be addressed), is its wide ranging application. Not only the above 
examples of pain, fatigue and lethargy, but also more commonly recognized disabling 
conditions such as blindness, deafness or restriction of movement have their share of desires 
whose attainment is characterized by increased amounts of effort.  
 
Imagine for example the act of catching a train. A person using a wheelchair must 
specifically request, often at a significant time in advance, that a ramp be provided both onto 
and off the train. This then requires them to submit to the ministrations of strangers since it is 
not something which they could do independently, they would also need to arrive at the 
station much earlier than non-disabled passengers in order for such arrangements to be made, 
and are therefore very unlikely to be able to purchase a ticket instantly at the station; often the 
lives of disabled people are sadly lacking in spontaneity. It is also worth noting that a 
disability access service such as assistance onto the train can vary wildly in quality depending 
simply upon the people involved and how efficiently the service, even when one is in place, 
is applied. (I will consider the quality of human assistance more completely in Chapter 3). A 
person with paraplegia is also unlikely to be able to use station facilities such as toilets, and 
could only make use of cafeteria or shopping facilities at the station or on the train if certain 
spacial and mobility requirements were met, which again is something that is heavily subject 
to variation.  
 
Someone with a visual impairment must either also make a request for assistance in 
finding and boarding the train (requiring similar amounts of preparation and interaction with 
and reliance upon strangers), or otherwise have sufficient skills in mobility techniques and 
memory of the station to do so, which could easily be disrupted by a change of platform, 
addition of barriers, sign boards or other unexpected moveable obstacles it would be 
necessary to manoeuvre around. Such skills would also need to be attained over a period of 
time with a large amount of route learning, again necessitating a large amount of preparation, 
and even then could be disrupted by alterations in the train times, rerouting through a 
different platform or the loss of an auditory announcement, (all of which have caused me to 
miss trains in the past).  It is also worth noting that the visually impaired individual does not 
merely have to locate the train itself, but also the ticket office, (even if the station provides 
assistance this would be necessary), toilets, or any other desired facility, not to mention 
finding a seat after boarding the train. 
 
A person with hearing impairments is not only at the mercy of auditory 
announcements which they could not access, but also is required to lip read, in order to buy 
their ticket or ask for information, a process taking significant concentration and open to 
variation in factors such as lighting conditions and the readability of the ticket seller’s lips. 
There is also the necessity of communicating desires to buy a ticket, etc. to individuals with 
normal hearing, which presents its own range of problems owing to the speech and 
communication issues inherent in deafness, and of course such difficulties will also occur on 
the train as well if, for example, the deaf person needs to discuss their seat reservations with 
the guard. 
 
One proposition in establishing a  possible acid test for effort might be to return to the 
naked, possibly disabled, castaway exiled from society mentioned in Section B. Would it, 
Disability, Desire and Society: The Establishment of a New, Individualistic Definition of Disability and 
its Practical Uses in Everyday Life 
By Luke Hewitt 
 
40 
 
given all relevant information, be more or less difficult for said castaway to perform any 
given activity with intrinsic disabling conditions, and if so, how much more difficult? (I will 
return to this question in the next section).  
 
As noted in Section C, it does not seem to matter if the disability is related to only a 
small range of activities, for instance a person with a specific phobia may require 
significantly more mental effort and fortitude when attempting activities related to their 
phobia but be otherwise unaffected by it.  
 
There is also the fact that in the case of many activities, such as the communication of 
the deaf individual or the assistance requirements of some visually impaired or paraplegic 
individuals, the degree of effort involved in carrying out any given activity or fulfilling a 
range of desires can be very heavily influenced by social factors and the adaptability of the 
environment, even though, as has been stated, it is not these environmental or social factors 
which in themselves seem to constitute disability since they are external to the self. It is also 
worth noting, that however much adaptation is made, the overall costs in terms of effort for a 
person with a disabling condition may rarely, if ever, be reduced to a point of non-existence. 
For example, as noted earlier, even if all access ways had ramps, more physical effort in 
terms of propelling a wheelchair up a ramp would still be required as compared to climbing 
stairs. 
 
One of the more severe issues concerned with effort as a criterion in disability 
definition is its unspecific nature. Being that effort works on a sliding scale rather than a 
basic all or nothing premise the way fulfilled or unfulfilled desires do, it presents a far more 
difficult problem in terms of quantification. As noted when discussing the medical model’s 
use of gross statistics to attain normality, not everyone is equal.  
 
To return to I.Q. (which, while theoretically problematic does have the significant 
advantage of being quantitative, thus providing good example matter), a person with an I.Q. 
of 100 would take considerably more effort in formulating quantum physics calculations than 
someone with an I.Q. of 120. However, someone with an I.Q. of 80 would similarly be 
disabled when calculating the amount of money necessary to buy items in a shop. Unless we 
follow the statistical model, there is no practical difference between these two levels of effort 
or these two sets of activities, given that both individuals desire to carry them out, and no 
way of saying that either is more or less disabling than the other. 
 
For this reason it is necessary to readdress in detail one of the other most basic and 
commonly discussed concepts of disability theory, and one which both the social and medical 
model have expended much time in exploring: the concept of normality.   
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Section E: Normality and environmental fitness 
As noted previously, there are considerable problems with definitions of normality as 
applied to individuals, or even as used to categorize disabled as a distinct class from non-
disabled. We have established a disabling condition as one which is intrinsic to the self and 
causes either a direct restriction upon fulfilling desires or an abnormal amount of effort 
required in their fulfilment. It is therefore necessary to actually define what a "normal" 
amount of effort required to fulfil a certain desire is, and also precisely in what ways the need 
for this "abnormal" effort distinguishes disabled individuals from non-disabled ones.  
 
Gross majority based definitions of normal appear to run into severe problems with 
bias, environment and equality, still more so when the object to be considered is not the 
individual themselves but the amount of effort those individuals must put into fulfilling a 
certain desire. Thus, as previously noted, to people with differing physical or mental 
capacities, the fulfilment of desires will require different amounts of effort. So, lifting and 
walking with a 25 kg suitcase, performing basic mental arithmetic, or being able to study 
quantum physics, will be significantly easier to some people and more difficult to others. 
Simply stating that the quantity of effort required by any given person to satisfy a desire is 
"abnormal" when it is greater than the majority of those who have carried out that desire 
before, seems an entirely inadequate answer. Absent minded artists concentrating too hard on 
their latest work to pay attention to numbers, people who are simply physically less fit than 
their fellows, or indeed anyone who struggles with quantum theory would not seem to be 
unusually disabled, yet would have different basic effort costs than others undertaking the 
above activities. Furthermore, this would make assessment of anyone who carries out a desire 
which the majority do not share, or pioneers a new method of accomplishing something, 
extremely difficult. Nevertheless, both the definition being formulated here, and principles, 
such as those of the W.H.O. whose assessment of a disabling condition depends upon 
assessing its effects upon the amount of effort implicit in carrying out various activities, 
would seem to indicate that some method of measuring the amount of effort required by any 
given individual to fulfil a desire or its constituents, against the effort of the majority in a 
similar situation, is in fact needed in a definition of disability.75 
 
One factor which we have thus far not considered with relation to effort, is that of the 
environment a person is in. It is trivially true that someone living in a country with mains 
running water, and someone living in a developing country where it is necessary to fetch 
water from a river must exert vastly different amounts of effort when it comes to fulfilling the 
desire for a drink. In this case, however, the disparity in amounts of effort is entirely due to 
differences in the physical environment and has nothing to do with the internal characteristics 
or attitudes of the people involved. Given the same environmental factors in both cases, i.e. 
the lack or provision of mains water service, the effort costs would be greatly equalized, 
which is indeed one of the major arguments of charities and others who seek to change the 
lives of those in developing countries, by first pointing out the disparity of effort even in 
carrying out basic tasks, such as drinking or washing, that living in one country as opposed to 
another causes. 
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Despite disagreement by social theorists however, it does not seem that the disparity 
of effort costs for any given desire between those categorized as disabled and the rest of the 
population can be reduced simply to a function of environmental factors, since the 
characteristic of the disability itself is internal to an individual’s self, and not external to it, 
whereas something like the lack or provision of mains water depends on entirely external 
factors such as economy, engineering, wealth, etc. Furthermore, when considering the effort 
of disabled individuals, as noted in the previous section with the train example, even when 
environmental adaptations are in fact made, the effort costs for a disabled person to perform a 
given set of activities in fulfilling a desire are not entirely equalized, i.e. it's still going to take 
more effort to push a wheelchair up a ramp.  
 
It would however be equally incorrect to claim that environmental factors played 
absolutely no part in altering the effort requirements to fulfil the desires of disabled 
individuals, in fact Shakespeare, Silvers, MacIntyre and innumerable other commentators 
working in the social model give many examples of environmental changes which could be 
made to drastically reduce the difficulties associated with disability.76,77,78 To take one 
example, a person with paraplegia may not be able to use conventional transport easily, 
however given a specially adapted car with an electric lift, wheelchair space, and controls that 
do not rely upon use of foot pedals,  they can drive, and therefore travel with considerable 
ease. Any theory of "normal" effort then, needs to take into account both the intrinsic 
qualities of a person and their ability to fulfil a given desire, and the nature of that person’s 
environment as it affects the activities necessary for the fulfilment of his or her desires.  
 
One similar problem is presented in biology. As Griffiths notes, there is an issue in 
attempting to discuss how well any given species is able to survive within its environment 
and to what extent the characteristics of that species may be said to give it an advantage.79 
After all, a considerable factor in how well a given species will survive is simply what 
environment it is in.80 A fish for instance is ill suited to survive out of water, though better 
able to survive within it than air breathing creatures. 
 
The writer Canguilhem therefore developed the concept of biological fitness to be 
used to categorize and quantify the relation between a species' environment and its 
survival.81,82,83 According to Canguilhem, a species is "fit" for an environment when it is best 
                                                          
76 Colin Barnes, Geoff Mercer, and Tom Shakespeare. 
77 Anita Silvers. 
78 Alasdair MacIntyre. 
79 Kim Sterelny and Paul E. Griffiths, “Chapter 1”, Sex and Death: An Introduction to the Philosophy of 
Biology, (University of Chicago, 1999). 
80 Ibid, “Chapter 2”. 
Also: David J. Buller, Function Selection and Design, (University of New York Press, 1999).  
81 Jean Gayon, “The Concepts of Individuality in Canguilhem’s Philosophy of Biology”, Journal of the History 
of Biology, vol. 31, no. 3, (Autumn 1998), pp 305-325. 
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able to survive within it, and an environment is "fit" for a species when that species has the 
best chance of survival there. Fitness therefore, may be seen to be a relational property, and 
one which derives from the interaction between a species’ characteristics, the nature of its 
environment, and a measure of how well both of these elements affect a species’ ability to 
survive and reproduce in that environment.  
 
This concept of a relation between environmental factors and an individual's intrinsic 
nature adding up to a total evaluative measure, is one which it may be possible to apply to 
human beings, and one which may be able to solve the problem of what a "normal" amount 
of effort, and a "normal" individual are.  
 
As Urmson notes, in carrying out a single desire, there are a large number of factors 
leading from intention to fulfilment, and often many subsidiary desires to be fulfilled along 
the way.84 As noted previously, we can of course measure the success or failure of a desire by 
comparing the result to the prior intention, however, between the intention and the eventual 
fulfilment of the desire is the set of steps taken to carry out that desire, and an expended 
amount of effort which must be used in carrying it out. This effort may be characterized as 
the toll of time, physical fatigue, concentration, emotional strain and generalized pressure 
required to achieve the state of affairs which the original desire aims at bringing about. This 
may be affected both by factors intrinsic to an individual’s nature, and by general 
environmental factors. Thus, if I desire to travel to a certain destination, I must first determine 
my route, decide on what preparations I must make for the journey, then concentrate upon my 
mode of travel, walking, cycling, using the train, etc. How much effort it takes me to travel to 
said destination will be affected by my own health, ability to concentrate, skills in 
organization and preparing for the journey and of course my proficiency at walking, driving, 
catching trains, etc. Then, there is the nature of the journey itself, distance, how difficult the 
ground is to cover while walking, how much traffic there is while driving, how likely 
possible obstructions or delays are to occur, etc. If I arrive fully prepared at my destination at 
my desired time, we can say that my desire was fulfilled. If either the internal or 
environmental factors change, the amount of effort involved in carrying out the desire will 
also change, for instance my journey may be made more onerous by an injury such as a 
broken toe, or by an unexpectedly long detour which requires greater time and trouble on my 
part to pass.  
 
By applying the acid test established in Section B, i.e., the position of a castaway 
marooned in a place totally outside social context, it is easy to make a distinction between 
which factors involved in carrying out my desire to travel are intrinsic to myself, like my 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
82 This is of course slightly altering the debate, since there are theorists who see the crucial factor in species 
survival not to be simply the whim of environmental change plus characteristics, but how well those 
characteristics allow the species to specifically adapt to changes in its environment. For our present purposes it 
is simply necessary to note the interplay of factors in survival, not discuss their importance or relation to 
adaptation. A detailed analysis of this issue is provided by both Buller and Griffiths. 
83 Kim Sterelny and Paul E. Griffiths. 
Also: David J. Buller. 
84 J. Urmson, “Chapter 1”, Aristotle’s Ethics, (Blackwell, 1991). 
Disability, Desire and Society: The Establishment of a New, Individualistic Definition of Disability and 
its Practical Uses in Everyday Life 
By Luke Hewitt 
 
44 
 
ability to walk, and which are part of the environment around me, for instance the amount of 
traffic on the road (and indeed the conduct and attitude of other road users). 
 
When comparing the amount of effort expended by different individuals to carry out a 
similar desire, it is worth remembering that, generally speaking, a number of individuals will 
share a similar environment, thus most of the variation will occur between sets of individual 
factors, for instance everyone taking my journey will experience the same detour problem, 
but only I will experience my broken toe, and it is thus within this variation that a standard of 
normality may be found. A person might then be said to be "normal" in a given environment 
when they were best able to fulfil their desires within that environment, and "abnormal" when 
individual factors caused the amount of effort they must expend and desires they must forgo, 
to increase beyond what is usually achievable within that environment.  
 
This is obviously not a definition of “normality” in the large and monolithic sense 
used by social theorists, scientists and politicians, such a definition is beyond what I am 
trying to achieve here (plus it is possible that such an absolute definition of “normality” may 
not even be plausible), rather it is a test to be used on a case by case basis to establish when, 
and to what extent, in any given environment a person’s desires are restricted biologically, 
i.e. when a person is disabled relative to that desire within that environment. 
 
Of course, "individual factors" are far more wide ranging than just the biological, and 
might apply both to those things a castaway would not lose were they taken out of social 
context, and those factors which an individual is free to alter themselves such as the person 
with unimpaired hearing who had never been introduced to Mozart mentioned in Section A. 
There are also factors such as wealth or social class which might vary significantly between 
individuals sharing the same environment, but are not intrinsic to them, or temporarily 
internalized factors which may alter the effort costs involved, but are voluntary since an 
individual may freely give them up at a later date. For instance a drunk person will expend 
more effort in fulfilling certain desires such as walking but only by virtue of a voluntary state 
of drunkenness they themselves induced, not because they suffer from an internal state that 
causes the activities necessary to fulfil those desires to increase in effort. Obviously all these 
factors will cause variation between individuals, but it is the difference in effort involved 
between individuals whose internal characteristics are involuntarily different, that is the main 
concern here. 
 
It is entirely possible that given other forms of acid test than the castaway, and other 
ways of isolating individual factors for comparison, other forms of abnormality, i.e. other sets 
of individual factors which cause a decrease in effort and lack of desire fulfilment among 
definable groups of individuals sharing the same environment, what are in effect other senses 
in which individuals may be normal or abnormal, may be discovered.85 However, here the 
                                                          
85 One highly similar example of such a test, though one far less specific than the castaway test and intended 
more to establish social justice than normality, is John Rawls’ idea of the Vale of Ignorance85a. This places the 
theorist outside society, but rather than comparing them to others, asks the theorist to formulate a system of 
justice based on the idea that they will be reincarnated as any member of society with any given set of 
circumstances and thus forces the theorist to consider everyone’s good as equal to their own. It is possible that a 
modification of this idea, by asking the theorist to consider the likelihood of certain individual, involuntary, or 
environmental factors in their next incarnation, and how such likelihoods should affect others, that a more wide 
ranging theory of normality may be created which can then be used to establish a standard for comparing 
various forms of individual circumstances.  
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concern is with disability, i.e. with the variations in effort caused by individuals' unalterable 
internal factors as picked out by the castaway test, thus, a prince and a pauper may take very 
different amounts of effort in getting what they want, however, according to the castaway test 
neither is disabled because neither wealth nor poverty would remain once society was 
removed from the equation, so that the standard of "abnormality" does not apply. Were we to 
apply another test of comparison, possibly by comparing the amounts of money each 
possesses independently of other factors, then indeed we might judge that one is poor and the 
other rich, and that this is an inequality. 
 
Since the achievement of desires and expenditure of effort is on a sliding scale, we 
may also here reintroduce a notion of majority, more specifically the notion of how much 
effort or what desires the majority of individuals in the same environment fulfil.  
As it is based upon the isolation of involuntary individual factors via the castaway acid test 
and how those factors relate to groups of individuals within the same environment, such an 
idea of majority is able to solve many of the issues raised with gross majority categorization 
earlier. For instance, since the individual factors identified by the castaway test must be 
involuntary, a distracted artist (who could freely concentrate on numbers if they desired), no 
longer is a possible candidate to be classified as "abnormal" when set against the standard of 
disability, as the artist’s distraction is a state she/he induced voluntarily for the completion of 
his/her art work and could relinquish if she/he wished. 
 
Also, as it concerns the variation between individuals in a similar environment and the 
ability to carry out desires, "normal" depression or fear is easily established, as it is simply 
necessary to compare the extent to which the desires and freedoms of the majority are 
negatively affected by such feelings as compared to someone with clinical depression. So, 
whereas a statistically average person who felt “normally” depressed would still be able to 
get out of bed in the morning, a person disabled by depression would not.  
 
 
On this view, the problem of categorizing M.E. as a disabling condition noted in 
Section A would not have arisen, since it would be an internal involuntary state of a person 
which causes him or her such a level of fatigue that the amount of effort required to fulfil 
desires is far greater than the majority of people in the same environment, i.e. citizens of the 
same country.  
 
It is also worth noting that recognizing what amount of effort and what variation in 
that amount of effort a majority might use to fulfil a desire allows the limits of certain    
negative internal conditions to be defined. One of the best examples of this occurs in (of all 
places) a book I  recall from my childhood, Little Miss Shy by Roger Hargreaves, a book in 
the “Mistermen” series, which explores characters relative to one defining characteristic, e.g. 
Mr. Happy, Little Miss Trouble or indeed Little Miss Shy.86 
 
Little Miss Shy is invited to a party, but being obviously shy she greatly fears going 
despite having a desire to. This desire causes her to experience considerable trepidation and 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
85aJohn Rawls, A Theory of Justice, (Belknap 1971) 
86Roger Hargreaves, Little Miss Shy, (first published 1981, republished Egmont, 2014). 
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repeatedly change her mind about whether or not to go. Eventually, she decides against 
going, however, just as she begins regretting her decision, the extravert and fun loving Mr. 
Funny arrives and explains that he’s come to fetch her, whereupon she attends the party and 
enjoys herself.  
 
Though a childish example, the above story (especially considering it as a parable for 
dealing with shyness) illustrates an example of how a certain level of shyness may be 
appropriately dealt with and a desire fulfilled despite the individual’s possession of an 
internal characteristic which causes problems in fulfilling that desire. More broadly we could 
say that Mr. Funny, as a feature of Little Miss Shy’s environment rendered her fit to fulfil a 
desire despite a certain amount of a given negative state, i.e. shyness.  
 
If, however, Little Miss Shy was so overcome by fear she locked the door when Mr. 
Funny arrived, or went to the party, stayed for the first five minutes and ran out in terror, she 
would be in a position in which the level of her shyness had escalated beyond the point where 
the environmental factors which related to it were able to alleviate its negative effect. At such 
a point, the level of shyness could be said to be approaching a state of disability.  
 
A similar argument regarding mental illness is made by Wakefield, that it exists 
relative to cultural norms, however this argument only covers a person’s mental state, and 
also places the level of cultural beliefs and practices in what seems to  me a dangerously 
dictatorial position with respect to an individual’s desires, which is why I believe desire 
satisfaction and the comparison of individual abilities to attain it versus the environmental 
factors that individual shares with those around them is a far more reliable method to identify   
the normal and abnormal, and indeed the disabled, as opposed to simply what a given set of 
cultural practices say.87 
 
Having now, finally, established a standard of comparison by which both the effort 
expended by individuals and groups of people with medical conditions may be specifically 
examined and categorized as different from that of the majority in the same environment, we 
can finally formulate a concrete definition of disability in terms of its effects upon quality of 
life which may be then applied to other issues such as accessibility, social prejudice and the 
matter of human assistance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
87 J. Wakefield. 
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Section F: Definition 
 
We have examined the nature of the term disability, how it differs from inability and 
yet carries both purposive and judgemental overtones. We then examined how this term has 
been applied medically to certain individuals and attempts by the medical model to define it, 
and how such attempts fell short due to subjectivity, reliance on simple majority judgements 
and inability to state in what ways precisely disability is a form of harm, as opposed to the 
irreducible harm of pain.  
 
We then turned our attention to the factors involved in possession of a disabling 
condition, and how the social model attempts to ascribe all these factors to society. This 
however, as we saw, is also not a tenable approach due to individual differences between 
disabilities and the fact that not all the negative effects of disabilities can be traced to social 
causes, so we attempted to establish the castaway acid test by which those elements of a 
disabling condition could be isolated from social or other environmental factors.  
 
We then turned to the effects of a disabling condition and why such a condition is bad 
for the individual who possesses it, how it impacts upon the desires of a person, both in terms 
of directly frustrating the fulfilment of desires, and by increasing the amount of effort 
necessary to carry out desires, thus having an overall detrimental effect upon a person’s well-
being and their ability to live aneudaimon life.  
 
Finally, we attempted to reintroduce a standard of normality as compared to disability, 
and found how, by focusing on an individual’s relation to her or his environment, and how 
those intrinsic, involuntary characteristics of an individual isolated by the castaway acid test 
may be compared to the majority in terms of fulfilling desires and effort, a case by case test 
can be used to formulate a method to distinguish a "disabling" condition, and the extent to 
which that condition affects an individual.  
 
Therefore, we may propose the following definition:  
 
A disability is any intrinsic state of an individual's physical or psychological nature 
which that individual may not freely relinquish, and that individual would still possess even 
outside her or his current social context, which causes that individual to suffer a diminution 
of his or her ability to fulfil desires, a lessening in the availability and number of desires 
which that individual may ultimately fulfil, and a greater amount of effort in the fulfilment of 
the desires he or she does possess, as compared to the desire fulfilment and effort taken by 
other individuals sharing his or her environment who do not share that internal, involuntary 
state. 
 
Of course, this definition is extremely subjective and intended primarily as a test to be 
applied in different situations and circumstances, rather than a purely static categorization. If 
an examination of the existing models shows anything, it is that disability is not a scientific 
term that applies to just one category of objects, or a term of identity that applies to one set of 
human individuals. It is a state of being, an interaction between a person’s basic self and the 
environment. It is a negative preclusion of a person’s desires, an involuntary state, but one 
which the vast majority of humans will, to some extent, temporarily or permanently 
experience throughout their lives. It is for this reason that the above definition is intentionally 
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individualistic and flexible; a flexibility which it is hoped will allow a far more realistic and 
reasonable consideration of the freedom, desires and lives of anyone who experiences a 
disabling condition which, as I have indicated, will be almost everybody at some time. 
 
In making disability both universal and practically dynamic, I hope to open the debate 
to allow far more realistic and ethical treatment of those with disabilities, not as medical 
abnormalities or as a “special interest group” but simply as individuals who, whether as 
members of a society, patients at a hospital, or just people we ourselves encounter throughout 
life, deserve as much consideration of their freedom and well-being as anyone else.  
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Chapter 2: Persons with unconscious disabilities 
Introduction 
The definition offered in the previous chapter, while hopefully broad enough to take 
into account most forms of physical and psychological disability, may however present 
problems when applied to one particular group of people commonly recognized as disabled, 
those whose cognitive faculties or  understanding of the world is such that they themselves do 
not recognize that they are disabled, i.e. that their achievement of desires, or freedom to 
access certain desires, is affected by their physical or mental state.  
One of the primary examples of such a group is the group now represented in 
governmental legislation as learning disabled. Though some with mild learning disabilities 
may indeed recognize that they are at least different from others around them, those with 
severe learning disabilities, categorized as P.M.L.D., or profoundly multiply learning 
disabled will generally not be able to do so, as their intellectual abilities will be far less than 
those of an average adult and so they do not recognize the fact of their lessened capacities for 
achieving well-being, as compared to those around them. This distinction covers both those 
with severe learning disabilities such as autism, as well as those who have suffered forms of 
brain damage. 
I feel that any definition of disability must be able to encompass those in this position 
just as much as those with usually understood disabling conditions such as blindness or 
paraplegia. After all, profound learning disabilities are always treated under the umbrella of 
“disability” in our common understanding, and it is undeniably true that such conditions are 
involuntary, integral to the self and have profound effects upon the lives of those who have 
them. Yet those with cognitive disabilities, particularly those who are  unconscious of their 
status as disabled, are a group whose interests, experiences and indeed even identity has been 
very much underrepresented in most of the discourse on disability, despite the fact that, 
unlike other groups categorised as disabled, those with cognitive impairments are by 
definition unable to represent themselves or recognize their own identity, indeed this 
asymmetrical relation to society seems to suggest that the  basic assumption of the social 
model itself is inadequate to this task. 
I have some personal experience in this area since my sister is diagnosed with 
congenital myotonic dystrophy and cerebral palsy, and so is categorized as P.M.L.D. by 
governmental standards, and is thus part of the group mentioned, since her cognitive 
understanding will in no way be such that she recognizes her own disability. I hope therefore, 
through reflection upon some of my personal experience of life with her,  and with the 
establishment of some conceptual tools, the definition offered in the first chapter will be able 
to work out a framework for discussing the desires, experience and quality of  life of people 
within this group, something which the existing discourse on disability has failed to do, and 
something which has extremely wide-ranging applications outside the field of academia in 
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education, social care and daily life, matters very much affected by how those with any form 
of disability are perceived and treated by the rest of society.  
Thus, in Section A, I will first review what precisely is meant by “unconscious 
disability” and how the existing theoretical research has not taken this group into account, 
and yet it is the unconsciously disabled who, being under-represented and generally unheard 
in much disability discourse, as well as possessing lives whose experience is heavily based 
around interactions with others (often medical professionals or carers), have most to gain 
from proper consideration and  representation of their interests, and most to lose without it. 
In Section B I will examine the lives and desires of the unconsciously disabled and 
their status as agents and bearers of desire, what information is lacking in their lives and 
ability to make choices about desires, and to what extent they may be said to be disabled. 
In Section C I will compare those with profound learning disabilities to a very similar 
group, children, and thus hopefully come to a more clear understanding of the status of their 
lives and experiences. 
Finally, in Section D I will compare these issues to my earlier definition, taking into 
account issues such as effort, in an attempt to establish methods of considering the lives and 
experiences of people in this underrepresented category, and how this might affect the 
definition previously offered in Chapter 1.  
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Section A: Discourse on unconscious disability  
The sociologist and disability advocate Tanya Titchkosky believes that a correct 
application of disability studies, a newly emerging speciality discipline followed by 
theoreticians working in the social model, must have its roots as much in notions of the 
phenomenology of disability, as in society’s treatment of those categorized as disabled.88,89 
Working as she does from a sociological background, her focus is on understanding the 
experiences of different groups of people socially categorized as disabled, and how they 
interact with general views of the world and the objects it contains. So for instance, what for 
a person with normal mobility might be an attractive ornamental piece of ironwork on an 
artistically created (and thus unusually shaped) set of steps, will prove for a paraplegic an 
insurmountable obstacle to entering a building.90 Thus, according to Titchkosky, much of the 
world is socially created by those categorized as “able bodied” with their specific values and 
capacities in mind, for example a desire for ornamentation over easy wheelchair access. This, 
Titchkosky contends, leaves no room for the experiences of lives lead by those with 
impairments.  
This is a perfect and structured statement of the social model’s most basic tenet, 
dividing the experiences of those with disabilities from those without them, because, 
according to the social model, the intrinsic categorization of both groups of people denotes a 
distinctly different form of experiencing the world, a majority and minority world view held 
in opposition to one another. It is therefore intrinsic to this model that those categorized as 
disabled know that they are disabled and understand the relation of the world’s objects to 
them, that people with paraplegia recognize the intrinsic difference between their own mode 
of locomotion (usually a wheelchair), and  the “normal”  method of walking, or that blind 
people recognize that they lack visual information about the world around them, and thus are 
excluded from many aspects of society, everything from signs and print to non-verbal 
communication.  
There are however, those who are categorized as disabled by definitions, such as that 
of the World Health Organisation, who cannot be said to fulfil this requirement, since their 
                                                          
88 Tanya Titchkosky, “Chapter 8”, Disability, Self, and Society, (University of Toronto, 2003).  
89 This view is also expressed by various other exponents of the social model who claim that the experiences of 
different groups of disabled people are categorically different from what are often called “the normals”, and that 
it is society’s inability to “recognize different experiences” in which lies the real identifying characteristic of 
disability. Titchkosky however, goes slightly further in her tying of personal experiences of disability to varying 
ways of “being in the world” rather than tying the social origin of disability more explicitly to something such as 
a dominant concept of the body or a simple prejudice. I will examine the nature of social relations and attitudes 
more specifically in Chapter 4, however for purposes of our present discussion it is merely necessary to note this 
often emphasized link between specifically, socially created ways of comprehending and being in the world, and 
disability. 
90 Tanya Titchkosky, “Chapter 5”. 
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perceptions of the world, its objects and their relations to it, will simply not fall into this 
pattern of group experience, particularly those with extremely severe forms of mental illness, 
autism, and more generally those categorized as P.M.L.D., or profoundly multiply learning 
disabled.91 
Whereas the person with paraplegia would recognize the existence of the steps from 
Titchkosky’s example, if they fell into this category, i.e. possessed some sort of cognitive 
impairment in addition to their paraplegia, they may recognize the steps only as a break from 
the point that a parent or carer pushes their wheelchair into the building, or even not 
recognize them at all as an object which has any sort of effect on the course of their life or 
experience.92 Indeed, for some people who are extremely severely cognitively disabled (those 
categorized as P.M.L.D.), the inability to recognize steps is itself a profoundly dangerous 
situation and one requiring input  from others such as parents, teachers or carers, especially 
when the person themselves has other impairments that affect their mobility. 
There are of course others who, despite possessing “normal” intellectual capacities are 
still “unconscious” of the significance of certain social objects or situations with respect to 
themselves, i.e. their disability. Tanya Titchkosky herself details her life lived with dyslexia, 
and the effect this had through school and university when she believed her difficulty with 
writing was her own failing through lack of practice or clumsiness, that it was in fact a 
voluntary, rather than involuntary condition and one which was the result of some character 
flaw that she herself could avoid such as laziness or wilful misunderstanding.93Similar 
accounts of self-destructive comparison to others and a belief that involuntary effects of a 
disability were in fact failings on the part of the individual have been reported by sufferers of 
many conditions such as M.E., indeed it was this fact which caused the diagnosis and 
classification of M.E. in the first place as a distinct condition in its own right, as previously 
noted. 
The case however of someone experiencing a condition they may not be aware of 
which is impacting their ability to fulfil desires, seems to be a different state of affairs from 
the case of someone with a more general cognitive impairment. Titchkosky was able to 
compare her own levels of effort, time and trouble taken with writing, comprehending 
information such as directions on a map, and similar tasks to those in approximately the same 
position as herself, effectively to establish an idea of what should be “normal” quantities of 
                                                          
91 Towards a Common Language for Functioning, Disability and Health. 
92 Of course, the mobility difficulties presented by obstacles to the movement of a learning disabled person who 
also has paraplegia will have an impact on the lives of those around them such as family members or carers, and 
it is for this reason that government benefits and services exist. However, it would be utterly incorrect to 
confuse the experiences of a disabled person and his or her assistant or carer in any task, even though they may 
be closely linked in the fulfilment of the desires of the disabled person. I will examine this relation when 
considering the question of human assistance more generally in the next chapter. 
93 Tanya Titchkosky, “Chapter 1”. 
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effort or efficacy in that given situation which she was then able to apply to her own 
circumstances. In failing to recognize that her amount of effort was equal, or even greater 
than, the normal amount a person expended in such tasks, she attributed her failing in them to 
her own character inequities. This indeed is common with people possessing a disability they 
are unaware of, whether this is a person in the first stages of sight loss straining their eyes at a 
far off object, or a person experiencing mental illness finding themselves more seriously 
affected by their emotional or mental state to a point where it significantly impacts upon the 
rest of their life.94 
As many commentators on the social model have noted, it is this tyrannical standard 
of normalcy which often causes a large amount of suffering for disabled individuals. This 
situation though, is still in no way analogous to that of a person with a condition such as 
P.M.L.D., since the person experiencing the disability is merely unaware of some facts about 
themselves. Upon being made aware of these facts, they are able to recognize their 
significance and integrate them into the rest of life, for instance by finding strategies whereby 
they are able to reduce the amount of effort and time required in engaging with activities or 
situations directly affected by their disability, thus while being made aware of these facts 
does not eliminate the disability itself, it does nevertheless allow the individual more control 
and understanding of their life, and also end their adherence to the overbearing standard of 
normality which may have caused considerable problems for them on its own, (I will return 
to this topic in Chapter 4 when considering how people with disabilities relate to others).  
The form of unconscious disability however, which I am attempting to address here, 
is that possessed by a group of people whose disability itself precludes them from 
understanding that it actually exists. People who cannot perform the effort based assessments 
mentioned above, or understand that their condition is involuntary, or even in severe cases 
understand that the effort or suffering they need to undergo to achieve a goal or participate in 
certain aspects of life can be related to a similar amount of effort in other people. It is the 
difference between a person being temporarily unaware of a fact about themselves that they 
may at any time be made aware of, for instance high blood pressure, and a person told a fact 
about themselves which is so profoundly alien and beyond their understanding that it can play 
                                                          
94 This comparison of a “normal” effect upon a person’s life is used in psychiatry to establish whether or not a 
condition such as depression is “chronic”, i.e. at the level where it may be considered to be a disability. There is 
a considerable and long running debate concerning whether the categorization of those with mental illness as in 
fact “ill” is simply an imposition of society’s view of reality and what a person’s beliefs should be upon a 
minority, but that would seem to be a much separated issue from the problem of disability, since disability 
concerns (as stated in the previous chapter), an involuntary state which interferes with the desires of a person, 
not a voluntary state which simply conflicts with society’s views. Indeed, conversations I have had with a 
number of people with mental illnesses such as depression and schizophrenia seem to indicate a case far more 
similar to Titchkosky’s account of dyslexia, where their efforts at fulfilling desires differed from those around 
them, so it seems reasonable to assume that, at least for some of those with mental illness, the state is 
involuntary and they do indeed count as disabled, albeit that there may also be cases of those diagnosed as 
mentally ill who do not. 
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no part in their self-assessment or how they conduct their life, and no amount of explanation 
will change this. It would be like attempting to convince a Neanderthal that disease was 
caused by microscopic organisms invisible to the naked eye and to alter their lifestyle 
accordingly, though even in this case it is conceivable, given enough education to create a 
shared field of reference, that the Neanderthal might grasp the concept, whereas in extreme 
cases of unconscious disability there would be no possibility of this at all. 
I also feel that while the topic of what might be called the temporarily unaware 
disabled has received a large amount of theoretical attention, the same is in no way true of 
those who are absolutely unconscious of their disability. As Chappell notes, many social 
theorists have simply ignored those whose disability causes their intellect to be in such a state 
that not only do they not recognize they are disabled, but they do not recognize even basic 
objects in the same fashion as “normal” people.95,96 
Sara Goering indeed categorically refuses to even engage with those with unconscious 
disabilities, on the basis that the “purpose” of the social model of disability is purely that of 
group advocacy, and though she acknowledges the importance of “understanding” those who 
cannot speak for themselves or form distinct social groups, she states that, since the purpose 
of the social model is group identity, such people directly fall outside its purview.97 
Swain and French on the other hand do suggest that the social model may be able to 
come to terms with this issue by engaging in dialogue with people with such conditions, and 
thus gain an understanding of the “social experience” of learning-disabled people.98 
However, though Swain and French both do present some examples of interviews with 
                                                          
95 Anne Louise Chappell. 
96 Chappell believes that this lack of accounting by the social model is more a matter of its focus upon the body 
as a socially created object, and the disparity between “the disabled body” and “the normal body” rather than 
elements such as the intellect. While this explanation would also account for the reason that, though they are 
often medically counted as disabilities, forms of mental illness are not usually discussed in the same light, this 
form of analysis goes beyond what I am trying to achieve here, since I am trying to establish a newly 
constructed definition which takes into account a lack in previous discussion, rather than simply demonstrate  
why such a lack may have occurred in the first place, though I will return to the topic of how social perceptions 
of disabled individuals relate to my desire based definition in Chapter 4. 
97 Sara Goering, “‘You say you’re happy, but …’: Contested quality of life judgements in bioethics and 
disability studies’, Journal of Bioethical Inquiry, vol.5, no. 3, (2008), pp.125-136. 
98 John Swain, Sally French and Colin Cameron. 
Also: K. Keema, “Chapter 2”, Inclusion or Segregation. 
Also: John Swain, “What’s So Good About Independence?”, Controversial Issues in a Disabling Society, ed. 
John Swain, Sally French and Colin Cameron , (Buckingham: Open University Press, 2003), pp 76-86. 
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people of mild learning disability, this still does not take into account the experiences of those 
with more profound conditions who categorically do not understand that they possess any 
form of disability, yet whose lives and experience may be most profoundly affected by their 
physical and psychological state. So, as Swain notes, while it is possible for Peter, a person 
with Down’s Syndrome experiencing mild learning disability, to utilize and understand the 
uses of governmental direct payments to advantage in his life, this option would not be open 
to those with more severe learning disabilities, since unlike Peter, they have far more 
difficulty in actually articulating and structuring their experiences and desires and what 
choices they wish throughout life, despite the fact that this very lack and reliance upon others 
would make a system, such as direct payments and its administration to their benefit,  of even 
greater significance. It may also be the case that even if a person, for instance someone with 
autism, understands that they are “different” from others, they do not attach any significance 
to this fact beyond its mere existence, or are able to actively consider the significance of why 
they are different at all.  
Of course, though I have attempted to draw a distinction between unaware and 
unconsciously disabled for the purpose of this discussion, the quantity of understanding is 
largely proportional, and therefore strict categorization here is impossible. For example, a 
child with learning disabilities and paraplegia may be quite aware that they are unable to play 
football like other children, but not be able to understand the reason why. It does however, 
seem to be the case that in theoretical terms, while some commentators like Swain and 
Chappell have attempted to extend the social model of disability to those with a limited 
understanding, very little effort has been made to encompass those with none at all. Yet, since 
they do not have the ability to share their “social experience”, and because they are often 
treated merely as the objects of the perceptions of others and so even more seriously subject 
to the vagaries of their environment, the more unconscious of their disability a person is it 
seems the more they are in need of theoretical attention and representation than many other 
more vocal groups of those who are usually recognized as “the disabled”. 
This can be seen in the formulation of the Warnock Report and the original 
governmental policy on the education of profoundly disabled children in 1973.99 As Mary 
Warnock explains, before the writing of this report, children with certain levels of disability 
were held to be uneducable, since they were not capable of learning to read, write, etc. They 
could, and did, receive basic physical care, but the idea of actually creating any sort of 
specifically designed, education programmes for them, or even that their education could be 
of any value at all was completely unknown. Needless to say, this was definitely in line with 
the thinking of the time which was dominated by the “disability as illness” schema of the 
medical model, and saw those with profound learning disabilities as simply “long term care 
patients,” as Newell observes.100 
                                                          
99 Mary Warnock, “Chapter 3”, An Intelligent Person’s Guide to Ethics, (Gerald Duckworth, 1998). 
100 Christopher Newell. 
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Mary Warnock however, questioned what exactly the purpose of education was. 
Rather than simply being understood as achieving the ability to write, perform arithmetic, 
etc., she proposed that the purpose of education was to achieve a certain level of control over 
a person’s environment, and thus make it easier for a person to enact the fulfilment of his or 
her desires. Thus, for a  profoundly disabled  child to learn how to use a switch 
communicator to choose between two flavours of ice cream was, according to Mary 
Warnock, a reasonable goal of education.101,102 
Yet, whether a profoundly learning disabled child received this form of education, or 
was encouraged to learn to articulate such choices was simply a matter of governmental and 
bureaucratic policy, and was far more a product of the sympathetic or pragmatic thinking of 
the time than any attempt to  consider children’s actual interests. This is why, even today, the 
type and mode of education received by learning disabled children is often related only to the 
attitude of the school they happen to attend, and not related to any larger consideration of 
what educational needs will be of most benefit to them personally. So, following Mary 
Warnock’s reasoning, it does seem that profoundly disabled people can be recognized as 
having desires, and that they stand in a relation to their environment by which those desires 
may or may not be fulfilled, albeit that the objects of those desires may not be similar objects 
of desire to those recognized by other members of society, and that the attainment of those 
desires may involve a vastly different process of intermediate steps.  
This similarity in form related to desires and their fulfilment needs to be emphasized, 
since a very worrying tendency exists in certain commentators to see unconsciously disabled 
people just as tools of moral example, or means to a moral end, rather than ends in 
themselves. Macintyre for instance, states that profoundly disabled children should be valued 
because they give those around them the chance to exemplify and practice moral virtues, and 
opportunities to develop unusual relationships.103 This may be true to an extent, since those 
who come into contact with the unconsciously disabled may indeed perfect some virtues, 
however it says  little about the status of the unconsciously disabled  themselves. It tells us 
nothing about how the experiences of unconsciously disabled people and their interactions 
                                                          
101 Some commentators such as Michael Smith have heavily questioned Mary Warnock’s motives, indeed in 
Smith’s opinion, the Warnock report was more concerned with transferring responsibility for profoundly 
disabled children from the health service to the education service. I, however, am more concerned with Mary 
Warnock’s philosophical, rather than political motives for the formulation of her report, which would seem to be 
based upon improving the quality of life for those with an unconscious disability, and the idea that the 
government’s responsibilities for providing education apply just as equally to cognitively impaired children. I 
personally find Smith’s attribution of ulterior and indeed quite self-centred motives to Mary Warnock, which 
differ markedly from the ones she expresses herself, less than convincing, but such a debate is best left to 
political historians. 
102 Michael Smith, “Does the Evaluative Supervene on the Natural?”, Well-being and Morality: Essays in 
Honour of James Griffin, ed. Roger Crisp and Brad Hooker, (Oxford: Clarenden Press, 2000), pp 91-114. 
103 Alasdair MacIntyre, “Chapter 9”. 
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with the environment should be considered and valued, the way the fulfilment and happiness 
of other humans is considered as a valuable end in and of itself. 
A far cruder, and more worrying expression of this view, is seeing profound disability 
as an expression of sentimentality with a vaguely moral bent. J. David Smith,  in his book In 
Search of Better Angels discusses many cases of  “lessons he’s learnt” from working as a 
teacher with profoundly disabled children, and indeed concludes that the main benefit of such 
children is simply the ability to show, “A  glimpse into our own  unselfish moral nature,” and 
wishes that more people would undertake working with profoundly disabled children in order 
that society receive this benefit, a view which is often exemplified by the media or even 
organizations such as charities supposedly working in the interests of profoundly disabled 
children.104This view however, though many have found it attractive, hides a form of thinking 
which on closer inspection seems extremely repellent, since it reduces the status of the 
unconsciously disabled to essentially that of a doll or a pot plant, i.e. an object upon which 
we can practice being moral in order that we may show moral behaviour towards “real 
humans” later on, but an object whose actual desires and experience do not in themselves 
matter half as much as they would were the person “normal”. This is a perfect case of treating 
such people only as means to another purpose, albeit the highly laudable purpose of 
practicing moral behaviour and developing personal virtues, rather than as an end in 
themselves with desires that actually have intrinsic value to them.  
But, as Mary Warnock demonstrates, the majority of those in the P.M.L.D. category 
do possess desires, do interact with the environment and do plainly have a life with its own 
structure and experience which can benefit from the possession of the ability to make choices 
over what those experiences involve. 
Yet, at the same time, it cannot be denied that many of the concerns which cover other 
groups classified as disabled may simply not be applicable to those in the P.M.L.D category. 
There would be little sense, for instance, in attempting to make an adjustment to the steps in 
Titchkosky’s example to allow profoundly learning disabled people access to the building, 
since they may not have the ability to recognize that freedom of this access is of any benefit 
to them, and indeed, depending upon the function of the building in question, it may not be, 
for example if the building were a polling station for voting in an election. 
The major problem in dealing with the unconsciously disabled, and P.M.L.D in 
particular, is that nobody has so far asked the question of exactly how those with profound 
disabilities may actually be said to be “disabled”, and in what ways their lives are limited, 
and how we should think of such lives,(other than as a moral example). This question is 
obviously difficult, since unlike those with more understandable sensory or motor 
impairments, or those with psychological conditions such as depression which cause 
                                                          
104 J. David Smith, In Search of Better Angels: Stories of Disability in the Human Family, (Corwin, 2003). 
Disability, Desire and Society: The Establishment of a New, Individualistic Definition of Disability and 
its Practical Uses in Everyday Life 
By Luke Hewitt 
 
58 
 
increased effort, the unconsciously disabled may not be in a position to understand that they 
“are” disabled, as noted previously. 
Thus, it will be necessary to turn to the nature of desires, and exactly what types of 
desire the lives of those who possess an unconscious disability involve, and in what ways 
these desires might be frustrated to establish the nature of their disability. 
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Section B: The quality of life and desires of those with unconscious 
disability  
The first and most major issue in discussing those with unconscious disabilities is that 
perhaps, even more than any other commonly recognized group of humans, the actual nature 
of their lives and capacities for well-being can vary extremely. In a discussion with David 
Stewart, O.B.E., head teacher of Shepherd School for severely learning disabled children (the 
school my sister attended), he revealed that though many researchers asked to perform 
research with his pupils, asking for people with specific conditions such as Down’s 
Syndrome or children who had a basic understanding of some given thing such as numeracy, 
it was often extremely difficult to separate children into one category or another, since the 
abilities and understanding of the children showed a huge degree of variation. Some were or 
were not able to walk, some were or were not able to speak, some recognized people, some 
did not, etc. This is the reason I have simply classified this group as “unconsciously disabled” 
since this seems to exemplify the theoretical problem provided by those who are medically 
and socially classified as having a disability, but are not able to recognize this fact or attribute 
such a distinction to themselves, yet unlike any medical definition of capacity or any arbitrary 
distinction such as I.Q. scores, it is able to encompass the whole of this group simply by 
virtue of the faculty of self-perception relative to others.  
As Mary Warnock noted, David Stewart did confirm that desires, relationships and 
general quality of life were still a question of importance to the vast majority of those 
categorized as P.M.L.D., so simply classifying them, as Warnock’s opponents did, as 
“vegetables” which just grow and require care but have no ability to have desires, or 
participate or engage in experience, is purely incorrect.105 This is also something I’ve noticed 
in life with my sister: her capacities to enjoy certain things, and not others, and her capacity 
to interact with people and form relationships, even if not based on spoken interactions since 
she cannot speak more than four or five words.  
 At the same time however, it is true that the desires of many experiencing learning 
disabilities and in particular those who are not conscious of having a disability will differ 
markedly from the desires of the majority of people, and may preclude things which are 
commonly thought of as of critical importance. For instance, as noted previously, while a 
wheelchair accessible entrance to a building is a desirable thing for a person with paraplegia, 
since without it they will not be free to enter that building, when viewed from the perspective 
of a person with any form of unconscious disability this desire for freedom of access does not 
directly apply since by the very fact of being unconscious of their disability, the person has 
no ability to recognize that they are missing something important by not possessing that 
freedom.  
                                                          
105 Mary Warnock. 
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This case is even less clear than that of the oppressed people offered in the previous 
chapter. While an oppressed people who have never known political freedom may, in some 
possible world with different circumstances, desire and benefit from such freedom, there is 
categorically no possibility that a person with an unconscious disability would recognize this 
lack in freedom and still be unconscious of their disability. Of course, someone with learning 
disabilities may wish to participate in whatever activity is going on inside an inaccessible 
building, such as attending a play, or watching a film in a cinema, however the simple factor 
of being able to enter independently in and of itself does not seem to have the same 
significance to them, since a desire to “go to a show” is a separate one from the desire to 
enter a theatre whenever desired. 
Furthermore, on the subject of freedom, it indeed may be the case that some desires of 
people with learning disabilities are, by their very nature, those which we would wish to 
actually frustrate simply on the basic, common sense level of living a life free of pain. Say for 
instance, the desire to put a hand into a fire. Curtailing a person’s freedom in respect to this 
desire would seem to be quite reasonable even though restrictions on people’s freedom are 
generally problematic to justify. At the same time though, despite the fact that freedom to 
plan life goals or activities might be problematic for many unconsciously disabled people, it 
is clear that possessing a given freedom to do something can in itself be pleasurable even in 
cases where such a form of freedom exists only to give that pleasure. I, for instance, 
remember the first time my sister was able to play with an electric wheelchair propelled by 
joy stick, as opposed to simply being pushed. She definitely enjoyed this experience 
incredibly, and yet there was no express purpose to it other than its own enjoyment, since it 
was not possible for my sister to understand or safely use an electric wheelchair to propel 
herself between desired destinations like a paraplegic person with “normal” intellect. This 
does seem a form of freedom, a freedom of movement, but a freedom of movement existing 
simply for the purpose of pleasure, even if it will not, due to the intellectual restrictions of the 
profoundly learning disabled person, be of use for any further, second order purpose such as 
travel or mobility. 
Several commentators working in desire theory, such as Sobel and Griffin, appeal to 
the idea of informed or second order desires as a method of grading and deciding upon the 
importance of desires, in order to suggest which should be satisfied to produce the best 
quality of life.106 According to this position, some form of intellectual understanding is used 
to deliberate upon desires and decide ultimately which should be satisfied. Thus, to a person 
of normal intellect, even if they were to feel the desire to put a hand into a fire, previously 
acquired knowledge of the effects of fire would instantly persuade them that such a desire 
was not in their best interest. 
                                                          
106D. Sobel. 
Also: J. Griffin, “Chapter 2”. 
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According to this informed desire schema, secondary, experiential desires such as the 
desire for a particular food are in many ways less important, and less crucial, indeed many 
who have written on desire theory maintain the position, first elaborated by writers such as 
Hume and Jeremy Bentham, that intellectual desires, or desires which relate to entire lifestyle 
choice and by which an entire life may be guided, are in some way more worthy and more 
admirable to cultivate than other forms of desire, expressed by Jeremy Bentham in his remark 
that he’d rather be Socrates unsatisfied than a pig satisfied, since even unfulfilled intellectual 
desires were better than fulfilled physical ones.  
Thus, with this view in mind, the lives of those with intellectual disabilities are in 
many ways less easily quantified, simply because the “informed” desires are in many senses 
less prevalent because (depending upon the severity of the intellectual impairment)  
perceptions of the future, or ability to enjoy intellectual pleasures are simply not present, and 
the more  immediate desires for food  or instant perception of  currently pleasing objects are 
more evident, such as a desire to continue listening to music or watching a children’s TV 
programme. It is for this reason that Peter Singer characterizes people of reduced 
consciousness as of less moral value, though it is also noteworthy that when his own mother 
fell into such a state due to age, he did not maintain this consideration (showing clearly that 
he was far from practical in his philosophy’s actual impact on his life).107 
Yet, thinking of those (as Singer plainly did) with intellectual disability merely as 
creatures of whim with no ability to enjoy or experience anything beyond immediate sensory 
satisfaction does not seem in any sense accurate, indeed it is dangerously close to the 
pejorative “Vegetables” employed by Warnock’s opponents.  
Mary Warnock recognized that education could provide profoundly disabled children 
with the ability to make choices and have degrees of control over their lives, and that in 
possessing these controls, profoundly disabled children could indeed develop and perfect 
their own preferences and desires, and through experience, albeit experience often on a very 
singular level, acquire a set of second order desires specific to them and some of the needed 
tools they could use to enact those desires. In the respect of acquiring “informed” experiential 
desires, the structure at least of the desire schema of profoundly disabled people is  little 
different to anyone else’s. My sister definitely has her own preferences for music, food, 
company and other forms of experience, preferences which also make her very distinctly “a 
person” (despite Singer’s contention).  
While the fact of more complex second order desires however, may provide 
something structurally similar in the lives of P.M.L.D. individuals to those of other humans, 
it is nevertheless also true that their lives will be vastly different.  
If one flavour of ice cream is desired and another is not, due to previous experience, 
this desire may be said to be “informed” to the extent that past experience and information 
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are involved in its choice, a choice which can only be made with reference to this prior 
experience, even if the basic nature of deciding between choices of this type would not 
usually be held by commentators as an example of an informed desire. However, it is also 
true that other, more complex forms of informed desires, such as the desire to enact a full 
scale life plan, or endure temporary discomfort for a future benefit, are far less evident. While 
my sister certainly possesses extremely strong desires for certain experiences over others, 
even if this comprises, for instance, preference for one sort of music over another. While 
making these choices via her past experience she is certainly quite as informed as anyone else 
making a similar choice, this does not stop her disliking necessary procedures such as 
breathing with oxygen. 
Both according to statements by David Stewart, and by experiences such as those of 
David Smith, it is in no way true that the only desires experienced by many people with 
learning disabilities are merely physical ones, indeed relationships and interpersonal feelings,  
towards parents, family members and carers, and towards peers, are very much in evidence, 
as noted previously.108 Yet this point is often also made in connection with informed desire 
theory as well. As Griffin notes, “informed” desires may be as much a matter of the passions 
and emotions as of purely intellectual thought.109 It is, I believe, partially this understanding 
of emotional connections which fuels some of the sentimentality of writers such as David 
Smith, who find the existence of emotional connection in the lives of cognitively disabled 
people so surprising.  It seems such sentimental reactions as Smith’s automatically assume 
some sort of proportional relationship between ability to experience emotional attachments 
and intelligence, and then are surprised when this belief is contradicted.   
Nevertheless, it is also completely true that many of those with reduced intellectual 
capacities are often unable to distinguish between past and future events and are thus 
unequipped to make plans of action, or feel emotional anticipation, which go beyond the next 
few moments. It would be impossible for instance, to ask someone in this group to 
distinguish between two sets of future circumstances set ahead in time, such as the decision 
between two holiday destinations or two schools. Thus they are clearly not able to make a 
great many informed or considered decisions about their own well-being or the fulfilment of 
their desires over time. Such decisions are usually left to those around them, those who, it is 
hoped, are sensitive to the interests and past experiences of the people in question, and are 
thus able to distinguish the difference between a number of temporally more distant future 
possibilities which the profoundly learning disabled are unable to. For instance, my sister 
greatly loves theatrical performances and shows such as pantomimes. It is however, not 
possible for her to read a show’s description from advertised material, or even for this 
description to be comprehensible to her if the material were read to her or accessed in a 
different format as a visually impaired person would. It is therefore up to my parents to 
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observe what shows are on at the theatre, and decide based upon their knowledge of my 
sister’s own preferences what she would, or would not be interested in seeing. 
It does seem therefore, that people with intellectual disabilities can be said, to an 
extent, to experience a lack; a lack in the capacity to formulate informed desires or perceive 
relevant information which would contribute to their formulation. This lack may be 
somewhat similar in fact to that of those with sight impairments’ experience in lacking the 
capacity to take in visual information and participate in desires that require this information. 
However, unlike sensory impairments, the intellectually impaired person is not free to 
wonder what possessing the capacity for informed desires actually is, or even perceive the 
capacity they do not possess, nor are they able to access the effects of this capacity in an 
alternative form. Yet, as noted in the previous chapter, this might even be considered a 
blessing in some circumstances, since it would not be to the interests of any disabled person 
to experience the wish to fulfil a desire which they were biologically inhibited from, but 
while for most people with disabilities this must be expressed intellectually and reasoned 
through in course of life choices, for the intellectually impaired it is simply another biological 
inhibition. 
Those with unconscious disabilities therefore, seem to possess emotional attachments 
and limited capacities for informed desires, but lack much of the ability to apprehend 
information about their lives and their choices, a lack which often means their choices will be 
made by others; others who it is hoped both possess the information and capacity they lack 
and are thus able to make choices which will be of benefit to them. Indeed one major 
responsibility for those making choices about the lives and preferences of intellectually 
disabled people, is that they make choices totally in the interests of the person themselves, 
and not choices aimed at some other goal.110,111 
                                                          
110 The notion that the interests of disabled people may be subordinated to those of another person, institution, 
political party agenda, or other goal than their own well-being by helpers, professionals, family members, 
nurses, carers, or just about anybody else, is one which appears with varying amounts of paranoia or evidence of 
misuse, directed at one disabled group or another in a huge variety of the literature on the social model.  
Titchkosky, French, Smith, Newell and Chappell, to name only a few, have all at one time or another  accused 
various groups, individuals or indeed society at large of attempting to either directly push the interests of 
disabled individuals aside in favour of others, or convince, by various sorts of  coercion, disabled people that 
other interests than their own take precedence. Some indeed, such as Tassano, even go as far as to accuse the 
medical profession of intentionally making people believe that they are “sick” and need the care of doctors and 
nurses in order to maintain their power over others. I will discuss such claims in more detail in the next two 
chapters, however I do find it rather interesting that while all of these authors loudly protest on behalf of groups 
such as the hearing, sight, or movement impaired, none of them seem to have recognized that the group most in 
danger of such subordination of interest is the group who cannot, by virtue of their disability, protest or even 
understand mistreatment at all. Only French has at all approached this point, however since French’s discussion 
is already couched in such emotive and vitriolic language and seems to roundly accuse most of society of 
innumerable crimes against all forms of disabled people, this specific point relating to the vulnerability of the 
unconsciously disabled is somewhat overshadowed. 
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We may conclude then that while the lives of those experiencing P.M.L.D. are not 
entirely dissimilar in the structure of their desire satisfaction to autonomous adults, they can 
experience at least a degree of desires informed by experience. This on the surface might 
make the application of the definition offered in the previous chapter extremely difficult, 
since if P.M.L.D individuals’ lives are so different, how can normal degrees of effort or 
desire frustration be established? Yet, there is another group in society who seem to be in a 
distinctly similar position.  
Children, like P.M.L.D. individuals, have desires which often bear many of the 
hallmarks of adult desires, but experience reductions in autonomy, in the ability to perceive 
temporally distant possibilities or engage in some of the more complex forms of second order 
informed desires mentioned by Griffin.112 
It is therefore my belief that while comparisons of P.M.L.D. individuals to adults will 
always appear inadequate, to a large extent due to the profound differences in the quality of 
life and the relevance in desire satisfaction, if considered alongside children and the 
experience of childhood, a far richer and more worthy understanding may be established, and 
one which may also be in line with the previously mentioned definition.
                                                                                                                                                                                    
111 Tanya Titchkosky. 
Also: John Swain, Sally French and Colin Cameron. 
Also: Michael Smith. 
Also: Christopher Newell. 
Also: Anne Louise Chappell.  
Also: Fabian Tassano, “Chapter 2”, The Power of Life or Death: A Critique of Medical Tyranny,  (London: 
Duckworth, 1995). 
112 J. Griffin. 
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Section C: Intellectually disabled individuals and children 
Cultural notions of childhood differ widely, whether for instance children are 
regarded as a form of members of society in training, or as possessing some quality of 
innocence or purity which emphasizes their need for protection or tuition.113,114Nevertheless, 
the vast majority of views on the nature of childhood seem to be fairly unanimous on the 
point that children are firstly, in many senses not to be considered as morally responsible for 
their own actions and welfare in the same way as adults, and secondly, that it is necessary for 
others, often parents, carers or other adults, to frequently act as proxy for the establishment of 
children’s life choices in cases where the children themselves may not have the facility to 
make such a choice.For instance, parents often decide while their child is at a very early age 
what school the child will go to, reviewing many schools to make the decision, (and 
sometimes in British society even moving house to be in the catchment area of specifically 
better schools).  This is not a decision, however, which a child just starting school at an 
extremely young age, four or five years, is able to make for himself or herself simply by 
virtue of their inability to comprehend all necessary information. A child that young will not 
fully understand the purpose of schooling or the future benefits of having an education, still 
less be able to determine how any given school might best provide those benefits. It is thus 
reasonable and well established that the choice of school is generally one parents will make 
on behalf of their child.  
Of course, it is not true that children’s interests and desires are entirely in the hands of 
others, or that children are completely free of all responsibility for their own actions. Most 
cultures see teaching responsibility for the consequences of actions, particularly related to the 
fulfilment of desires, as a key part of the experience of childhood, for instance by 
encouraging a child to make less critical choices, such as what film to watch, then allowing 
them to live with the consequence of that choice. Nevertheless, this lack of complete 
                                                          
113 There are of course significant variations in the way different cultures treat childhood, see for instance 
Qvortrup, Frones and Montgomery. Here however, I wish to concentrate on the attributes of childhood which 
most closely relate to the treatment of those with profound cognitive disabilities and their ability to fulfil desires, 
namely, the role of parents or other individuals to aid in the fulfilment and comprehension of desires. This is of 
course not to state that all cultures’ views of childhood are the same, or that an Ethiopian child expected to learn 
adult tasks and participate in society is similar to a Japanese child treated as a precious and pure bearer of 
innocence. Still, it seems that the difference in capacities, knowledge and power between adults and children, 
and the responsibility taken for children by adults could be said to be a universal fact of human society. 
114 Jens Qvortrup, “Varieties of Childhood”, Studies in Modern Childhood: Society, Agency, Culture, ed. Jens 
Qvortrup, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), pp 1-20. 
Also: Ivar Frones, “Structuration of Childhood: An Essay on the Structuring of Childhood and Anticipatory 
Socialization”, Studies in Modern Childhood: Society, Agency, Culture, ed. Jens Qvortrup, (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), pp 267-282. 
Also: Heather Montgomery, An Introduction to Childhood: Anthropological Perspectives on Children’s Lives, 
(Blackwell, 2009). 
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freedom, and reliance upon others for fulfilling, or in some cases choosing the objects of 
desire, seems a very well established fact.  
At birth, a baby is totally reliant upon those around him or her to fulfil desires, since 
alone a baby cannot physically fulfil any of them, even a basic desire to change its position. 
Though it is certainly true that even an extremely young baby is able to form emotional 
attachments to and, to a limited extent, interact with those around them, particularly parents, 
it is also true that a baby is in no way accountable for his or her actions or the consequences 
of desires. It would be unreasonable to expect a newborn baby to refrain from some action, 
even something as simple as messing its clothes, because the baby’s intellectual capacity is 
simply not well developed enough to comprehend the nature of refraining from action or 
even, according to some theorists, the distinction between self and other. 
From this total and complete reliance upon others, the child slowly accrues both the 
capacity to decide upon her or his own desires, and the ability to take responsibility for their 
fulfilment. Though the age at which progress occurs, and even the age of full self 
responsibility can alter significantly between different cultures, it does seem that there is 
always a progression in this responsibility for desires, from a baby totally reliant upon others 
to even interpret what its desires are, to an adult who is able to make his or her desires known 
to others and responsibly work towards their fulfilment. It is also, therefore, obvious that 
when thinking of children, one is justified in curtailing desires which may be harmful, in the 
child’s best interest, such as the desire of a young child to put a hand into a fire. This 
curtailment of desires may not be recognized by the child at the time it occurs even though, if 
the child had both the relevant information and the ability to understand it, the child would 
agree, indeed, “You’ll understand when you’re older,” is a phrase not infrequently used by 
parents, albeit even then, a good parent may still attempt some sort of degree of explanation 
couched in terms a child can understand, for example “Don’t touch the fire, it’s hot and you’ll 
hurt yourself”. 
Since children seem to lack capacities for fulfilling desires and the ability to recognize 
this lack, a useful schema for examining and understanding the lives of intellectually disabled 
people might be to think of them not as invariably similar in moral status to fully cognisant 
individuals, but as essentially possessing the moral status and reduced state of responsibility 
of children. 
For instance, as Griffin notes, since the virtue of choice is itself an intrinsic part of 
desire, another person could not consign an adult to spend most of his or her time during the 
day in a set place and location without an extremely good reason; indeed such a restriction, 
i.e. imprisonment, is usually held to be a punishment.115 However, in cases where the adult 
suffers from an intellectual disability that prohibits their decision making process, it may 
even be a highly moral act, indeed locating a day centre for my sister to attend that she would 
enjoy, involved a lot of reviewing and careful exploration on her behalf by my parents, in 
                                                          
115 J. Griffin. 
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much the same manner that a conscientious parent would choose a first school for his or her 
child. 
Like children, intellectually disabled people have reduced responsibility, and are often 
entirely reliant upon others, particularly if they also possess physical impairments which 
(unlike a person with no cognitive impairments) they cannot recognize or accommodate for. 
Also like children, their ability to communicate, and to apprehend their own desires and 
moral status and their differences or similarities to others, can vary markedly even while still 
being classed in the same category as “child” simply by virtue of the severity of their 
intellectual disability. This also very much goes along with the experiences I myself have had 
with my sister, since my ongoing relationship and interactions with her are far more similar to 
those I would have with a three or four year old child, than those I would normally have with 
a person of 21 which is her actual age. Of course this does not demean or diminish the 
importance of such interactions and relationships, indeed I certainly do regard my sister as 
important to me, only to note that the nature of my relation to her is certainly not what it 
would be if she had “normal” intellectual capacities, and should not be thought of as 
occurring in the same way or form, anymore than an adult’s relation to a child is not of the 
same nature as their relation to another adult. 
In my discussion with David Stewart, he fully agreed on this classification, further 
adding that such a distinction is not one common to legislation or policy on education, since 
in the British education system enforced status changes ,such as leaving school at the age of 
18, can have profound, and often dire consequences on the lives of intellectually disabled 
people, even though such a distinction as the age of 18 means comparatively little for 
someone whose approximate age and mental capacities remain those of a much younger 
child. Simple and fairly obvious as this move may be, I have found no one anywhere in the 
literature I have examined who takes this route, in fact, as previously noted, very few authors 
on disability wish to engage with the subject of intellectual impairment at all, despite the 
intellectually disabled being one of the groups most in need of theoretical representation due 
to their inherent inability to interact with those around them. Indeed I partially desired to 
include the subject of cognitive impairment in my overall discussion of a new definition of 
disability precisely for this reason, that the majority of literature (especially from the 
perspective of the social model), miss them entirely, despite the fact that legislatively and 
socially our common understanding of “disability” does include cognitive disabilities, and 
that as a group who categorically cannot represent their own interests they require far more 
theoretical attention than more politically active groups of those classified as “disabled”. 
There is, however, one extremely important aspect in which children and those with 
intellectual disabilities differ markedly: Children grow up!  
In considering the needs and desires of children, it is necessary for anyone to consider 
the fact, sometimes obscured to children themselves, that they will eventually cease being 
children and certain decisions taken in childhood will have a large and more long lasting 
effect over the course of their lives. For example, while it may be reasonable from a child’s 
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perspective to not attend school and spend the day playing, in terms of attaining educational 
goals which will later be of much greater benefit this is not advisable, hence why an adult 
needs to often encourage children to attend school even against a child’s other inclinations.  
This concern however of recognizing children’s ability to alter their capacities over 
time, does not apply to people with unconscious disability, since, by the very nature of what 
their disability is and the reduction of their capacity for self-assessment, they cannot and will 
not be able to change their circumstances in the future. Like Peter Pan, they would seem to 
literally be children who never grow up, and as such the values which should be used in 
understanding their moral status show some differences from those involved in the 
consideration of “normal” children. Since these differences bear heavily upon the 
environment of children and a comparison of their lives to those with unconscious 
disabilities, it will be necessary to appeal to the theory of environmental comparison I 
established in the first chapter to resolve them.  
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Section D: Unconscious disability, children and conceptions of the 
“normal”  
In much of the anthropological work on children I have surveyed, most 
anthropologists have focused exclusively on children as slowly gaining cultural practices and 
status throughout childhood.116 Childhood has, as Montgomery observes, in many cases 
simply been seen as a time when children have neither acquired the biological maturity nor 
necessary understanding of a given culture’s values to be thought of as fully developed 
members of that culture, an acquisition often marked by some sort of coming of age 
ceremony or ritual.117 
In the 1970’s however, through the work of psychologists, sociologists and 
anthropologists taking a more humanistic approach such as Piaget and Gregory, the idea of 
childhood changed. Children were no longer simply a half full glass of cultural value which 
slowly filled up over time until the child was finally able to go through the appropriate rites 
and be accounted a fully equal member of a given society.  
Under Gregory’s view (a view with such modern exponents as William Corsaro), 
children were part of what could be thought of as their own culture and environment, unique 
and specific to children with its own individual set of values, rules and proprieties existing 
even at the same time as children learned and were introduced to more adult values.118Thus, 
as well as accruing adult experiences and learning the appropriate behaviours and standards 
of a given culture, children could be considered fully aware and conversant members of “The 
culture of childhood”. Corsaro indeed, took the step of quite literally posing as a child in 
several nursery schools in America and Italy, where he encouraged the children to think of 
him as “Big Bill”, i.e., as another child (albeit one of larger stature) rather than as an adult. 
He did this in order to participate in, and understand the “culture” of, childhood in much the 
same way as other anthropologists would study a culture by living within it for a short 
amount of time.  
Corsaro’s findings were that children’s behaviour among other children involved not 
merely an aping or playacting of half learned adult behaviours, but many acts, such as 
                                                          
116 Allison James, “Life Times: Children’s Perspective on Age, Agency and Memory Across the Life Course”, 
Studies in Modern Childhood: Society, Agency, Culture, ed. Jens Qvortrup, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2005), pp 248-266.  
Also: Ivar Frones. 
Also:Heather Montgomery. 
117 Ibid 
118 William A. Corsaro, “Collective Action and Agency in Young Children’s Peer Cultures”, Studies in Modern 
Childhood, Society, Agency, Culture, ed. Jens Qvortrup, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), pp 231-247. 
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spontaneous and instantaneous role-play, the construction of fantasies, or the changing 
relations and formalities existing between groups of children, that were unique and specific to 
the experience of children in that setting. Such experiences could not be directly acquainted 
with the teaching children had received from adults or from wider social practices they may 
have observed, and seemed entirely unique to the experience of childhood itself. Thus if we 
treat childhood as possessing its own distinct identity as a state of being and a cultural 
environment, the consideration of cognitively disabled people as “children” seems to become 
extremely clear in exactly what ways the cognitively disabled differ from the “normal”, i.e. 
those adults who are optimally equipped for the fulfilment of desires within their 
environment and how their desires, experiences and abilities to relate to others should be 
assessed: not as merely the sentimental postures of a doll, or yet as a disabled individual who 
is aware that they are denied fulfilment of desires, but as a child with the desires, capacities, 
limitations and cultural identity of a child. 
We can now apply the acid test for normality, i.e. comparing the intellectually 
disabled individual to a child in a similar isolated castaway circumstance, in order to then 
establish rules, variations and ultimately the nature of the respects in which their lives are 
limited. For instance, though a three year old child and a fifty year old man with impaired 
intellectual capacities may be equally unconscious of themselves and the world around them, 
and equally happy playing with a set of toy bricks, the three year old child has the clear 
possibility of being able to grow into an adult who is more able to take responsibility for and 
fulfil his or her own desires. Thus, the play with bricks takes on another meaning for the child 
which it does not have for the intellectually disabled man, since for the child learning the 
physics, spatial awareness and basic knowledge of objects, which will come from playing 
with the bricks, holds value beyond their immediate pleasure, whereas for the disabled adult 
it is the desire to simply play with bricks that is satisfied in this case. This is, however, not to 
say such a desire is in itself reduced in its effect to provide pleasure through fulfilment, but 
the three year old child, when viewed from a temporal perspective, would seem to have a far 
greater value in playing with the bricks than an adult. We may therefore categorize the 
limitation on the lives of intellectually disabled people as a “temporal impairment” in rather 
the same way that, while all humans are, for roughly the first year of life quadriplegic, only 
actual persons with quadriplegia will be forced to remain in this state throughout the rest of 
life.  
Thus, it is argued that the desires and lives of those with levels of P.M.L.D. should be 
considered not according to a comparison to the fulfilment of desires of an adult, but a child. 
Indeed in many ways  the P.M.L.D. state places a child in a far more difficult position since 
they lack the capacity of self-analysis and later retrospective judgement of their own 
experiences and thus are far more at the mercy of  desires being frustrated, e.g. while a 
normal child might be able to later say, “Mr. Jones was a bad teacher since he stopped me 
doing art,” a P.M.L.D. individual will later never get that retrospective judgement, and thus  
will simply have the desires of childhood, and its activities frustrated or aided by those 
around them. 
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It is also easy to see on this schema how the legal restriction of altering the lives of 
intellectually disabled people at the age of 18, or forcing them to follow a set national 
curriculum in school is a harm, since we would not expect, in normal circumstances, a child 
of a similar intellectual state to follow such rules.119One issue with this schema is that quite 
evidently, as Mary Warnock noted, intellectually disabled people can learn a degree of 
control over their lives analogous to that of a child of a similar age, for instance it is possible 
for my sister to say “yeah” and “nah” to answer any questions she understands such as “do 
you want a drink?”120 Because, however, of the lack in cognitive capacities, such teaching 
will necessarily be limited in what it can achieve. This is of course not to say that such 
teaching or experiences of freedom are not in themselves equally valid and valuable to 
intellectually disabled individuals simply by virtue of their ability to bestow an experience of 
freedom. My sister completely enjoyed using an electric wheelchair, and loves the ability to 
use large, easy to handle buttons to turn off and on her own videos. Neither of these served 
any purpose but the enjoyment of freedom, albeit a purpose that is fully worthy in the context 
of the desire applied to a child. 
This perhaps shows the key difference in considering the lives and desires of 
intellectually disabled people, that though they seem to be children bearing a temporal 
impairment, and that certain decisions and assumptions connected with childhood and 
development seem to not apply, many others, such as their ability to participate in the culture 
of childhood, enjoy the rhymes, stories and play of childhood and experience the freedom 
implicit in exacting control over the world are very much prominent and thus worthy of 
respect, particularly if we consider those with cognitive disabilities not as disabled adults who 
lack some sort of undefined intellectual attribute but who should nevertheless be treated as 
responsible adults, but as children who have literally suffered a temporal impairment, which 
frustrates, or indeed in many cases completely removes their capacity to cease being 
children.121Thus, in any case in which we consider the lives, desires and responsibilities of 
cognitively disabled people, who are unconscious of their disability and will remain so, it is 
necessary to view them as children, and children worthy of consideration and empathy. 
                                                          
119 It is unfortunately true that in many schools in Britain, children with cognitive impairments are forced to 
endure circumstances intended for children of much older age groups, and that their status utterly changes at the 
age of 18. Indeed some of the worst experiences my sister has had have involved her being in the care of those 
who focus on age rather than actual desires and will for example play her pop music that would appeal to 
teenagers, rather than directly considering her own desires and understanding.  
120 Mary Warnock. 
121 Of course, my suggestion here is not to imply that “child” is in any sense an absolute state. Some children 
may enjoy engaging in adult activities, and as noted, control and education have purposes at almost any level of 
childhood. However, it is hoped that by having the category “child” in mind when considering intellectual 
impairments rather than defaulting to “adult” a more reasonable and flexible system for valuing and 
understanding the desires and experiences of intellectually disabled people may be achieved. 
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In using the comparison to children and the distinction of temporal impairments, the 
definition offered in the previous chapter is able to provide something that the social, and 
medical models have lacked, a method for considering the desires and relative state of 
environment of cognitively disabled people, and understanding in a practical and on a case by 
case basis, exactly what is required for their well-being. To remain (ironically), 
“unconscious” of them, as so many commentators in the social model are, misses a 
fundamental aspect of what disability is.  
If the intention of discussing the definition of disability is, as Davis and Goering both 
suggest, the removal of some sort of “ableist human paradigm” and the setting up of some 
kind of pro-disability self-identity, then it is true there is no room in this discussion for those 
who are not conscious of their disability.122 
As I have noted, however, the inadequacy of the social model’s response in 
accounting for the needs, desires and well-being of those with cognitive impairments is 
fundamentally missing a part of what our current understanding of “disability” is. If indeed 
the intention is to remove a “ableist paradigm” and replace it with a “disabled paradigm” then 
where on this scale do those currently categorised as disabled but unable to recognize 
themselves as such fall?  
Since, however, my intention here is to clarify our existing intuitions regarding 
“disability” and to formulate a definition which allows discussion of disabilities, rather than 
preclude it to some pre-existing political groups and their ultimate goals which may exclude 
certain types of disability, then engaging with temporal impairments and the questions of 
unconscious definition is critical to that project, i.e. as legislatively, intuitively and logically 
we believe people with P.M.L.D. to be disabled, any definition of disability must take time to 
examine in what ways they might be disabled and endeavour to formulate models, language 
and tools that may be used to discuss and promote their well-being.  
This is why the comparison to the moral status of children, and understanding the 
desires and well-being of those with P.M.L.D. with respect to this status, is a necessary step 
in  applying the definition of disability based on well-being to those who are so often usually 
outside disability discourse.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
122 Sara Goering. 
Also: N. Ann Davis, “Invisible Disability”, Ethics, vol. 116, no. 1, (October 2005), pp 153-213. 
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Section E: Conclusion  
In this chapter I first established the nature of an unconscious disability, and 
distinguished it from the state of unaware disability, i.e. the unconsciously disabled who is in 
such a state that he or she will never be aware that he or she belongs to a distinct disabled 
group or differs from other members of society.  
I then considered the scant literature on the subject and showed some of the very 
inadequate attempts the social model has employed to deal with this aspect of disability.  
Next I examined the desires and life of people with unconscious disabilities, who 
usually fall into the category of the profoundly intellectually disabled, and considered in what 
ways their lives could be valued.  
Finally, I established that by comparing the intellectually disabled not to adults, but to 
children, a far more logical and useable framework of reference may be created to discuss 
their needs and desires, and also it may be seen how through temporal disadvantage they are 
disabled in respect to children, and why I believe this discussion to be so critical to the 
application of any definition of disability. 
In the next chapter, I shall take the definition I established, along with the 
modification I have made here regarding intellectual disability, and look at some of its 
practical and social implications. 
 
Disability, Desire and Society: The Establishment of a New, Individualistic Definition of Disability and 
its Practical Uses in Everyday Life 
By Luke Hewitt 
 
74 
 
Chapter 3: Applications of the definition: accessibility and the relations of 
empowerment 
Introduction 
In the first chapter it was established that the defining characteristic of disability was 
not its social identity or its medical classification as part of a person’s bodily health, but 
simply the ways in which disability affects a person’s well-being, i.e. the fulfilment or 
frustration of their desires throughout life, and how much effort it takes to fulfil those desires. 
Having established this on a purely theoretical basis, it is now necessary to examine precisely 
how this definition may apply when considering exactly how disabled people’s lives are 
lived, how their desires are fulfilled or frustrated and what measures and mechanisms may be 
employed to circumvent the difficulties of unfulfilled desires caused by a disabling condition. 
Hopefully by making a detailed examination of disability simply in light of its effects upon 
desires and well-being, rather than specifically its social or medical relations, it will be 
possible to learn in what ways the well-being of people experiencing disability may be 
improved on a realistic, practical basis, and the problems or pitfalls associated with such 
improvements.  
Of course, measures for alleviating the bad effects of disability are already familiar 
features of our social or ethical landscape, thus a good part of what is suggested here may be 
more in the matter of refinements or clarifications of some existing concepts, such as 
accessibility or assistance, than suggestions which are completely and entirely new. Using a 
definition of disability that is based upon desire and well-being, however, will, it is hoped, 
provide a far more straight-forward approach to evaluating such concepts, and a more 
relevant set of tools to decide how well such concepts actually work in practice. For example, 
while the idea of accessibility is one which is familiar in fields from the building trade to 
economics, thus far few discussions of making a thing “accessible” have related that 
accessibility to any discussion of effort. 
As noted in Chapter 1, there are two principal ways that a disabled person, 
experiencing a desire whose fulfilment is adversely affected by their disability, may respond 
in order to fulfil the desire. They may either employ some external agency that enables the 
desire to be fulfilled irrespective of biological limitations, whether that is a human or animal 
assistant, or an inanimate piece of technology such as a wheelchair, or by altering the 
conditions under which that desire counts as fulfilled in such a way that the biological 
limitations of a disability still allow the disabled person to fulfil it.  
I will consider the first of these questions in Sections A, B and C, dealing first with 
the circumstances surrounding the uses of inanimate aids to fulfil a desire, and then in Section 
B with the unique problems associated with the use of a human assistant.  
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In Section C, I will add a brief note on assistant animals, their relationship to a 
disabled person, and the ways in which they differ from human assistants and technology in 
aiding desire fulfilment. 
In Section D, I will turn to the conditions surrounding desire fulfilment and attempt to 
establish principles under which it may, or may not, be reasonable for a disabled individual to 
alter their desires, or indeed the conditions under which their desires are fulfilled to 
compensate for biological limitations, as well as when it is reasonable for such alterations to 
be proposed and who has the right to propose them. 
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Section A: Accessibility and external agency 
In the social model, as noted by many commentators, the intrinsic misfortune of 
disability and any detrimental effects it has on a person’s life are held to be largely a matter 
of society’s overall view of disabled people, rather in the way that the detrimental effects of 
belonging to a racial group suffering discrimination are not physically identified with 
belonging to that race, but with the way society treats members of it.123 
As noted in the first chapter, however, this contention that a disabled individual’s 
disability is essentially as neutral a characteristic when it comes to the fulfilment of desires, 
as, for example, skin colour or accent, does not seem to fit with the facts.Whatever society’s 
actual attitude is, biological limitations seem to be implicit to the body and the self, rather 
than being imposed externally by social pressures or practices.  
Thus, in America up until the 1960’s, the laws of the prevailing establishment forbade 
so called “Negros” from playing basketball in a similar mainstream arena to “white” players. 
There is no intrinsic reason why possessing darker skin should affect a person’s ability to run, 
jump or throw a ball. The only restriction in this case was entirely created by the society of 
the time. There is however no similar rule that states categorically that a person with 
paraplegia cannot play basketball, the restriction here is set by a person with paraplegia’s 
biology, since as it stands, the ability to run is implicit in playing basketball and that is an 
ability a person with paraplegia does not have simply by virtue of their paraplegia. 
Furthermore, there are cases where a disabled individual, rather than being directly 
excluded, as in the case of the paraplegic person, is simply in the position of having to 
                                                          
123 It is not just the Nazis who argued for the qualitative difference in the lives of people of various racial 
groups. Even recently, some statisticians such as Michael Eysenck123a  have put forward the idea of differences 
in racial intelligence, characteristics such as musical understanding or emotional empathy, social responsibility 
and even overall standard of living. Given major differences in the social and cultural conditions of different 
racial groups, it is, however, extremely unclear whether any perceived differences are due to racial factors at all, 
or merely due to differences in environment.  
Then, as with any sets of statistical differences, any difference is shared by the group and not by an individual, 
thus being of one racial group said to be overall superior in one factor, would not automatically mean that 
belonging to that group endowed a superior amount of that factor, which would mean at most that being of a 
different racial group gave a slightly increased chance of possessing a given characteristic, not that a person 
would necessarily possess it, just as it is true that while most people born in England speak English as a first 
language, not all do. Then of course, even if the question of, for example racial intelligence, had a definitive 
answer, whether this equates to well-being is a far more complex matter and not one with a clear and distinct 
answer either.  
For purposes of comparison, and because racism is itself an intrinsically social phenomenon, I will leave this 
question aside and assume that different racial individuals are (with the exception of their individual differences) 
innately similar in their capacity for well-being. 
123a H.J. Eysenck, Race, Intelligence and Education (London: Temple Smith in association with New Society, 1971). 
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expend such a large amount of effort in performing the necessary steps to fulfil a desire, it 
would prove ultimately to be pointless. A blind person possesses the abilities to run, jump, 
and dribble the ball by hand, however in order for them to play basketball vast amounts of 
time memorizing the court, calculating precisely the location of the basket, not to mention an 
extreme concern of colliding with other players, would make such a desire far more trouble 
and effort to fulfil than for a person with normal vision. Again, this effort factor is not 
imposed upon a disabled individual by society, but part of their intrinsic nature and 
capacities, though undoubtedly society could aid in fulfilling such a desire, a fact I will return 
to later. This is indeed why many disabled individuals choose to only take up part-time jobs, 
since the effort costs required of full-time employment would mean a disabled individual, 
even one whose disability was primarily physical rather than based on fatigue, would not be 
able to undertake many other desires that they may wish to fulfil.124 
Many writers in the social model, (Silvers, Darke, Swain and French), have for a long 
time protested for “access” by which they usually mean the availability of resources to make 
it possible for a disabled person to fulfil a given desire and usually, as in the case of 
Roulstone, a desire common to many individuals in society such as the desire to perform a 
job, have access to reading, or indeed access to freedom of travel.125,126,127 
Frequently, the method chosen for this access by social theorists, disability 
campaigners and indeed those involved in any form of dialogue with individuals regarding a 
disabled person’s fulfilling of desires, is via the means of altering part of the environment, or 
                                                          
124 Alan Roulstone, “Researching a Disabling Society: The Case of Employment and New Technology”, The 
Disability Reader: Social Science Perspectives, ed. Tom Shakespeare, (London: Continuum, 1998), pp 110-128. 
125 Anita Silvers. 
Also: Paul Darke. 
Also: John Swain, Sally French and Colin Cameron. 
126  Though some of the more radical social theorists such as Titchkosky, Germon and Barton protest that the 
social model is not primarily motivated by political ends, but by a “different, non-ableist phenomenology”, this 
position is usually only arrived at after long discussions of more practical matters of access and fulfilling 
desires, and for many social model theorists it is the intrinsically political ends of the social model (i.e. making 
social changes to allow disabled people to fulfil desires) that is the main thrust of the enterprise, indeed some 
activists like Germon feel academics working on disability theory have somewhat missed the point of the social 
model in the first place. Thus, access may be said to be the cornerstone of the social model, albeit that it is 
assumed any lack of access is due to society only, rather than being attributed partially or entirely to a disabled 
person’s physical or mental condition. 
127 Tanya Titchkosky, “Chapter 8”. 
Also: Penny Germon. 
Also: Len Barton, “Sociology, Disability Studies and Education, Some Observations”, The Disability Reader, 
Social Science Perspectives, ed. Tom Shakespeare, (London: Continuum, 1998), pp 53-64. 
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through the use of technology. Using an embosser (a Braille printer), to provide written 
materials in Braille, installing a lift to allow wheelchair access to buildings, indeed on one 
level, wheelchairs themselves generally as an alternative to walking, as well as the inclusion 
of subtitles in films and other inclusions of written rather than spoken information, are all 
examples of ways in which technology can externally influence the desires of a disabled 
person by altering the conditions of the world around them so as to make a desire easier to 
fulfil.128,129 
The thinking behind this form of external modification of the environment seems very 
straight-forward on the surface: Jane has a given desire, but one or more of the requirements 
for fulfilling this desire is biologically beyond her capabilities. Thus, by effectively altering 
Jane’s ability to interact with the object of desire by employing another external object or 
agency, Jane’s own biological limitation is no longer an obstacle to fulfilling her desire. On 
closer examination, however, it seems the issue of using technology to enhance accessibility 
is not nearly so simple or clear cut as it initially appears. Firstly, there is the question of 
effort, a question I touched upon in Chapter 1. Thus far comparatively few solutions to 
disability based desires have been able to reduce the effort required by a disabled person in 
the fulfilment of a desire to approximately the same degree as that of an able bodied person. 
To use an everyday example, as noted previously, while a wheelchair and a ramp may 
be sufficient to ensure a person with paraplegia is not utterly barred from going up-stairs, it 
will still take them more time and muscular work to do so than someone ascending the same 
distance on foot, which will have correspondingly greater effects on what other desires they 
may be able to fulfil during the rest of their life. This is one aspect of the problem of 
accessibility rarely even accounted for by social theorists, and yet it has very real and 
practical consequences in any dialogue concerning the use of external agencies to augment 
desires.  
                                                          
128 Of course, another major factor involved in the use of technology, and one which will heavily influence an 
individual’s decision to use or not use such devices, will be a person’s own perceptions of his or her 
independence, and any social assumptions or attitudes attached to uses of that technology. Though this is 
undoubtedly a hugely important factor in the use of external aids and devices, it is one entirely divorced from 
the function of the technology itself or its capacity to fulfil desires. I will return to this aspect of technological 
assistance in Chapter 4 when I consider disability and social attitudes. 
129 Goering takes the significance of inaccessible aspects of life rather further by claiming that society itself sets 
the conditions under which lives may be lived and desires fulfilled, and that “accessibility” is only a minor 
recognition of this fact which doesn’t go far enough in examining the “Ableist thinking” implicit in society. I 
will return to Goering’s suggestion about society constructing the environment, or at least setting the fulfilment 
conditions for desires later, though it is worth noting at this point that, even though Goering argues fervently for 
a radical reconstruction of the social environment and against providing access to an existing socially 
constructed “ableist” one,  her actual recommendations such as altering shops to make them less threatening and 
inconvenient to those with a mental illness or with mobility problems might as well be couched in the language 
of accessibility, since they practically come down to the same thing just made with a degree of additional 
rhetoric. 
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For instance, my bank recently started employing security questions about the balance 
and status of my account when I use telephone banking. When I explained that the very 
reason I wished to use telephone banking in the first place was because I was unable to read 
conventionally printed bank statements, their solution was to provide a bank statement in 
Braille. A Braille statement not only wouldn’t fit through my letter box, but since it takes 
approximately 15 minutes in Braille to read an average A4 sheet of print (bearing in mind 
skim reading is not possible in Braille), reading the statement would take me about 45 
minutes. Yet, according to my bank, they had provided an “accessible” alternative, and would 
not consider other options of getting my bank statements to me for that reason.  
These types of situations, where the effort costs of the fulfilment of a desire are 
massively altered by a person’s disability even where an external technological solution has 
been introduced to make the desire supposedly possible to fulfil, occur with worrying 
regularity in the lives of disabled people, and are often not commonly recognized in society. 
It is believed for instance, that asking a wheelchair user to go a long way around the back of 
the building to find an accessible entrance is a reasonable form of accessibility, despite the 
extra time and effort required, (indeed often a disabled person who points out this fact is 
thought to be ungrateful or pushy, a point I will return to in Chapter 4 when considering 
social attitudes). This is because “accessibility” is usually held as simply “have access to”, 
i.e. be available as a possible alternative course of action or alternative choice, saying nothing 
of the effort or desirability of that choice.  
For instance, a place that is said to have “road access” simply means that a person can 
drive there. It is not implied that travelling to such a place by road is easy, or that driving is 
easier or harder than walking, simply that as one method of getting to a given place, if it has 
“road access” a car is a possible choice of travel. If the purpose of accessibility, i.e. 
introducing external changes into the schema of a disabled person’s desire, is to provide them 
with “equal opportunities” as many forms of literature and current governmental thinking put 
it, then not merely the basic biological access to the fulfilment of desire must be provided, but 
also an attempt to equalize the amount of effort required by a disabled person to fulfil the 
same desire. 
As noted in the first chapter, if a disability is an involuntary biological state of a 
person that adversely affects their ability to fulfil desires, then the purpose of equalizing 
technology must be to compensate for this biological lack, but not merely by making a desire 
“possible” but “possible with approximately equal effort”. Thus, it is not only necessary that 
a building has a wheelchair entrance, but that in order to be truly “accessible” that wheelchair 
entrance must (as much as possible) not require greater effort on the part of a wheelchair user 
to enter than climbing the steps. 
One serious problem however in the definition of effort as a factor, is that even 
between “normal” humans, the effort involved in carrying out a desire will be greatly 
unequal, for instance a person in their 70’s will have far more difficulty running a hundred 
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metres than a person in their 20’s. As noted in the previous chapter however, in one sense 
many humans at one stage or another may be thought of as disabled, i.e. biologically 
precluded from carrying out desires, indeed it is quite possible that the 70 year old may be 
disabled in some respect (many elderly people use external devices such as walking frames 
for this reason). How then, would it be possible to create a category by which to compare the 
effort costs involved in carrying out a given desire, and thus establish what work must be 
done by an external agency in aiding a person in that desire’s fulfilment? To answer this 
difficult question, it will be necessary to return to the example of the castaway mentioned in 
the first chapter.  
A castaway divorced from the action of society has nothing but his or her basic 
biological equipment with which to fulfil any given desire, thus for instance a dark skinned 
castaway would seem to be on an equal footing to a light skinned one. However, as noted by 
J.R. Lucas, all humans are not equal, and skin colour is only one comparatively unimportant 
factor in a person’s biological make up which may affect their fulfilment of desires, and the 
biological nature of different humans may vary widely.130 
It is however not the purpose of the castaway example to create some sort of ideal 
standard by which humans should be measured, indeed, as J.R. Lucas notes, the 
establishment of such a standard may be impossible, as all humans are to some degree 
imperfect in their ability to fulfil desires in some area. As noted in Chapter 1 however, the 
castaway thought experiment is rather a tool to be used in the testing of different humans 
against each other, rather than some ideal way to compare all humans.  
So, the question under discussion is not “is a 70 year old unable to run 100 metres in 
some sort of ideal average time in need of a walking frame?” but “is a 70 year old unable to 
run 100 metres as quickly as a 30 year old in need of a walking frame?” Obviously, different 
30 year olds will take different times, however it is not the purpose of the castaway test to 
establish an average time for running 100 metres, but instead to observe whether there is a 
general difference in the two groups, i.e. those categorized as disabled or with some sort of 
biological condition, including bodily condition due to age, and those without it.  
So the issue is not whether a given person is better at performing any desire, but 
whether the average of humans who enact that desire perform it with more or less effort with 
or without a disability. Indeed, this inequality due to biology is exactly what the disability 
itself is, a preclusion of desire fulfilment which one group of humans has due to their 
involuntary characteristics, and which another (the larger group) does not. More broadly, this 
may be compared to the scientific process (often used in medicine)of postulating ranges of 
averages for different biological groups, for example a minimum and maximum heart rate for 
people in their 20’s, though obviously it is the purpose of the castaway thought experiment to 
compare the effort involved in the carrying out of different desires. By taking any given 
                                                          
130 J.R. Lucas. 
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desire, and performing a non-biased comparison of effort in this way, it is possible to see the 
inequities involved in given situations, with or without technological agency, and thus 
establish the nature of what modifications may need to be enacted to alter the needed effort in 
the desire fulfilment of a person with a disability.  
It may also be seen therefore that the definition established in the first chapter is not a 
static, monolithic concept by which disability is singly categorized from ability, such as a 
species definition, but rather a theoretical definition of the word which establishes the tools 
under which any given interaction between a person’s involuntary biological state, the state 
of the world, and the fulfilment of their desires can be measured. Indeed, it is in the 
performance both individually and on a more global level of this evaluative process that the 
nature of disability itself exists, i.e. it is not correct to say that person x “is disabled”, but 
rather that person x is “in a state of disability” in any given time or set of circumstances.  
This is also obviously a key way in which disability differs from racism or sexism, 
and “being disabled” should be thought of as closer to a concept such as “being lost”, i.e. a 
temporary or permanent relation possibly with a group identity, possibly without, that 
adversely affects a person’s relationship to his or her fulfilment of desires, though the nature 
of disability and society is something I will return to in the next chapter. 
So, taking “accessibility” as to include the concept of effort, in looking at a  person 
with paraplegia’s desire to enter a building, if he or she has a far longer journey around the 
back of a building to an entrance, and a harder time pumping his or her wheelchair up a ramp 
than a person who can merely climb up a short flight of steps to the door, it is obvious to see 
that though the paraplegic person may have access to the building, i.e. he or she can enter it, 
the establishment of equality for the person with paraplegia in making the building 
“accessible” has not been met. 
Another major concern in the matter of effort and accessibility, is the question of 
disabilities which may not actually involve the direct biological preclusion of a desire, but 
simply through pain, stiffness, or other forms of strain make it far less possible to carry out 
with the same amount of effort as a person who did not experience those biological 
conditions. Many people in such situations may have desires that, while not precluded 
directly, may simply involve an excessively high effort cost which makes their fulfilment an 
unreasonable expenditure of time and trouble. This is where the use of the castaway example 
and a definition of disability which incorporates effort can be of valuable help, in establishing 
when at any given time a biological condition is contributing markedly to the effort costs of a 
person’s desires, and when a person should indeed consider using some form of external 
device or agency, whether the condition is a temporary one such as a broken leg requiring the 
person to use a crutch to walk, or a permanent one such as arthritis. 
For instance, a person experiencing increasingly more strain peering at smaller print 
with a degenerative eyesight condition, such as retinitis pigmentosa, may need to compare his 
or her own effort, pain and trouble involved in viewing smaller objects, to those of a person 
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without such a condition, and when the costs involved in such effort become prohibitive 
perhaps consider technological assistance like a magnifier or screen reading computer 
program.131,132 Comparisons to others in such situations by those around the disabled person 
or by the disabled person themselves, for example “it’s taking me far longer to read that 
newspaper than Jack”, are in fact already common throughout life as personal decisions 
undertaken by those with disabilities (Carel’s increasing use of breathing aids in the face of 
her degenerative illness is a very well illustrated and moving example).133 Though the formal 
use of the castaway test may aid in these situations by deciding precisely what forms of 
external aid are required, and also deciding how effective a given external change is for the 
fulfilment of a desire.  
Using the idea of the effort involved in carrying out desires, rather than the more 
common notion of simply “access” divorced from effort, it is also possible to recommend 
accessibility changes for conditions not usually associated with them. For instance, a person 
experiencing agoraphobia would greatly benefit from the ability to do their shopping at home 
across the internet, since the amount of effort involved in them going shopping would be far 
more than a non-agoraphobic person, though this sort of access change also applies to anyone 
with movement difficulties as well.134 
So, accessibility can be said to be the employment of external agency or factors (i.e. 
factors not involved with changing the person’s physical or psychological being), which 
contribute to either removing or reducing biological limitations to fulfilling a desire, or 
reducing the effort required for fulfilling that desire to the same amount experienced by a 
                                                          
131 In British policy on disability by the National Health Service or other bodies, provision of “aides and 
assistance” is often the first response to the diagnosis of a disability. This refers to wheelchairs, personal devices 
such as a white cane, glasses or a hearing aid, however in my category of external agencies to aid the fulfilment 
of a disabled person’s desires, I would also include more large scale modifications such as a ramp to a building 
or the provision of subtitles, as both are external, i.e. outside the person’s body and connected with the world, 
and both have the function of aiding a disabled person in the fulfilment of desires.  
While some devices such as a wheelchair or white cane also have a social function in the identification of 
disabled people  (and according to commentators such as French and Darke, their stigmatization and mark of 
segregation) here I am only concerned with the function such items have in the fulfilment of a disabled person’s 
desires. Any social ramifications will be examined in Chapter 4. 
132 John Swain, Sally French and Colin Cameron. 
Also: Paul Darke. 
133HaviCarel, “Chapter One”, Illness: the Cry of the Flesh, (Acumen, Stocksfield, 2008). 
134 There are some psychological techniques such as systematic desensitization that would expressly require an 
agoraphobic person to get used to going outside, and it may be recommended they take the extra effort in 
shopping as part of reducing the more general overall effects of their condition, i.e. curing it. This, however, is 
not connected with access specifically, since the desire to no longer suffer agoraphobia is a different one from 
the desire to make purchases from shops, with different effort conditions for fulfilment. 
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hypothetical individual with no similar prohibitions, divorced from society, fulfilling the 
same desire.  
At our current rate of technology, external agents used to aid disabled people in the 
fulfilment of desires are at best an imperfect solution. As noted, the effort costs of using such 
agencies are often high, and such external agencies, especially when they take the form of the 
alteration of an object or location in the world rather than a device under the direct control of 
the disabled person, may not be consistent. For instance, some public buildings may have 
wheelchair ramps and some not, and some bus services may provide audio announcements to 
stops and some not.  
In fact lack of consistency may make such alterations useless, as a disabled individual 
may not wish to gamble on such alterations being present so may not be able to make reliable 
use of the ones that are there. I myself never use buses for this reason, as only some announce 
the stops in audio, and I do not wish to risk finding myself on a bus with unknown stops. It 
may even be argued that when an accessibility measure is accompanied by this sort of 
inconsistency in its application, the “effort” involved in taking the risk, and the anxiety of, for 
instance arriving at a building that one is unable to enter, or being provided with audio only 
material that one cannot access, denigrates or even completely negates any possible 
equalization of effort that the accessibility measure is intended for in the first place. 
Of course, technology, environmental alteration, and other forms of external agency 
are only some of a number of methods by which a disabled individual may fulfil a desire. 
Another, and one commonly examined and criticized by social theorists, is the use of another 
human being as an assistant in fulfilling a disabled person’s desires. 
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Section B: Accessibility and assistance  
The idea of a human as an assistant, guide, carer or otherwise provider of help to a 
disabled individual, though it appears an intrinsically simple one, is one of the most 
frequently debated issues in disability theory.135 
Social theorists, such as Swain, French, and Brisenden, all claim that, to a greater or 
lesser extent, the idea of receiving help or care is basically a negative, paternalistic state. The 
person cared for automatically stands in a more dependent and powerless relation to their 
able-bodied assistant, a relationship often believed to be intrinsically attached to the 
“disability as illness” thinking of the medical model.136 Many theorists, such as  Newell, 
Shakespeare and Titchkosky, have hotly debated that words like “handicapped” and even 
“disability” imply a state whereby one person is automatically existing on the charitable 
action, or under the care of, another.137 Some social theorists contend that the word 
“handicap” is derived from “hand in cap” i.e. putting money in the hat of a disabled beggar, 
while some hold that even the word “disabled” is one which implies a state of increased 
dependence upon others and so prefer terms like “differently abled” or “impaired”.138 
Though the 2002 Disability Governmental Survey did show that many people did not 
wish to consider themselves disabled since they believed it intrinsically implied helplessness, 
this is perhaps exactly why a new definition of the term is needed and an examination of the 
supposed dependent relationship between the disabled person and any human assistant they 
require in a less negative light.139After all, if one holds the broader idea of “disability” as 
being a state which will at some point affect most humans throughout their lives, then the 
implication of the term “disabled” seems to lose a lot of its uniquely negative emotive impact, 
                                                          
135 Social theorists usually use the terms “agent” and “patient” to define the roles of the assistance relationship, 
and indeed criticize the relationship on the basis of those roles, i.e. the patient is passive and stands in a relation 
of lesser power to the agent. Since, however, I wish to examine the relationship more fundamentally  and 
dispense with bias caused by medical labels, I will use the terms “assistant” and “recipient” instead, which it is 
hoped, are more functional and less loaded. 
136 John Swain, Sally French and Colin Cameron.  
Also: Simon Brisenden. 
137 Christopher Newell.  
Also: Colin Barnes, Geoff Mercer, and Tom Shakespeare.   
Also: Tanya Titchkosky. 
138 R.B. Jones. 
139Ini Grewal, Sarah Joy, Jane Lewis, Kirby Swales, and Kandy Woodfield, “‘Disabled for Life?’ Attitudes 
Towards and Experiences of Disability in Britain”, Research Report 173, (Department for Work and Pensions, 
August 2002). 
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since “disabled” becomes, not automatically a group of powerless individuals to which some 
people are condemned to belong, but a group with an unfixed membership standing in a 
relation to their environment and the people around them, which is much closer to “being 
lost” or “having an accident”: unfortunate, but not out of the ordinary or in any sense 
demeaning to the one who suffers such misfortune.140 So, for most social theorists, the fact 
that a person is “disabled” and consequently receives assistance in their lives from another 
person, automatically implies that the disabled person is in a subordinate relationship to those 
providing that care or assistance. 
Some writers, such as Szasz and Tassano, have taken this concept to a quite extreme 
level and claim the medical profession, either deliberately or accidentally, maintain the 
“doctor/patient” relationship specifically so that they can hold privileged access and power 
over the patient themselves, as well as over society at large.141 Swain also notes that the idea 
of a disabled person as the recipient of “charity” undermines their own autonomy and control 
over the course of their life, while putting the disabled person (as Smith argues), in a relation 
whereby their own desires and well-being are subsumed to those of the “carer” (either a 
medical professional or a family member).142 It is common when reading any account of 
disability written by a social theorist like Swain or Smith, even Titchkosky, to note an 
extremely strong reaction against any sort of human assistance in the fulfilment of desires, 
and the implication that to have a human fulfil such a function is always damaging in some 
way to a disabled person’s life, indeed some, such as Smith and Germon, go even further and 
rank such relations as very literal “oppression”.143 
                                                          
140 How a word is perceived and what its derivation might have been in the past, is an incredibly different matter 
to how it is used now. For instance the word “woman”, some believe, had a derivation of “half man” and thus an 
automatic implication that women are less than men, and it cannot be denied that there were situations in the 
past when the word “woman” automatically implied subservience and dependence upon other. It is, however, 
the task of philosophers and ethicists to examine uses of language and establish precise and useful definitions 
that will, it is hoped, reject any such unethical uses of language in the past. Thus, just as it is hoped now the 
word “woman” means “female human” with no other negative connotations it is hoped that the redefinition and 
precise examination of disability which I am offeringin this thesis will allow relations such as dependence to be 
rethought, irrespective of the older derivations or implications of the term. 
141Thomas Szasz, Fabian Tassano. 
142 John Swain.  
Also: Michael Smith. 
143 John Swain.  
Also: Michael Smith. 
Also: Tanya Titchkosky. 
Also: Penny Germon. 
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In these many criticisms however, the social theorists do seem to have failed to ask 
two basic questions about the nature of human assistance. Firstly, “What exactly is the 
intended purpose of this “care” or assistance?” and secondly, “Is the recipient automatically 
made powerless by receiving it?” 
In their criticisms of “care” or “assistance” as a concept, social theorists usually 
assume that it follows the model of nursing. A nurse is defined as a trained medical 
professional responsible for the well-being and continual health of a person who is ill, i.e. 
who is suffering some form of physical malady (see Chapter1).144 
If a nurse is, however, responsible for insuring the “well-being” of a person who is ill 
(or disabled), the person’s “well-being” must logically include the fulfilling of desires, and 
therefore, as Griffin argues, the freedom to make choices about those desires.145 Indeed some 
nursing training materials define the role of a nurse not as a dictator, who determines what 
will happen to the patient without reference to the patient’s own wishes (as many social 
theorists seem to believe them to be), but specifically as “an enabler” i.e. someone who 
enables the patient to fulfil his or her own desires despite biological or medical restrictions 
against them. Therefore if a professional nurse or carer were to act in the ways Smith, Szasz, 
and many other social theorists detail in their many harrowing examples, by not taking into 
account the preferences, desires or personal integrity of a disabled individual, they would not 
be acting in accordance with the requirements of their profession and would have “failed” at 
the job of being a nurse.146 Thus, even for a person who is not “disabled” as per the definition 
in Chapter 1, but is merely experiencing pain or illness, a “nurse” who fails to take into 
account a person’s autonomy and treats them simply as another object in their job schedule is 
simply a bad example of a nurse. 
Thus, the cases that Swain and Smith note in which disabled individuals are treated as 
objects lacking desire, or are provided “services” which are totally unnecessary to their lives 
by councils or charities, do not seem to be (as usually argued), an argument against human 
assistance generally, but a case where the attitude of the assistant involved has utterly failed 
                                                          
144 As noted in Chapter 1, the differences between “disability” and “illness” are many and complex. Most social 
theorists however tend to criticize the “nursing” relationship, not specifically because of the use of the term 
“illness” in and of itself in this context, but because that use of illness automatically implies a person’s 
dependence upon another for the fulfilment of their desires or the “fixing” of their body (see Davis for both), 
here, however, I am primarily concerned with the role of an assistant in the fulfilment of desires, rather than in 
the provision of “treatment for illness”, since assessing to what extent a medical professional treating an illness 
is fulfilling a person’s desires is (like the wider definition of illness itself), beyond the scope of what I am trying 
to achieve here. 
145 James Griffin, “Chapter 2”. 
146 Michael Smith. 
Also: Thomas Szasz.  
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to take into account what their essential function is, namely providing for the fulfilment of a 
desire and ultimately the well-being of the recipient.147 
To take a real world example, a person with quadriplegia may require the assistance 
of another person to dress themselves. The act of “dressing” however implies more than 
merely wearing clothes, it also implies a choice of what to wear, a choice of when to dress, 
and a choice of the most comfortable ways in which clothes may be put on. A nurse who 
turns up on a rota at a set time, pulls on whatever clothes are put out and brusquely leaves for 
the next appointment, is directly failing to fulfil the person with quadriplegia’s desire to “get 
dressed” whatever he or she ends up wearing, just as if some inanimate device used by the 
person with quadriplegia such as a head tracker for his or her computer, a device which 
allows a quadriplegic person to operate a computer mouse by movements of the head, would 
be fulfilling its function only if it allowed the person with quadriplegia to fulfil his or her 
desire to access information and make full use of their computer when they desired, not 
merely when the device happened to be functioning according to its own erratic schedule, or 
only  allow access to the specific parts of a computer’s operating system the head tracker 
itself was compatible with (an area where assistive technology often fails in its requirements 
for access).  
The second question, that related to power, therefore now becomes more clearly 
defined: does using a human assistant to fulfil a desire make the recipient who holds that 
desire automatically more powerless than someone fulfilling that desire on their own? 
It is certainly true that when our desire depends upon another person, that other 
person has the “power” to fulfil or not fulfil the desire. Thus, when hiring a taxi to get to a 
particular destination, whether or not we reach that destination is entirely dependent upon the 
driver of the taxi rather than ourselves. There are, however, a number of factors which may 
influence the driver’s willingness to fulfil or not fulfil our desire. Broadly these may be 
categorized as one of three forms of motivation. Some may be under our control, others not. 
The first is the question of selfishness and reciprocity. We agree to pay the driver, 
then we have control over fulfilling one of her desires, i.e. the desire for money, in which 
case we are no longer powerless since now we each have a certain amount of control over the 
desires of the other person, and if one desire is not fulfilled, it is likely the other will not be 
either, for instance, we would not actually get to where we are going unless we agree to fulfil 
the driver’s desire to be paid. Obviously relations between the two parties with desires and 
the situations may vary hugely throughout life, and there may be circumstances where either 
the recipient of the assistance or the assistant providing it has more power, for instance if the 
driver had a starving and dependent family and was desperate for any amount of money and 
thus would do far more to receive it, or if we were desperate to reach our destination and thus 
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would pay any price asked. Here, however, it is only necessary to note that so long as the two 
parties involved each have an ability to fulfil one of the other’s desires, the power relation 
cannot be entirely that of suppliant and supplier. 
The second reason is empathy. The driver may be a friend or family member, in 
which case she feels sympathetically towards our own well-being and therefore fulfilling our 
desire will (to a greater or lesser extent) be in accord with hers, and thus if our desire to travel 
were not fulfilled, neither would her desire to promote our well-being. This might be said to 
be the ideal case for having another person as a constituent part in the fulfilling of desires, 
since the extent that the empathetic person’s “good” may be said to be that of the person they 
help is the extent to which the recipient may be said to have power over the assistant.  
Catriona Mackenzie criticizes directly the idea of empathy in relation to disability, 
claiming that it is impossible to understand by a form of social empathy and “In each other’s 
shoes” style thinking, what the experiences of another human (and in particular a disabled 
human), actually are.148 
I will address her criticisms more completely in the conclusion, however for now it is 
worth noting that “empathy” here does not actually require understanding, rather it just 
requires the sort of assimilation of another’s good, talked of by authors such as Edith Stein, 
i.e. the desire to promote the “good”, or in this context the well-being of another human 
besides yourself, and in promoting that other person’s “well-being” to fulfil at least partly 
some desire of your own.149  The actual experiences and motivations for one individual to 
desire another’s well-being might be varied and complex, however, for now it is just worth 
noting that such desires do in fact exist. From a parent going out of their way for their child, 
to a taxi driver who agrees to drop their customer on a more convenient side of the road, such 
promotions of the good of others are a part of human experience, and one which naturally any 
discussion of assistance must take into account. 
Of course in reality, both of these first two factors, that of empathy and that of control 
over the assistant’s desires, may exist concurrently, or more usually on a sliding scale. Even 
when engaged in the most standard commercial transaction, most people would not want to 
see the shopkeeper who sells an item or the worker who performs a service suffer 
significantly to do so, though it is doubtful many people would be willing to utterly forgo 
their desire entirely for the good of the worker or shopkeeper. 
The third factor is the one that is most problematic for the fulfilment of desires. This 
might be called “external motivation”, i.e. a case where the person who can fulfil the desire 
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does or does not do so for some reason totally outside the control of the person having the 
desire. If the taxi driver will only drive us in a direction she is already going, or if she simply 
makes a point of driving or not driving for people with a certain physical appearance or 
characteristic, then we have no control over the situation at all and stand in a relation of 
powerlessness to the driver since her decision has been made with reference to some factor 
which we have no ability to change. Most obviously, this applies to cases of prejudice or 
direct discrimination, such as the bus drivers in America at the time of Martin Luther King 
who refused certain seats to, as they would put it, “Negros”. Equally, however, this can apply 
to far less drastic instances, such as a shop assistant who refuses to serve customers because 
they have gone onto lunch break and are no longer officially working, or a restaurant which 
cannot serve a meal because they have run out of ingredients. In both cases, the shop 
assistant’s job description or the restaurant’s lack of ingredients, the customer with the desire 
can do little about either circumstance and is thus powerless, though it is worth noting that 
where this powerlessness is caused directly by the judgements or assumptions of the assistant, 
it is more likely to be felt as an injustice or a direct wrong than if it were simply the result of 
unlucky circumstance (a fact I will return to in Chapter 4). 
As regards the question of disability and assistance, the crucial factor seems to be that 
whatever motivation the assistant has for the fulfilment of the disabled person’s desire, it is 
not one which is outside the control of the disabled person with that desire, i.e. there are no 
pressures or motivations upon the assistant which remain external to the recipient. 
This seems to be truly the problem which social theorists, like Swain, see in a 
disabled individual utilizing the assistance of another person, the problem of the powerless 
relation the disabled individual will be in if the motivations of that person are entirely outside 
the control of the disabled individual in question, such as the bad nurse and the person with 
quadriplegia noted above where the desire of the nurse is to adhere to some sort of 
professional or external code of behaviour or scheduled set of tasks and predetermined job 
requirements completely outside the control of  the person with quadriplegia.150 
Of course, there are cases where the provided assistance or desire fulfilment, even 
when the factors in control of it are outside the control of an individual, does fulfil that 
individual’s desires. In disability, these may correspond to cases where governmental or other 
services, though reliant upon an externally imposed schema for their behaviour, do fulfil the 
desires of a disabled individual. Taking a “one size fits all” type of approach though, and 
assuming that such a plan, however well defined is indeed, as many social theorists have 
noted, opening the door both to the relations of powerlessness, and the possibility that such a 
system will fail in accomplishing whatever desire fulfilment it is assumed to work on. It is for 
this reason that Michael Smith notes that the Direct Payment system whereby disabled 
individuals, instead of receiving governmentally provided services worked out on a basis of 
what the service provider deems necessary, receive a quantity of money to pay for and 
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arrange such services themselves either privately or through agencies, has had so much 
success.151 
So, to be effective, a human assistant must, A: actually fulfil the desire of the person 
involved and, B: either through empathy or through a factor, such as payment, be in a 
position where their own desires are in conjunction with those of the disabled recipient, (I 
will return to the question of the assistant’s attitude in Chapter 4).  
Of course there are arguments that disabled individuals should as moral beings strive 
to perform all their desires without the aid of any human assistant at all, simply because the 
acceptance of assistance, even when an assistant is not overpowering the patient with assisted 
desires, is itself an act that denigrates the patient’s dignity. Indeed, in some philosophies 
(notably that of Aristotle), the ideal of a human is a person who, like a super hero, has the 
desire and ability to aid others, without at the same time ever needing aid themselves.  
The problem, however, with this idea is that such super heroes exist only in films and 
comics. Truly, the only way to escape all human relations would be to really live alone on a 
desert island and interact with nobody else, since even in the most mutually respectful and 
cordial of friendships, one person will at some time fulfil the desires of another, even if these 
are such simple desires as the company of another individual or a desire for a shared activity. 
For instance, if my friend and I both desire to converse and are interested in each other’s 
conversation, then we obviously stand in a relation of fulfilling one another’s desires. It is, 
however, part of being friends, that our desires are intermingled, and as I fulfil my friend’s 
desires, he will fulfil mine and vice versa. To claim such basic human exchanges as 
“undignified” or try and locate a subordinate agent/patient type of relation in all these sorts of 
human interactions would seem to be near impossible. 
Turning to disability specifically, if then we hold that disability is a pervasive and 
nearly universal state which simply occurs in different degrees, then the interactions of 
disabled recipient and assistant would seem just as pervasive and nearly all consuming as 
other sorts of interactions, such as commercial ones. It is, however, completely true that just 
as we need rules of conduct for commercial transactions precisely so that relations of 
powerlessness do not occur, so then the relationship between the disabled individual and their 
assistant must be subject to similar regulation and examination, so that cases of “bad 
assistants” can be categorized as the immoral acts they actually are, based on how they stand 
within the assistance relationship and how it should function for the good of both the disabled 
recipient and indeed to an extent their assistant. 
Thus far we have assumed only that a human assistant is essentially the same as a 
mechanistic device, i.e. something which fulfils any desires of a disabled person that they are 
biologically precluded from fulfilling, for example, a person pushing a wheelchair satisfying 
a person with paraplegia’s desire to travel somewhere being functionally equivalent to a 
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wheelchair motor. This, however, fails to take into account the most key thing about human 
assistants; namely that they are humans, with desires, attitudes and well-being of their own. A 
disabled person making use of a human assistant to fulfil desires is not simply in the position 
of giving orders, as one might to a programmed voice assistant function of a mobile phone, 
but standing in a complex set of social and moral relationships to the other person, and as 
such human assistance, even when the desires of individuals are entirely reconcilable, has 
some rather unique problems surrounding it.  
The first is competence. Even when fulfilling the desires of a disabled person is the 
mutual goal of the recipient and their assistant, the assistant may or may not be competent to 
fulfil such a desire. This may occur with professional assistance, but is more likely to occur 
with friends, family members or strangers. Certainly I myself have occasionally asked a 
person for directions, only to receive the wrong information, or information in an entirely 
unusable form. On one occasion I remember being told for example when walking up a 
street, “Take the fourth exit at the roundabout”, as though I were driving a car. In the case of 
family members or professionals of course, it may be possible for them to acquire 
competence through repeated experience of fulfilling similar desires and familiarity with the 
recipient, but this may not be the case with strangers, or with certain professionals who 
change on a regular basis. Furthermore, whether a person does or does not learn such 
competencies depends very much on, A: the assistant’s ability to learn generally, and B: the 
disabled recipient’s ability to articulate when a desire is or is not being met.152 
Then, there is the question of arrangement. A tool or aid is inanimate and obviously 
will be predictable in where and when it becomes available and its mode of operation, indeed 
if it is unpredictable or inconsistent in its operation we would say that it is “a bad aid” and 
probably not make use of it. This is doubly true for a disabled individual who may be reliant 
upon that inanimate aid to fulfil some very basic desire, such as a person with paraplegia’s 
need for a stair lift to get up stairs to the bathroom, and the intensive inconvenience caused if 
that lift should fail. This is not true of human assistants, who, as people with lives of their 
own, obviously work on their own schedule. Indeed, there are cases where a disabled 
                                                          
152 It is for reason of lack of communication that often people with learning disabilities have a characteristic file 
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the reader of the file is unable to interpret what communications the person with learning disabilities can give, 
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On the other hand, it may also be true that there is vital information that the learning disabled person simply 
cannot communicate, for instance dosage of a needed medicine, and thus it must be communicated by a 
responsible third party in order that the assistant is aware of it. This would seem to be a clear case where treating 
a learning disabled person morally as a child, as noted in Chapter 2, may be justified, and provides an extremely 
good answer to the problem of how we both value and encourage a person with learning disability’s autonomy, 
and yet at the same time ensure that their physical well-being and care are maintained over and above the 
limitations of their mental abilities. 
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individual must wait a significant time to receive assistance from a human, or must book an 
“accessible” service long in advance. For example, Nottingham has a dedicated taxi service 
free to disabled customers, however in order to use this service, bookings must be made three 
weeks prior to use. This means a service which purports to give disabled individuals the same 
access to the social world as an able bodied person would receive through driving a car, fails 
entirely since most able bodied people do not need to book their car three weeks in advance 
before driving. This, however, is not due to a malfunction of the cars the taxi service uses, but 
simply the demand upon the service, and their number of drivers, both unfortunately factors 
outside the disabled recipient’s control, albeit factors there is little way of changing on an 
individual level.  
Then, there is the problem of consideration. If in fact a disabled person is a moral 
being themselves, they will naturally not wish to consider a person as simply a means to 
fulfilling a desire, particularly if the person is a friend, family member, or indeed (if the 
disabled individual has a developed sense of ethics), a perfect stranger. Thus, in dealing with 
that person in the context of assistance, the disabled person must constantly be considerate of 
their desires, well-being and attitude, things which would not affect the disabled person in 
relating simply to a tool or device. For instance, a disabled person may feel a sense of guilt 
when a paid assistant is performing some task, still more when the assistant is unpaid, even 
when this task is indeed one which the disabled individual could not fulfil themselves, or 
fulfil only with intensive effort, indeed a disabled individual might feel beholden to perform 
some task with the accompanying intensive effort simply to avoid having a non-disabled 
assistant do it for them. This certainly makes the task of using assistance of any kind to fulfil 
desires more difficult for a disabled person, and is one aspect of experiencing life with a 
disability often not covered by theorists in the social model, indeed some, like Smith, go as 
far as stating that a disabled person has a direct right to the assistance of others and should 
repress feelings of guilt.153 
Corresponding to this, there is the attitude of the assistant themselves, and how such 
an attitude affects the disabled recipient. If, for instance, (as Swain notes) a disabled person is 
constantly being made aware of how much trouble the assistant is required to go through to 
fulfil their desires, it is doubtful that such an assistant actually contributes to their well-being 
at all since the intensive feelings of guilt and negativity could negate any benefits to a 
disabled person’s well-being that having the assistant aid in fulfilling their desires 
produced.154 
By contrast, in Botswana anthropologists noted that disabled people were perceived 
by many in society as heroic figures who had a right by their own status to receive 
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consideration from others.155 Though such attitudes in an assistant are often still 
uncomfortable for the disabled person in terms of moral relations, it is far better than cases 
where the disabled person is made to feel a helpless burden upon an assistant, (a topic I will 
explore further in the next chapter). 
Finally, there is the disabled person’s own desire for autonomy. A disabled person 
may choose to fulfil their own desires without the aid of another person simply because they, 
A: have a desire for autonomy which receiving the aid of another would not satisfy, or, B: 
consider the fact that they and not another person actually fulfil the desire of paramount 
importance in its fulfilment. I will discuss the second of these qualities in the next section 
when I turn to the alteration of desires themselves rather than the means by which they may 
be fulfilled.  
For all of these reasons however, a human assistant, though able to either aid in the 
direct fulfilment of a disabled person’s desires, or reduce their effort costs by a substantial 
margin, even when the question of power is no longer an issue, should not be considered as 
the ultimate solution to the fulfilment of a disabled person’s desires. Where attitude and 
desire for autonomy are considered, a disabled person’s desires may simply not be fulfilled 
by using a human assistant, and even in other cases, requirements to adhere to the assistant’s 
own schedule, or risk the assistant not being competent both mean that using an assistant is 
not as effortless as it appears.  
Before considering whether in any situation a human assistant actually does the job of 
fulfilling a disabled person’s desires, we should ask the following questions:  
Does the disabled individual have an ability to influence the assistant’s behaviour in the 
fulfilment of a desire?  
Is the assistant capable of fulfilling that desire?  
Is the assistant able to fulfil the desire on a schedule which suits the disabled person?  
Does utilizing an assistant interfere with the disabled person’s well-being in terms of 
autonomy? 
Are the feelings of the disabled person, and indeed of the assistant, such that fulfilling the 
desire by way of assistance will be beneficial to the disabled individual’s well-being?  
Only if the answers to all of these questions, in any given situation, can be positive does it 
seem fair to state that the assistant has fulfilled the same function as a device, namely 
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intervened in the life of a disabled person such that a desire which may either require 
exhaustive effort on their part, or which may be impossible to fulfil, has in fact been fulfilled.  
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Section C: Animal assistants. 
In the previous section I have addressed only the idea of specifically human assistants, 
just as in Section A I only discussed inanimate aids and environmental adaptations. One other 
form of assistant, however, which is available to certain groups of disabled people to aid in 
desire fulfilment, is that of assistant animals. Though service dogs (especially guide dogs), 
are most common, the category of assistance animals also includes: physical assistance or 
“helper dogs” for those whose motor impairments prove difficult in household tasks; alert 
dogs for people with impaired hearing to notify them of noises in the environment; and so 
called “Pat dogs” or “Buddy dogs”, who provide companionship for those with conditions 
such as depression or chronic anxiety. Neither are all service animals dogs, since guide horses 
are well known, (particularly in heavily rural areas of the world), and other assistance animals 
such as monkeys, dolphins and even birds exist. Though since I am mostly personally 
acquainted with assistance dogs (particularly my guide dog Reever), I will confine my 
examples here to predominantly canine ones, although it is hoped the discussion in this 
section, being mostly concerned with the relationship between animal assistant and human 
recipient rather than the specific nature of the animal in question, may also apply to other 
species as well.  
In the context of this chapter’s discussion on accessibility, service animals seem to 
possess both some of the characteristics of a human assistant, and some of the characteristics 
of an access aid.  
On the one hand, my guide dog Reever does certainly aid in the fulfilment of my 
desire to travel safely, and it cannot be denied that her efforts reduced markedly the effort 
costs implicit in my undertaking any journey, indeed this was my major experience when I 
started walking with her as opposed to walking using only a white cane for mobility 
purposes, that I was no longer required to concentrate intensively on every tiny aspect of the 
environment to avoid  injuring myself on obstacles or losing my way.  
It is also true that from the standpoint of fulfilling desires autonomously, an assistance 
animal’s status as an animal over which a person has stewardship (a metaphor borrowed from 
Mary Warnock), means that often a person can still feel that a desire is being fulfilled 
independently of others.156,157 
                                                          
156 The notion of animals as property and their status related to humans is a large and complex one. However, 
here it is only necessary to note that a person is “responsible” for their animal assistant, and that this 
responsibility communicates itself as a felt sense of autonomy. Mary Warnock uses the term “Stewardship” to 
describe human’s relationship to animals, i.e. a human has authority over an animal, but authority tempered by 
the needs to protect and conserve rather than just to dictate. Whether Warnock’s metaphor of Stewardship is 
appropriate for that of all animal relations to humans it not a matter I will consider here, but it does seem apt  as 
a description of the relation a disabled person bears to his/her animal assistant. 
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This is by contrast to the fulfilment of a desire by a human assistant where the 
disabled person may feel that they are intrinsically dependent upon another human, and that 
this dependence negates the satisfaction felt at freely fulfilling the desire themselves. This is 
not to say that a person’s relationship to an  assistance animal is entirely that of owner and 
disposable property, however, due to intrinsic species differences it is one where the person 
remains primarily in charge of the motivation in the relationship, and the animal assistant 
responds to that motivation, e.g. if a physically impaired person asks their dog to pick up a 
dropped object and bring it to them, it is the disabled person, not the dog who makes the 
overriding decision to pick the object up, where the dog, it is hoped, is pleased to do so.  
 Also, as with the use of access aids, an assistance animal, being that part of its 
definition as an assistance animal is to provide that assistance, does not bear some of the 
loaded emotional problems of interacting with a human assistant associated with guilt or 
morality. I do not need to be concerned, for instance, if Reever wishes to go out for a walk at 
the same time I do, or worry that Reever might perceive me as dependent due to me requiring 
her assistance for mobility. 
That being said, one other less fortunate aspect of the ways in which assistance 
animals resemble access aids, is that the access they provide is in some way incomplete, i.e. 
they can rarely if ever give a disabled person the same experience of desire fulfilment as an 
able bodied person in a similar situation.  Though Reever is quite capable of finding her way 
around obstacles and recognizing generalized categories of objects such as “stairs” or “door” 
which she can then find and direct me to, she could not read a sign, get directions from a map 
or recognize an unknown place instantly, such as a shop. Indeed while she can quite easily 
“Find a bus stop” she is certainly not able to tell whether it is the right bus stop, or to know 
which bus I should board once there.  
There is, however, one very important aspect in which animal assistants differ 
markedly from inanimate adaptations, namely that as animals they can be involved in a 
relationship with the recipient of their assistance. Indeed, for many service animals involved 
with mental illness, it is this relationship which is central to their fulfilment of their function 
as assistants i.e. providing comfort, stress relief or companionship.  
Even for assistance animals like Reever, whose chief function is mainly the very 
practical fulfilment of common place desires such as mobility, it is unquestionably the 
relationship with their person which is central to their ability to provide assistance. This is 
both because (as I was told during my own guide dog training with Reever), an animal such 
as a dog’s chief reason for performing an activity, such as guiding or assistance in lifting 
objects, is indeed to please the person whom they relate to, and because, manifestly, the 
closer the relationship with a service animal, the more the service animal will be willing to do 
in service of that relationship.  
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Indeed, while I do not know if dogs are capable of  empathy in the literal sense, it is 
certainly true that dogs, and likely some other service animals, are able to put the good of 
their person before their own, or at least, be conscious of what the person sees as good or bad, 
though Reever’s ability to reason and be aware that I will be injured if  her guiding is 
incorrect has sometimes  surprised me, especially when it revolves around her realizing when 
not to obey an instruction, for example if I urge Reever forward but there is an obstacle in the 
way I cannot see. This indeed is why those who believe that animals are simply mechanistic 
and that dogs particularly can obey implicitly on a gross reward/punishment model are 
directly incorrect, indeed during my training I was told sternly not to harbour any such beliefs 
at all and rely on rewards such as treats just as a reinforcement, not as an end in 
themselves.158 
Much of the training service animals and their respective people receive directly 
promotes the relationship between the service animal and their person, so that when it comes 
to a choice between the service animal providing assistance or satisfying their own desires, 
the animal will be more inclined to choose to act on behalf of their person rather than for their 
own satisfaction. To take one specific instance, Reever had to learn when walking with me 
that running in the direction of any other dog on the street was not a good idea despite her 
inclination to do so. Conversely, during training it is also necessary for the person to actively 
form an attachment with the animal, and take on a role of stewardship, i.e. caring for the 
animal, and indeed frequently considering the animal’s interests, especially in situations 
where the animal is affected by the human environment, for example providing food, 
protection from things like traffic, opportunities to play and have pleasant experiences, etc.. 
This is why I appreciate the “stewardship” metaphor, since it implies not only ownership, but 
also a sense of responsibility or caretaking, which are undoubtedly central aspects of the 
relationship with an animal assistant. 
It is also undeniably true that the relationship a disabled person has with their service 
animal, can itself become a deeply loving and close one, and one which, quite aside from the 
utilitarian fulfilment of desires, can provide a huge benefit to the disabled person’s life and 
well-being, especially if the disability, like visual impairments, also makes communication 
with others difficult. 
It must also be remembered however, that the relationship a person has with an 
assistance animal does entail its own set of responsibilities and compromises, indeed it is 
frequently necessary for a disabled person with an assistance animal to consider the animal’s 
good first rather than their own, and to heavily alter their life or circumstances around their 
animal assistant’s needs. 
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These difficulties can also bring their own social requirements, for example, 
discussions about whether service animals are allowed in places like restaurants, and where a 
dog or other animal might relieve themselves, as well as more general responses from others, 
(something I will return to in the next chapter).  
It is these requirements and necessary life alterations, and the effort implicit in 
meeting them which mean a service animal is not ideal for every disabled person despite the 
fact that on average the fulfilment of a desire by use of an assistance animal is generally 
preferable to going without it (were it not the case, the intensive training and inconvenience 
would make the very idea of an assistant animal superfluous). An animal does not fulfil the 
role of a human assistant entirely, nor can they provide complete access or reduce the effort 
costs in desire fulfilment to such a level as to negate the person’s disability, though certainly 
they are a very unique way for a disabled person to fulfil desires and form a complex 
relationship as well, particularly since animals, unlike any current form of technology we 
have, have some ability to reason and form emotional attachments, thus the scope of their 
ability to fulfil desires is potentially far wider than inanimate objects, albeit, as stated earlier, 
the effort costs in becoming steward to an animal do always need to be considered carefully 
for each individual, i.e. they’re not right for everyone.  
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Section D: Altering the conditions of desire fulfilment  
Thus far in discussing the desires of disabled individuals, we have only considered 
their fulfilment from a comparatively narrow angle, namely that a person’s desires are only 
fulfilled when a state of affairs occurs that initially matches their intention. While a useful 
schema for discussing the biological limitations implicit in disability, desire fulfilment is a far 
more complex matter and one which ethicists and theologians have discussed for nearly two 
thousand years.  
In the context of the current discussion, one particular aspect of fulfilment of desires, 
which thus far we have neglected, is the interplay between the initial intentions or beliefs of 
an individual, and the circumstances under which their desires may be fulfilled. More 
specifically, we have not yet discussed cases in which the conditions for the satisfaction of a 
desire may be altered to allow it to be satisfied in the face of opposition. 
Suppose for instance, Jo has the desire to fly an aircraft, but suffers from a heart 
condition that would cause a severe risk of death were he to ever actually fly off the ground. 
Since it would seem to be implicit in the idea of flying an aircraft that one leave the ground, it 
would seem that Jo’s desire is unfulfillable and therefore a source of pain. If, however, Jo 
altered his desire to simply having the sensory experience of flying a plane, it would seem 
that the ability to use one of the grounded plane simulators upon which pilots train, which 
simulate all the movements of an aircraft in flight via the use of hydraulics, would be a 
possible variant of the desire which Jo could fulfil irrespective of the condition that 
prohibited him from the fulfilment of his initial desire. Obviously, there would be many 
circumstances surrounding his initial desire to fly a plane that Jo would need to forgo in the 
alteration of his desire to simply having the experience of flying a plane, rather than actually 
doing so. He would, for instance, have to give up any hope of having a career as a pilot and 
transporting himself from country to country by plane, nevertheless, the desire to 
“experience” flying a plane without having to do so upon a simulator would be achievable 
given Jo’s biological limitations, whereas the desire to actually work as a pilot would not be, 
and so there would be an advantage to Jo in altering his desire. 
This sort of compensation occurs in the lives of disabled people constantly, the 
realization that through sheer limitation, or even an unreasonable amount of required effort or 
fatigue, an unfulfillable desire might have to be changed to one which only related to the 
initial desire, rather than was identical with it. Of course, this relation is not a simple one. As 
many commentators on desire have argued, there is considerable debate as to whether any 
given object is desired because it is in itself of value, or valued simply because it is desired 
by an individual.159 For instance, if Jo’s valuing becoming a pilot of an aeroplane conferred 
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value upon it directly, the simulator option might be best thought of as a “partial” fulfilment 
of his desire, so it fulfils only some of the requirements set by his initial desire, but this is 
better than none. 
If, however, Jo desires to fly an aeroplane for some other, more layered reasons, 
because he thinks pilots gain great status, because he wants to travel and see the world, or 
indeed because he wants a certain experience such as that of seeing the world from above 
through a window, then the simulator option, rather than being a partial fulfilment of his 
desire, i.e. a poor quality, second class option to which he must resign himself, would rather 
be said to contain “some” of what he wants rather than the “all” provided by his initial desire 
to be a pilot, though another desire wholly unrelated to the circumstances of flying a plane 
might do so equally well or better. For instance becoming captain of an ocean liner might 
fulfil Jo’s desires for travel and status far more readily than the simulator option would. 
There seem in the case of desires and disability fairly plausible reasons for assuming 
both of these positions are true, or at least that both may hold merit in different 
circumstances, since if we asked Jo why he wanted to fly a plane, he’d probably list a number 
of beneficial and understandable characteristics rather than just, “because I want to”. On the 
other hand, however, it would seem that an experience closer to Jo’s initial desire, i.e. the 
simulator, would be more likely to bring him a sense of well-being and overall satisfaction 
simply because it is related to the desire he holds that is precluded to him, rather than being 
an unrelated desire which might happen to tick some of the same boxes. Indeed Havi Carel 
defines disability in its interaction with well-being as a positive experience of learning how 
not to have certain desires fulfilled.160 
Whatever the exact relation between the person who desires, the objects of original, 
biologically restricted desire, and a possible new, non-restricted desire, it does seem that the 
key process here is a relation of similarity. If, for instance, someone suggested to Jo that he 
become a taxi driver instead of a pilot, that would not be a reasonable suggestion, since the 
experience, mode of life, and just about everything else that distinguishes the two states of 
affairs (being a taxi driver and being a pilot), are entirely and completely different, making 
such a suggestion less than reasonable. Yet, it is also true that the lives of people with 
disabilities, especially those with sensory or motor impairments are full of just those sorts of 
suggestions. Someone (more often than not someone who does not suffer the same 
disability), will substitute an unrelated desire which seems to have little or no similarity to the 
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original, biologically restricted object of a disabled person’s desire (or at least an object of 
desire which the one who makes the substitution assumes to be biologically precluded). 
For example, on one occasion I was asked by the musical director to perform in a 
light opera production in Buxton Opera House since the chorus needed extra tenors. While 
the musical director was keen to have me sing, the stage director himself was absolutely 
against the idea of having a visually impaired person on stage. He clearly believed that the act 
of performing on stage was biologically prohibited due to my possession of a visual 
impairment. The director did however suggest that I stand in the wings, not appearing on 
stage or participating in the production, and sing from there. Of course, a critical factor here 
is that of the source of the restriction. In my case, it was not a direct biological limitation that 
prevented me from performing on stage (I’d done so several times before), it was the 
assumption regarding the biological limitations of visual impairments made by that director, 
an assumption which was in actuality false, but which he refused to alter even upon receiving 
information to the contrary. However, even had his assumption been true, his proposed 
solution, that I stand in the wings, effectively out of the production, and simply sing 
privately, was so unrelated to my initial desire to perform on stage as to be entirely 
unreasonable. 
Thus, disturbingly often in the lives of disabled people, what alternative desire is 
proposed to take the place of a supposedly restricted desire, and indeed whether a certain 
desire is restricted at all, seem to be matters decided not by the disabled individual 
themselves (the one whom we should assume in the vast majority of circumstances is in the 
best position to pass judgements over their own desires and capabilities), but by people or 
institutions within society itself entirely unrelated to that disabled individual. 
These sorts of social restrictions are often deprecated by those working in the social 
model and quite rightly so (Darke, Shakespeare, Silvers, Wasserman, Davis, and virtually 
every other social model commentator deals with this point to some degree or other).161 
Indeed Szasz and Tassano attack the entire medical profession on these grounds claiming that 
doctors have a vested economic and political interest in remaining in control of the desires of 
people who are ill in order to maintain their power in society.162 Whether indeed this idea, 
that a person other than the disabled, autonomous adult is in some way more qualified to 
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judge both the biological restrictions of any disability and what desires may be reasonably 
substituted for restricted ones is deliberate, or at least is motivated by less than savoury moral 
grounds or not, is a question I’ll further discuss in the next chapter. Whatever the motive 
however, it is certainly fairly obvious that such assumptions, reassignments of a person’s 
desires and downright obstructions, do exist. A disabled person might frequently be told that 
such a desire is “not possible” just because a certain third party thinks it is not, or fobbed off 
with some low grade alternative to his or her desire which bears little to no relation with its 
original object, but which the person making the decision believes is more “appropriate”.  
It seems therefore critical that if a theory of disability is to deal with the idea that 
desires are biologically precluded, we must give an account of some way of measuring, A: 
when a desire is or is not biologically precluded by a disability and, B: how we may decide 
when any proposed alternative does or does not bear a reasonable relation to the original 
desire.  
The first and most obvious answer, is that in determining these two factors, the 
disabled individual themselves has far more experience, weight and power than anyone else, 
simply because it is their desires that are most affected by their own physical and 
psychological state and therefore they are in the single best position to determine whether or 
not any given desire requires modification or an alternative proposition. 
Thus, while it may be universally true that a given activity, say catching a train as 
detailed in the example in Chapter 1, will be naturally more difficult for people with certain 
categories of biological limitations, for example people with paraplegia, visually impaired 
people, etc.,  whether any given disabled person will decide to catch a train or for instance 
use a taxi will depend upon more general circumstances surrounding that person’s life, how 
much time he or she has for the journey, how much energy he or she has after the journey, 
etc.. Thus, while we can say on a general level that catching a train for a person with a 
disability is more difficult based on the averages and the castaway example, whether any 
specific disabled individual should or should not catch a train is a matter best left up to 
themselves.  
Of course, this sort of thinking is only possible if, as detailed in Section A, disability 
is thought of not as an absolute category of persons akin to nationality or gender, but as a 
relational, qualitative category which affects a person’s freedom of action and ability to carry 
out desires similarly to the category of “being lost” and is therefore a state into which people 
may all fall at one point or other throughout life. 
The admission of the autonomy of a disabled individual, though trivially true does 
seem to need a more formal statement, since in the lives of disabled people denial of 
autonomy occurs frequently, indeed I myself recall one disability professional telling me flat 
out, “Disabled people are not the best judges of what they can and cannot do”. Of course, it is 
true that there are cases where a disabled person simply is not aware of possible risks to 
others or themselves in possessing a certain desire, or is not aware of how their own disabled 
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status has an effect upon their desires. In these types of cases, however, if we understand 
disability as to be a state that everyone falls into at some point or another, it would seem that 
the disabled individual here, in misunderstanding his or her own desires, is guilty not of a 
misunderstanding regarding the status of “being disabled”, but simply of a misunderstanding 
in connection with their self and their desires. This is something whose cure is self-
knowledge, access to information and experience, rather than the tyrannical impositions of an 
external agency. 
So, for instance, a person with quadriplegia might firmly believe that using a 
computer is not an optional desire and that they should abandon all desires connected with it, 
because they are not aware of adaptive aids such as head and eye trackers. Such aids would 
allow them to use a computer with, if not exactly the same effort as a person with normal 
motility, certainly far less than would be needed without them. If we therefore assume that 
the disabled individual themselves (when acting competently as I will expand upon in the 
next chapter), is the best measure of whether a given desire is or is not biologically restricted, 
it seems then that the measure of when an alternative proposed desire is reasonably related to 
the restricted one is also the disabled individual themselves, and that in proposing such 
alternatives, those who are unreasonable are guilty of not taking into account the feelings of a 
disabled person, and thus behaving in an unethical manner.  
Just as British colonial doctors in places such as Ceylon, who insisted on “civilizing” 
the natives of the colonies they were involved with by enforcing alternative practices such as   
medically assisted births (in the case of Ceylon), and were guilty of not considering the 
feelings and interests of the native population, so a person who proposes an alternative 
related desire to a disabled individual which is not in that individual’s best interest, such as 
the above mentioned director, is guilty of unethical, and high-handed behaviour.163 
It may also be seen that this proposal of alternative desires and exploration of 
alternatives to precluded desires is one of the chief responsibilities of a good, rather than bad, 
assistant to a disabled person, as in fact is detailed by Michael Smith.164,165 
                                                          
163 Margaret Jones, “Infant and Maternal Health Services in Ceylon, 1900-1948: Imperialism or  
Welfare?”, Social History of Medicine, vol. 15, no. 2, (August 2002), pp 263-289. 
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165 Smith details the case of a boy, Tony, with Down’s syndrome. Though Tony does not have the mental 
equipment to fully control and plan his life, Smith details how, with the aid of an assistant and the direct 
payment programme, Tony can make choices about desire alternatives and what “he” wants to do from day to 
day. This is a practical example of the treatment of a disabled individual with unconscious, mental impairments 
as a child. Just as a good parent would wish his or her child to experience the pleasure of choice and fulfilled 
desires to as great an extent as possible, but not to an extent where the child would harm themselves, so Tony’s 
carer allowed him to take pleasure in the choices and ordering of desires which he is able to, without risking his 
reduced responsibility causing injury to himself. This also shows that Tony’s carer is working in Tony’s best 
interests to as large an extent as possible, since, as John Stewart Mill argued, disallowing someone freedom of 
choice would ultimately go against their best interests. 
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Of course, there are some cases in which a disability (particularly those such as 
depression or schizophrenia), may create desires which an individual may not wish to fulfil,  
such as a person with Depression having a temporary desire to commit suicide,  however it 
would seem that again this is a case where self-knowledge and knowledge of the person’s 
own status and condition is needed, and especially knowledge of what desires may be caused 
by that condition as opposed to those autonomously accepted by an individual in the normal 
course of their life. Indeed often people living with such conditions (especially ones, such as 
bipolar disorder, which run in episodes), use the consistency of desires as a guide to the 
effective  scope of their condition. This form of self-knowledge also ties in to the idea of 
competency which I will discuss further in the next chapter. 
So, we can say that the preclusion of a biological desire is a fact determined by an 
individual’s current relation to his or her state of disability, and his or her competence 
working within that state, and that the proposal of alternative desires is only a viable option if 
it is undertaken in the spirit of promoting the interests of the disabled individual themselves, 
rather than the interests of the individual proposing the alternative desires.  
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Section E: Conclusion 
In this chapter we have examined the relation between disability and desire. We have 
established how, and in what ways, the circumstances surrounding the effort made to fulfil a 
desire may be altered, either by external changes to the world and environment, or by the 
intervention of a human assistant whose desires are synonymous with those of the disabled 
individual they are assisting. We have also discussed the relationship of an animal assistant to 
a disabled person, the unique compromises and benefits of such a relationship, and the 
responsibility of stewardship it involves, (noting that such as a relationship, though beneficial 
is not for everyone). We have also suggested that in cases where accommodations to fulfil 
desires cannot be made, a disabled individual, or a party attempting to work in their best 
interest, may propose an alternative desire, whose relation to the initially restricted desire is 
also a matter the disabled individual themselves needs to determine. As noted, however, this 
puts huge amounts of power of choice into the hands of the disabled individual themselves, 
and also depends upon the attitudes of those around them, both in an immediate context, and 
more generally throughout society.  
Therefore, in the next chapter, even though we take disability to be the biological 
restriction detailed in Chapter 1, it will be necessary to analyze the ethical relations and 
responsibilities of both individuals experiencing a state of disability, and those they interact 
with, in order that the definition detailed in Chapter 1 is able to achieve an ethically 
harmonious state both for disabled people and those surrounding them. Since, as a state 
which affects all humans to a greater or lesser extent throughout life, disability is, like other 
ethical states, such as family relations or community responsibilities, one that is implicit I 
believe, with both moral push, and moral pull, i.e. a disabled person is not merely the bearer 
of relations to others such as assistants (human or animal), friends, family and even strangers, 
but also bears some implicit responsibilities inherent upon them due to existing in a state of 
disability towards the world and their ability to fulfil desires within it.  
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Chapter 4: Disability and relations to the non-disabled 
Introduction 
Disability is, as we have established, more than just a social phenomenon, being a 
relation between a person’s biological and psychological self, the environment in which they 
exist, and their desires and how those desires might be fulfilled. This contrasts with many 
theories of disability which implicitly state that disability is directly constituted in how 
disabled people are perceived and categorized by those around them.166 Nevertheless, as 
shown by the discussion in Chapter 3, and indeed by the impetus behind the formulation of 
the social model in the first place, the interactions between a person’s own disabled state and 
how that state is directly perceived by those around them play a huge part in a disabled 
person’s ability to fulfil his or her desires, from a desire for a certain career or path in life, to 
desires attached to the mundane but vital details of everyday living such as travel, dressing, 
eating, and of course relationships with friends, strangers and family. Though, as shown in 
the first chapter, disability is not just made up of these social relations and perceptions, not 
the least because under the definition I have proposed disability is a far wider category than 
the usually labelled groups, e.g. “the blind”, or “the physically impaired”, yet no discussion 
of a definition of disability would be complete without addressing them. 
In the previous chapter, we noted that disability is a state similar to “being lost” in its 
placement of a disabled person in a negative relationship to their environment. Though 
“being lost” is itself not implicitly a social state, society can have a huge impact on a lost 
person. People’s willingness to help, society’s shaping of the environment in terms of maps 
and street signs, even the relative language spoken by the lost person and those around them, 
not to mention the attitude (helpful or otherwise) of any people the lost person asks for 
assistance. Equally, however, the lost person is not merely a passive sufferer of a misfortune. 
Logical exploration of the environment and use of orienteering skills, a sympathetic attitude 
if asking for directions, and the ability to explain the lost person’s exact problem in detail 
when conversing with locals will all be helpful skills which someone who is lost could 
develop and use, both to alleviate their immediate unfortunate circumstances, and as useful 
skills to be perfected should the lost person (as seems entirely probable) become lost in the 
future. We might say therefore, that a person prone to being lost is advised to become 
“competent” in coping with their state of being lost. 
As part of this set of competencies which a person may develop, one major aspect 
seems to be the need to treat others, even when requesting their assistance, with respect and 
consideration. Imagine the stereotypical, colonial era English tourist, who, when lost in a 
foreign country, becomes short tempered, aggressive and abrasive, often behaving rudely 
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towards locals even when asking for assistance, such as by speaking slowly and insultingly, 
without trying to learn any local language or geography, or wilfully misunderstanding 
attempts by locals to communicate with them.167 Such a tourist simply expected locals to 
accommodate them “because they’re English”. 
We would class such a tourist as not only boorish, ignorant and  possibly even 
immoral, but  also more fundamentally, as “incompetent” at dealing with the matter of being 
lost in a foreign country, an incompetence fuelled by their social prejudices and beliefs about 
their own status and that of the locals they encounter.  
Equally, however, though existing in a negative state related only to their own 
circumstances, all the moral responsibility for dealing with the unfortunate condition of their 
life does not rest just with the lost person. If those in a lost person’s environment, even when 
approached in a considerate manner, respond with disdain, wilful ignorance, mockery, 
derision or even attempts to take advantage of the lost individual, then they would be just as 
guilty of behaving immorally as the tourist mentioned above.  
Thus, “being lost” is both a situation which has a distinct level of competency 
expected of the person who is lost, and also a necessary moral requirement upon those around 
the lost person by virtue of his or her misfortune, even more especially if the lost person’s 
desire to alleviate his or her state of being lost is being assisted directly with reference to the 
desires of those around them, say by the lost person employing a guide, or having a local 
friend who knows the area. In ethical terms therefore, we could say that the situation  has 
both moral push, i.e. the implicit moral imperative upon locals to assist a lost person caused 
by that lost person’s reduced circumstances in that environment and to provide that assistance 
in such a way as to not be in itself offensive or unpleasant, and moral pull, i.e. a lost person’s 
requirement not to treat those who can possibly provide assistance in an unethical fashion, 
both when requesting assistance and when interacting with an assistant, as Kant would say, 
treating people as ends in themselves rather than as means. 
It is my belief that the social relations surrounding disability, despite the comments by 
social theorists such as Wasserman, Swain and Darke who categorize disability’s social 
relations  only in terms of a natural assertion of denied moral rights, are just as reciprocal in 
nature as those I have outlined above regarding “being lost”.168 While there is undoubtedly a 
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definite moral imperative for the non-disabled members of society to alleviate, rather than 
exacerbate the negative consequences of disability, a disabled individual also bears moral 
responsibility for learning to live with their negative circumstances in as competent and 
efficient a way as possible. This involves taking into account the needs and desires of those 
around them, including human assistants, as well as learning practically what is specifically 
best for the fulfilment of their desires with respect to their own individual circumstances, 
what forms of access aids or adaptations might be available to help with desire fulfilment, 
and practicing to be either a “good steward” if deciding to use animal assistance, or a “good 
partner” if being the recipient of human assistance. This idea seems even more necessary if 
we categorize disability as a general, biologically inhibitive state which will be experienced 
by most people at some point in their lives, rather than as only applying to some specialized 
groups within society who have specific cultural or political interests which need exceptional 
treatment or recognition. Thus, in this chapter I will attempt to present a reciprocal view of 
the social relations of disability, whereby the necessary moral attitudes of those around a 
person with disability are balanced by a similar set of moral duties implicit upon a disabled 
individual, and any discussion of disability access, advocacy or social equality must 
recognize both sets of responsibilities.  
In Section A, I will explore this concept of disability competency, i.e. the idea that a 
disabled person has suffered a misfortune in their ability to fulfil desires which also conveys 
upon them a duty to develop skills, knowledge and practical wisdom in dealing with that 
misfortune. This knowledge must be acquired for both their own benefit and the benefit of 
those with whom they interact, and if a disabled person fails to develop such competency, 
they may be guilty of behaving irresponsibly, or even immorally. This is an idea certain 
brands of social theorists would doubtless frown upon, but one which I believe is absolutely 
necessary if there is to be any meaningful and cooperative relationship between disabled 
people and society. 
In Section B, however, I will balance the portrait of disability competency by 
discussing the more familiar themes of social attitudes towards disability, and more 
specifically the idea of social difference as being the chief force in society’s general 
perception of disabled individuals, a force which, if not universally negative, does have 
extremely unfortunate and negative consequences and should thus be considered as one 
which provokes immoral attitudes and behaviour. 
In Section C I will assess the offshoot of the idea of an attitude of social difference 
and one of the main stumbling blocks in any reasonable discussion of disability: the problem 
of the assessment of a disabled individual’s capabilities with respect to normality.  
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In Section D, however, I will conclude with a recommendation of how such capacities 
should be objectively discussed, and recommend a social change which could aid 
significantly in the discussion of disability even under my more liberal definition. 
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Section A: The need for disability competency 
In his theological novel The Screwtape Letters, C.S. Lewis (writing in the persona of 
a devil discussing how to tempt humans into committing sins) argues for a new understanding 
of several sins not merely in light of their literal, biblical meaning, but in light of their 
consequences to others.169 Thus, Lewis (or at least the devil, Screwtape), argues that the 
“sinful” aspect of gluttony is not the quantity of food or drink which a person consumes, but 
the level to which those in a person’s immediate surroundings are inconvenienced or directly 
harmed by a person’s appetites. So, a woman who, upon being presented with a large and 
lavish meal insists that it is “too much” and that the chef take it away and give her “just a bit 
of dry toast” is equally guilty of committing the sin of gluttony as a person who will only be 
satisfied when provided with an extra, larger meal to the one originally prepared.  
To place this idea in less overtly Christian moral terms, we could say that the woman 
in Lewis’ example is behaving immorally since she is making no allowance for the feelings 
of the chef, or considering the amount of work she or he has put into cooking the meal. The 
woman is focused purely on the exact fulfilment of her desires as dictated by her biological or 
social needs, and is not prepared to modify her beliefs or perceptions of what will fulfil those 
desires to save the feelings of the chef, to ease the chef’s workload, or even to acknowledge 
the achievement of the chef in creating the rejected meal in the first place. After all, she is far 
less likely to cause offense to the chef if she only eats a small portion of the meal, rather than 
demanding that the chef prepare for her an alternative, meagre in size though that alternative 
might be. More simply we could say she is treating the chef as a means, simply the provider 
of the fulfilment of her desires, rather than an end. 
Of course, this is not to say the woman’s need to consume less than the allotted 
portion of food is not a real need, particularly if it has a purely biological cause which she 
herself can do nothing about, rather than being (as Lewis implies) a personal preference 
based upon some social ideal of wishing to appear refined or dainty. However, it is in the 
subordination of the efforts of another individual to a person’s biological needs, and the 
denigration of that individual to merely a means to fulfilling those needs without any 
consideration of how much work, effort or time is involved that she is behaving immorally. 
Suppose, however, that the woman, in full knowledge of her abnormally small 
appetite were to ask, prior to the preparation or serving of the meal, that she is given a smaller 
helping, thus ensuring that the chef’s efforts were not wasted. Such a course of action is 
consequentially no different from the point of view of satisfying the woman’s desires, since 
in either case she will attain the smaller portion she requires, however, by asking the chef in 
advance she is both recognizing the efforts of the chef, and also being cognisant of the fact 
that,  for whatever reason, her own desires require a different strategy of fulfilment to those 
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which the chef would normally encounter, a strategy which may require extra effort on the 
part of the chef, and for which effort a specific request needs to be made.  
This is a perfect illustration of what we might call disability competency and, despite 
its fictional source, a highly realistic one. Frequently individuals who have undergone a 
gastric bypass to remove a cancer or cure pathological obesity do indeed have such a reduced 
appetite that they  can only consume an abnormally small amount of food at one sitting. The 
problems associated with a gastric bypass can therefore often cause issues with portion sizes 
in restaurants or when dining with friends, making it yet another illustration of the wide 
ranging nature of disability.  
Thus, a major part of developing competency at dealing with any disability would 
seem to be simply the ability to consider the effects of that disability upon others and how 
fulfilling desires affected by that disability may impact upon them. This consideration could 
be overt and fairly straightforward as with the above example from Lewis, or something more 
subtle and less easy to quantify. 
During her work on the social perceptions of disability, the sociologist Tanya 
Titchkosky, while pretending to be blind with her visually impaired husband, details an 
incident in which they enter a shop, attempting to buy batteries.170 Passing the counter, which 
other customers are using, they walk to the back of the shop to an unused counter, and wait 
for an assistant to serve them. When the assistant does come, Titchkosky simply requests the 
batteries, with no politeness or acknowledgement that she is making a less than typical 
request, where upon the assistant simply grabs the batteries, deposits them on the counter and 
leaves. This forces Titchkosky to have to make a further request and insist that someone 
come to the disused counter so that she can pay for the batteries.  
While the social attitudes of the assistant and their less than obliging stance on 
disability are certainly a factor (one which I will return to later),Titchkosky did nothing to 
alleviate the situation. She did not greet the assistant, make conversation with them, make 
any effort to be pleasant, or indeed acknowledge the fact that she was asking the assistant to 
perform services which wouldn’t normally be part of the responsibilities their job requires 
when dealing with customers, i.e. fetch items from the shelves. She even went to a different 
counter and expected the assistant to come to her, rather than going to the counter that was in 
use and asking the cashier there for assistance, something which she definitely could have 
done (indeed it would have been easier to find a crowded counter for a blind person than an 
unoccupied one, especially if her guide dog was trained to find counters specifically as 
Reever my dog is). 
Though it is fairly clear from Titchkosky’s example that the assistant sought to keep 
visibly disabled individuals at arms length, an attitude which is sadly often seen in society, 
(I’ll discuss this attitude further in Section B) Titchkosky neither recognized, nor attempted to 
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alleviate this attitude, nor did she make any effort to present herself in the situation as 
anything other than a customer with demands that required fulfilment. Of course, Titchkosky, 
as a customer buying an item from a shop, did have every right to “expect” the assistant to 
perform the obligations required of an assistant towards a customer, even if those would be 
slightly different when dealing with a visually impaired customer, however it was her overall 
attitude towards the assistant and the situation which seems to have been lacking.  
This is the key principle of the idea of disability competency: the recognition by a 
disabled individual that in asking others to assist in the fulfilment of their desires, a disabled 
individual, due to their status as “disabled” is often making a singular or unusual request, and 
requiring extra effort on the part of others to fulfil that request. In light of the 
acknowledgement that a disabled individual is making such a singular request, a disabled 
individual has an equal moral imperative to show particular consideration to the person who 
is fulfilling the request, whether that person is a shop assistant, paid help, or a family 
member.  
This isn’t to say that a disabled individual should not make such requests, or that 
individuals around them are justified in denying such a request because it is other than what 
would constitute the normally expected responsibilities or behaviour towards others in 
society, only that a disabled adult is required to recognize that the fulfilling of their desires is 
not simply a one way, slot machine process whereby a request can automatically be expected 
to be fulfilled as soon as it is made. Rather, such a request would seem to be a two way 
process whereby the disabled individual collaborates with another human (or in some cases 
an organization or institution), to have their desires fulfilled, such collaboration being assisted 
by a mutual fulfilment of desires between the partners, as detailed in Chapter 3. In one sense 
such cooperation is directly worthwhile to the disabled person as well, since the disabled 
person’s cooperation with a non-disabled assistant in the fulfilment of their desires is also a 
way to directly promote empathy, and therefore assure that the non-disabled individual’s 
desires will be attuned to those of the disabled person, rather than orders which the assistant 
is expected to simply obey like an automaton; orders which might well cause resentment and 
ultimately make the fulfilment of desires less, rather than more likely. Of course, there are far 
more reasons for a disabled individual to treat an assistant decently than just as an extended 
way of getting what they want, but it can’t be denied this is certainly a major factor which 
most disabled people will directly experience in their lives, since cooperation in the 
fulfilment of desires is far more likely when both parties recognize the worth of each other 
and each other’s efforts during the course of that cooperation. 
Of course where a disabled person uses access aids or animal assistants, a further 
level of competency is needed to predict exactly how such things affect people in their 
immediate environment and make adequate allowances for such effects, while equally 
remaining aware of their own need for such aids and assistance and not down playing that 
need for others’ benefit either. For example, a person in a wheelchair with an adapted car is 
often required to park their car both so that they do not inconvenience other drivers while 
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removing their wheel chair ramp from the back, and yet also still be in a position to have 
enough space to use the ramp themselves. Of course, balancing such needs for access, 
particularly if those in the immediate environment do not recognize that a disabled individual 
doesn’t have a choice about using such aids, is not an easy matter and often takes a large 
amount of diplomacy, compromise and advocacy (a matter I will return to later).  
It is also evident that while disability competency may be expected, just as politeness 
may be expected from an adult, i.e. a person in full recognition of their own disability who is 
able to understand its effects upon others, it is equally obvious that just as we recognize that a 
child has diminished moral responsibility for their actions, so a person with cognitive 
disabilities (and possibly certain forms of mental disabilities) cannot be expected to make  
this  recognition of others to the same extent that a person with normal cognition or mental 
processes would. Again this is why, as I suggest in Chapter 2, certain categories of disabled 
individuals need to be regarded as having the status of children, though even in this status, as 
Michael Smith notes, children can learn consideration for others in the cooperative fulfilment 
of their desires, just as a parent would expect degrees of unselfishness from a child as it 
grows.171 My sister for instance, though intellectually close to the age of three, has still 
learned the concept of sharing. For an adult, however, the inability to recognize the 
cooperative fulfilment of disability related desires should be regarded as a form of immoral 
behaviour analagous to any mistreatment of another person, such as insensitivity or rudeness. 
Of course one of the most major problems in assessing a person’s actual level of 
disability competency is that, like common politeness and consideration of others, there is 
little or no way that it can be quantified. A disabled person, as per the castaway test 
established in Chapter 1, adheres to different processes to fulfil desires and needs affected by 
their disability than a non-disabled person, and by definition this will automatically be a more 
arduous, effort filled process than that employed by individuals without that disability, simply 
by virtue of being disabled. However, as with much to do with disability, it would seem that 
disability competency is more useful as an acid test, as a way of measuring in any given 
situation whether a disabled individual is indeed considering the desires and effort of others 
with equal respect to their own, i.e. if a disabled individual is or is not behaving competently. 
Thus it is a moral duty towards others, rather than an intrinsically hard and fast rule which 
may be followed rigidly like a law. It is also evident that as a form of competency, disability 
competency is, like a virtue, something that may be gradually perfected and attained over 
time through practice, rather than something which can instantly be said to be present or 
absent in any given situation, indeed most people who have lived with disability and 
successfully interacted with non-disabled members of society have likely developed 
it.172,173So, we might characterize disability competency as the duty implicit upon a disabled 
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individual to learn the ways in which they may best and most efficiently deal with the effort 
costs and other preclusions of their disability, and most readily relate this to the effort taken 
by others on their behalf so as to behave in a considerate, rather than inconsiderate way.   Of 
course this is a “duty” in its social and every day sense rather than a duty in the stronger, and 
more imperatively  moral  sense  usually meant by philosophers, especially those working in 
a  Kantian tradition. “Duty” in this sense means a matter predicated upon consideration for 
the good of others, such as “the duty of politeness”, rather than more objective or exclusively 
rationalist concerns of “willing the good.”  While of course another term such as “obligation” 
could be used, in its conventional sense “duty” can also signify a strong   set of 
responsibilities towards others resulting from a person’s position within a larger group, for 
example, the duties of a judge, a teacher or a doctor.  “Duty,” may also refer to an obligation 
caused by a less than equal relationship to another person, for instance, the duties of an 
employee or a tenant. Of course, the relations of power and obligation are not entirely one 
way even in equal relationships, since the land owner has obligations to their tenants just as 
the employer does to their employees, and where such relations were entirely one sided, e.g. 
the greedy employer exploiting their workers or the indolent employees shirking their jobs, 
the relation breaks down into one of enforced slavery and thus loses all sense of duty. As 
noted in the first chapter, disabled people are not slaves, i.e. powerless individuals thrust into 
a defined group which automatically relates negatively to the rest of society, neither, 
however, does a disabled person’s status as disabled make them an aristocrat, i.e. a member 
of a privileged class able to regard their own desire fulfilment as taking primacy over the 
desires and well-being of those outside that class. 
Following Nietzsche, Tassano argues that disability is actually a survival trait and that 
disabled people have an ability to trigger the pity of others, a position which is reinforced by 
the medical profession.174 This argument is far from convincing, however, it does represent a 
worryingly common social attitude: that people feel resentful at the supposed special 
treatment disabled people receive (an attitude which even receives voice at higher political 
levels). I recall for example one occasion when, on a train a woman refused to move one seat 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
virtue of competency I suggest here may have worthwhile properties outside and above its relation to disability, 
I am far more concerned here intrinsically with the idea of competency as a state which disabled individuals 
should attain in achievement of aneudaimon life for themselves and in consideration of others.  
MacIntyre’s conception appears to hold disability as an intrinsically neutral state in which certain virtues may be 
practised, whereas the definition I considered in the first chapter exclusively states that disability is negative, 
and thus the “virtue” of competency (if it can be considered such) is more a best possible way of dealing with 
misfortune, after all, if nobody suffered paraplegia, the skill of driving a wheelchair would be totally 
unnecessary. Though of course, just as driving a wheelchair may help a person learn patience, coordination and 
develop strength in their arms, disability competency may aid in developing other skills, in particular how a 
person relates to others, but it is not valuable exclusively because of the attainment of those skills. 
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over to allow room for my guide dog causing me to stand the entire journey, she exclaimed, 
“It’s not my fault that you have special needs”.  
It is as a direct counter to the rationale which often underlies such unearned 
resentment, even if not to the actual resentment itself, that a concept like disability 
competency is required, and why, despite how inconvenient society often is, the reciprocal 
nature of the disabled person’s relationship to those around them should always be 
remembered, both by the disabled person themselves and by the non-disabled members of 
society.  
Of course, disability competency only comes into play when a disabled person is 
interacting on a personal level with others, which is why it might be characterized more as a 
duty born of politeness and consideration, than as a cast iron moral law; a facet of individual 
behaviour and attitude, rather than one of institutional or social justice. Yet, like many other 
forms of social interaction between people, it is a principle by which a disabled adult could 
be judged to fail or succeed in, both on a general, interpersonal level, and also possibly more 
broadly, just as someone with a rude manner or a lack of consideration towards others might 
be judged as acting immorally. For this reason, and especially given the social attitudes 
towards disability, it is a principle which I believe must be included in any discussion of the 
interactions between disabled and non-disabled people, especially if, as indicated, disability is 
such a wide-spread phenomenon. Thus, disability competency is an instrumental virtue which 
many people should acquire.  
The potential consequences of failing to act with competency are even more serious 
than just the disabled individual’s own inconsiderate treatment of others, since, when a 
disability is visible, it can influence individuals or institutions for, or against, anyone with 
that certain type of disability. When I first attended the Aims International Music School, the 
principal was extremely reluctant about accepting a blind person, particularly with respect to 
my guide dog.  This, as it turns out, was due to a couple of blind people who attended the 
school previously and showed distinctly less than considerate behaviour, demanding services 
from others (such as picking up dog droppings),  rather than making any efforts on their own 
behalf to assist others in fulfilling their desires. They also demanded ensuite bathrooms 
despite the fact that nobody at the music school has such a room, and the fact that the 
accommodations officer had already placed them as close as possible to the nearest bathroom 
facility. They were thus not only guilty of treatment of others purely as means, but also of a 
level of unrealistic expectation of desire fulfilment which did not fit their current 
circumstances or indeed bear any relation to what was “normal” in that situation and 
environment, all based on the fact that they were blind. Since, as humans, people are inclined 
to make judgements of any previously unencountered groups based upon the first member of 
that group they come into contact with, it is therefore of even more importance that an 
individual with a disability which is made evident to the non-disabled people in their 
surroundings, avoid prejudicing others further by inconsiderate behaviour, though this is by 
no means the only benefit from acquiring disability competency.  
Disability, Desire and Society: The Establishment of a New, Individualistic Definition of Disability and 
its Practical Uses in Everyday Life 
By Luke Hewitt 
 
116 
 
Of course, the attitude of people within society towards disabled individuals is not 
simply one of potential universal helpfulness, neither is it a blank slate upon which the 
actions of disabled individuals will be measured with no previous expectations.  Therefore, in 
the next section I will examine social attitudes in more detail, and what the key features of a 
society’s given prejudices and judgements about those with disabilities are, and how these 
features may affect a disabled individual’s ability to fulfil their desires.  
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Section B: Social attitudes towards disability  
Havi Carel notes in her book on illness, that the attitude of others quite abruptly 
changed when she was seen with an oxygen cylinder.175 She suddenly became known as “the 
lady with the oxygen”; it was the first thing people saw about her, and the thing people most 
frequently remembered. Similarly, Murphy notes that when he suffered an illness which 
confined him to a wheelchair, it was suddenly the chair that was the first and most important 
characteristic of his which people noticed.176 
I have observed myself that upon meeting anyone for the first time, for the first five 
minutes often nobody will speak to or acknowledge my presence. Furthermore for the length 
of our first conversation people will speak slowly and carefully, as though I were easily 
offended or angered, or from a nation with a different first language to English. It is usually 
not until I have talked to someone for some time (usually half an hour or so), that they 
suddenly forget my eyesight, start consciously using expressions like “I see” as opposed to 
obviously avoiding them, and in general treat me the way they would treat another person, 
rather than as some unusual curiosity whose differences from themselves are something they 
are perpetually conscious of.  
Government studies done in 2002 confirm this practice, that when presented with a 
disabled  person whose disability is marked by a visible difference, most people will react at 
first by keeping the person at a distance, at arm’s length, or even by actively ignoring their 
presence.177 Similarly, those who are found to have a disability (especially a mental illness), 
often experience this form of avoidance from the public when that mental illness becomes 
apparent, as noted by Brülde.178 Indeed, I remember a friend on one occasion being very 
reluctant to disclose to me the specific nature of a mental illness she was suffering for fear 
that it would alter my attitude towards her, and finally deciding to reveal the nature of this 
mental illness only because she thought (correctly as it happened) that, as someone with a 
visual impairment, I would not treat her differently or cease being her friend due to her 
suffering the condition in question.  
Swain, Germon, Wasserman and many others see social reactions to disability as 
primarily negative, indeed in many social accounts of disability even derivatively negative, to 
the point where disability is defined directly by the majority’s prejudice. I am not myself, 
however, convinced that society’s attitude about disability can be so easily dismissed as 
universally negative, despite how marked most reactions I have encountered from others 
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towards me are.179 In many countries, for instance, such as Canada following the First World 
War, or El Salvador following their revolution, favourable attitudes to military veterans who 
suffered disabling wounds during the war spilled over more generally into a “positive” 
attitude held by many of the population.180,181 This phenomenon of admiration for victims of 
war causing a general improvement of attitude towards disabled people also occurred in 
Britain, Canada, America and several other countries, where disability related services 
initially began as a direct way of supporting those injured in war, rather than as anything to 
do with “disability” in its purist sense.  
Even on a personal level, the responses to disability can vary widely. Titchkosky, 
Smith and Swain all note, for instance, that often people show an extreme overt admiration 
towards disabled individuals, seeing even the conducting of daily tasks as worthy of praise, 
an attitude I have encountered myself.182 On one occasion, for example, at a social function, 
when a lady found out that I’d travelled there alone with no assistance from others, her first 
response was, “Oh well done!” as though I had completed some sort of impossibly difficult 
task simply by travelling there.  Murphy also noticed that he was perceived as less 
intimidating or threatening as a professor, i.e. a person with a certain degree of power over 
others, once in a wheelchair.183 
While some commentators, and indeed many disabled people, tend to view this 
attitude of admiration in a primarily negative light (particularly since actually encountering it 
in reality can be uncomfortable), there is no denying that often the attitude is absolutely 
genuine, simply because people cannot appreciate what living with any sort of disability, but 
especially those which necessitate radical changes in a person’s life, is like. Some 
commentators, such as Goering and Wasserman, primarily put this down to a negative 
general social attitude, even calling it “the admiration for a clever animal”, however, again, 
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this seems a rather bitter dismissal of what is frequently a perfectly honest sense of 
admiration.184 
On the other hand however, negative attitudes towards disabled individuals are sadly 
not infrequent. This can occur politically or institutionally, as noted by social activists such as 
Shakespeare, Swain, Davis and Germon, or more frequently on a very standard, personal 
level which people with perceived disabilities will encounter in their daily lives, sometimes 
on a regular basis. Negative responses and attitudes can range from a tendency towards 
avoidance, to distaste or covert snubbing, or even to complete hostility, mockery and 
violence.185,186,187 
There are different causes attributed to these various social attitudes. Darke,  for 
instance, assumes that people are afraid of the body images of disabled individuals, being 
examples of an imperfect body, though this does not explain the abnormal attitudes 
encountered towards those with mental or cognitive disabilities, nor the cases where positive 
attitudes are encountered (either genuine or exaggerated), since admiration, however 
misplaced, is rarely a response to apparent fear.188 Several social theorists have, however, 
taken this idea of bodily imperfection to quite extreme lengths, leading to a complete 
phenomenology of disability. This phenomenology is based almost exclusively on rejecting 
the idea of “normal bodily experience”, as in fact Titchkosky, Goering and Carel all suggest, 
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though Carel’s idea rests far more on a practical approach to experience of life, death and 
illness from the perspective of a body which does not interact with the environment as per a 
person’s expectations of that body, following Merleau-Ponty.189 According to this 
phenomenology it is not society, but the failure of the body as the centre of experience and 
the bearer of human intentions which is at fault, and others’ attitudes can be seen as 
recognition of this failure.  
Titchkosky’s formulation of this phenomenology, however, is based purely upon the 
social construction of reality, and avoids discussion of specific bodily experience in favour of 
a critique of society’s construction of an environment which she believes is naturally 
incompatible to those who have a “disabled experience”. While Sara Goering specifically 
narrows herself to the opposition between “the disabled” as predefined social groups, and 
“the ableist construction of reality”: a construction of the environment specifically designed 
to reject the experiences of those who are categorized as disabled. Others, however, offer a 
completely contrasting account of social attitudes towards disabled individuals not based on 
opposing phenomenology, but generalized social or cultural factors. Tassano, for instance, 
follows an account based upon Nietzsche’s master/slave hypothesis, suggesting that society’s 
function allows “the injured” to exert a moral pull upon the well for treatment of their injured 
condition, (though he doesn’t deal with disabled individuals specifically, he does imply that 
they could be considered permanently ill).190 
I am not,  however, myself convinced by any of these accounts of the origins or 
explanations of the detailed mechanics of social attitudes towards disabled individuals, since 
those attitudes can be so completely diverse, ranging from avoidance, to hostility, to over 
protectiveness, admiration or distant politeness. For instance, if Szasz’ hypothesis were 
universally correct,  then disability should be an advantage for the moral reactions it arouses 
in others, while if Titchkosky’s formulation were correct then it would be impossible for 
social institutions to conflict with the structure of reality by suggesting that disabled people 
were admirable in the way that war veterans, or  disabled people sometimes performing 
mundane tasks throughout life are  admired, (while this admiration might be seen as 
misplaced, it cannot be denied that it is genuine).191 
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Neither do basic explanations of “socially constructed reality” or “bodily image” 
explain the variance in different social attitudes to different levels of disability or how 
disability is perceived as a whole concept. For instance, those with disabilities that affect 
communication are more often pitied or thought stupid, as Koch notes, while those with a 
mental illness could be perceived as threatening, quite  the opposite of Murphy’s findings of 
the perception of  those with paraplegia.192 
 It is also worth noting that frequently these phenomenologies, which extrapolate 
“types of experience” from social attitudes, are also couched in universally positive terms, in 
which the “Tyranny” of “ableist reality” is set against the “freedom” of “Disabled 
experience”, giving them a distinctly political bias, i.e. explaining society’s perceived attitude 
to a group whom the writer sees as “disabled” rather than trying to analyse attitudes towards 
disability as a whole. After all, while it’s reasonable for a paraplegic person to claim that 
society’s use of stairs is an environmental change which they experience negatively (albeit I 
am not convinced by attempts to link this to some sort of arbitrary, majority prejudice as 
Goering does), it’s difficult to see, for example, a person with chronic depression claiming 
that their experience of the world is a valid, personal interpretation being oppressed by the 
majority’s non-depressed view. 
While there may be explanations for people’s attitudes towards anyone with a 
perceived disability, such explanations I would see rather as a matter of the psychology of an 
individual, or at most the generalized beliefs that individual has absorbed from the group to 
which he or she belongs, rather than all being symptoms of any single, overarching 
explanation that covers all the multitude of classifications of disability and attitudes towards 
it. For instance, in Arthur Conan Doyle’s novel The Sign of the Four, Colonel Shalto’s fear of 
one legged men is a direct symptom of his guilt at how he swindled the one legged Jonathan 
Small, and thus purely a matter of his own individual experience and not applicable to anyone 
other than himself. More generally, people in El Salvador who perceived disabled individuals 
as worthy of admiration due to their association with war veterans, would seem to have a 
very different psychological history from those mentioned in the B.B.C. documentary who 
perpetrated sadistic or violent acts against disabled people, even when those individuals 
possessed similar disabilities, such as missing limbs.193 
The one key factor, however, in the treatment of anyone perceived to have a 
disability, and the factor which seems to have most implication in an ethical debate is simply 
the fact that there is a distinct difference in the attitudes of most individuals and cultures 
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towards those perceived to have a disability, as opposed to those who don’t. No matter where, 
when, or what nature the disability takes, most people will automatically assume anyone with 
a disability is, rather than merely being a similar sort of being to themselves who happens to 
have suffered a biological misfortune, a different kind of being entirely, and one requiring a 
different sort of response to that the individual would give to another able-bodied person. 
This response may be good, bad, admiring, avoiding or condemning as the individual’s own 
psychological makeup or life experience dictate, however, it is still not the response the same 
individual would give to a non-disabled person.194,195 
Since we do naturally have such a term as “disability” and groups identified as 
disabled to whom it applies, this seems to imply that individuals belonging to those groups 
will be perceived as requiring, not merely differences related to their disability, but 
differences of lifestyle, ethical value, opinion, thought and even choice. The apprehension of 
these differences often mean the desires and freedoms of disabled individuals are thought of 
and evaluated otherwise than the desires and choices of anyone else, and it is in the effect 
upon a disabled individual’s freedom caused by these differences in opinion that I believe the 
moral implications of attitudes towards disability truly lie, not in their underlying cause or 
even in the attitudes themselves. These opinions of difference seem to be almost universal, 
and held to a greater or lesser extent by a vast variety of people, even people connected with 
disability related governmental services (a fact that Smith, Swain, Brisenden and Titchkosky 
all note).196,197,198 
                                                          
194 Of all the discussions of attitudes towards disability, I find Carel’s careful explanation the most convincing, 
being based entirely on the individual experience of a lived body in the world, rather than specifically aimed at 
the idea of a socially constructed reality. Her formulation (unlike that of Titchkosky), however, is not 
exclusively directed at an explanation of the social attitudes towards disability, but rather a more general 
treatment of an individual’s experience of illness, and therefore covers several issues that are not directly 
applicable to disability such as the perception of the nearness of death. Interesting as the phenomenology of a 
disabled or ill person’s experience in the world is, however, it is not my main focus here. In terms of purely 
ethical considerations of the relationship between a disabled person and society, it is, I believe, the basic 
perception of difference that bears chief responsibility for the differing ethical treatment of disabled individuals, 
however that difference may be experienced or explained. 
195HaviCarel.  
Also: Tanya Titchkosky. 
196 Michael Smith.  
Also: John Swain, Sally French and Colin Cameron.  
Also: Simon Brisenden. 
Also: Tanya Titchkosky. 
197 The 2002 governmental survey did suggest that the vast majority of people hold some differing attitude 
towards those with a visible disability. This is something I can attest to myself, since usually the only people 
who will instantly get over the, “He’s blind!” reaction at first meeting me are those who have perhaps been used 
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While I was applying to universities to study a degree in philosophy, for instance, the 
disabilities adviser at one university (which shall remain nameless), said to me, “Why are you 
doing philosophy? Why don’t you do computer science? That’s what blind people usually do: 
everything is prepared.” I do not believe this assumption was intrinsically malicious in origin, 
indeed I genuinely believe the disabilities adviser “thought” he was acting in my best interest 
in suggesting I do “what blind people usually do.” Yet it is clear that in his assumption that 
“blind people” should have lives ordered in a very specific and narrow way, he was 
extremely guilty of the most literal form of prejudice, i.e. pre-judgement of a person’s desires 
based just upon the fact that the individual happened to have a visual impairment, a 
judgement just as potentially harmful as judging that all women wish to have children or that 
all Indians eat curry. 
This form of prejudice is one many disabled people find extremely damaging, being 
forced into doing what “it is expected” they should do, rather than doing what will best fulfil 
their desires. Indeed in many communities of disabled individuals it is automatically assumed 
that a person’s preferences in life, desires and even language will be dictated exclusively via 
their disability, for instance, assuming that all blind people read Braille or that all those in 
wheelchairs will naturally have no interest in spectator sports. Among some disabled groups 
there is a conscious effort to “embrace the culture” of disabled experience, often a desire 
based heavily on beliefs in the majority/minority phenomenal construction of the world, as 
previously detailed, though this would seem more likely to exacerbate rather than alleviate 
social perceptions of the intrinsic difference of “the disabled” and thus perhaps even 
contribute to fostering radically other-regarding unethical attitudes. This idea of the nature of 
disability is one I will return to in the conclusion of this work. 
The perception of difference is extremely overwhelming and encountered by perhaps 
everyone who has a disability when that disability is directly apprehended by others. This 
apprehension can range from an active avoidance, such as the well documented “Does he 
take sugar?” syndrome, where a person would rather talk to an able-bodied individual than a 
disabled one even about personal arrangements of the disabled individual, to a very minor, 
over-politeness or over-consideration. As Brülde and Szasz both note, it also intrinsically 
affects those with mental disability, and Chappell details its effects on those with cognitive 
disabilities.199 Indeed, even individuals with one sort of disability can be guilty of this 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
to encountering other people with a visual impairment (perhaps friends or relatives), and are thus used to 
thinking of visual impairment without an intrinsic moral or experiential difference. There have been some 
occasions when I have met unusually open-minded people who, through application of reason and life 
experience will consciously minimize any difference in thinking concerning visual impairments, but these are 
extremely rare. 
198Ini Grewal, Sarah Joy, Jane Lewis, Kirby Swales, and Kandy Woodfield. 
199 Bengt Brülde. 
Also: Thomas Szasz.  
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unexpected perception of difference, as witnessed by the famous deaf/blind author Helen 
Keller’s desire to avoid those with cognitive disabilities.200 
Even the recent Paralympics can be seen as evidence of the “difference” of disabled 
individuals. While many people promote the Paralympics as a positive influence on social 
perceptions in recognizing the “achievements” of disabled athletes, it is still true that the 
Paralympics is a separate event from the Olympics itself, held at a different time and with 
different media coverage. Whereas heats for men and women are held in the “normal” 
Olympics, as well as heats for other categories of humans such as weight classes in boxing, 
when “disabled people” are competing it must be done in a “special” venue. Thus, if the 
Paralympics were truly to promote a positive and not “different” image of disabled 
individuals it really should occur as part of the main Olympic event, rather than as a separate, 
segregated one.  
Yet, ironically, although this perception that disabled individuals are a “different kind 
of people” seems intrinsically false, it does contain a grain of truth, since obviously, if a 
disabled individual didn’t have a disability, the difference wouldn’t exist. Even under the 
definition I provided in Chapter 1, disability automatically implies a difference from the 
normal course of fulfilling desires, since manifestly, if a disabled individual did not need to 
take extra effort or suffer a biological preclusion of their desires, they would not be disabled 
in the first place.  
In the more general social perception of difference, however, the critical factor is the 
moral and psychological weight this difference is given, since if disability is seen as just as 
common place a human problem as illness, being lost, being frustrated or any other sort of  
condition that  alters a person’s ability to fulfil his or her desires, then disability will quite 
obviously be a less exclusively “different” occurrence, or one which should necessitate a 
change in attitude, i.e. disabled people will (as I told the unhelpful university disability 
adviser) be “people who are disabled”, not “Disabled people”  
This indeed is already a main aim of several disability aids and practices, for example, 
assistance animals can often make social situations easier, a fact I’ve certainly noticed myself 
with Reever. While I am not sure of the psychological reason for this, I do sometimes wonder 
if it is because people find the more common experience of talking to a black Labrador easier 
than trying to address the “strange blind man”.  
Unfortunately, significantly altering the perception of “disability”, from that of a state 
of difference to merely a state of misfortune, would take a major change in the social 
consciousness, and it is currently true that for a disabled individual, being treated as 
“different” is almost inevitable as soon as people perceive their disability. Though a 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Also: Anne Louise Chappell. 
200 J. David Smith. 
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sufficiently competent disabled individual can take steps to alleviate this perception, provided 
that people are willing to change their outlook, often individuals and institutions are not, 
especially when that perception of difference is also tied up with the assessment of a disabled 
individual’s capabilities.  
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Section C: Disability and assessment of capabilities  
One of the most damaging aspects of the nearly universal perception of disabled 
people as fundamentally different types of beings from non-disabled people is the general 
misapprehension of the capabilities of disabled people. In the course of many prejudicial 
attitudes, the belief that a person who is a member of a given group is in some way “inferior”, 
or unable through their membership of said group to perform some sort of activity, can be 
quickly and manifestly demonstrated to be false.  
The early 20th century belief, for instance, that women were unsuited to intellectual 
activities such as mathematics and science, can be shown to be false by the examples of 
successful female scientists and mathematicians, just as the belief expressed in the title of a 
1992 sports film, White Men Can’t Jump, that Caucasians were inferior at playing basketball 
can be altered by the example of a skilful Caucasian basketball player.201 So, we would 
expect that prejudicial beliefs based on inductive reasoning concerning that belief should be 
changed by the simple exhibition of a counter example. Of course, whether a group or 
individual will in fact reverse their prejudicial beliefs upon apprehending such a counter 
example is quite another matter, though it is hoped that any reasonably forward-thinking 
person will be able to do so, or at least on a basic logical level (as well as an ethical one) 
should do so.  
With a disability, however, since by its very definition disability automatically 
implies that a disabled individual is unable to do something, prejudicial judgements about the 
capabilities of disabled individuals are far more complex, since while there are prejudicial 
beliefs which may be utterly unrelated to a person’s actual disability, e.g. “people with 
paraplegia are not fun to be with,” which may be similarly disproved as the above mentioned 
examples (for instance by experiencing a “fun” paraplegic person), there are also some 
restrictions implicit in the very definition of disability itself which, though perhaps not 
prejudices in the usual sense, do seem to be related in their imposition of beliefs that 
negatively concern another’s capabilities.  
By definition a person with paraplegia cannot walk, a deaf person cannot hear, a blind 
person cannot see, etc.,  are applications of that definition rather than a completely unfounded 
prejudice.202,203 Some social theorists, and indeed governmental agencies bent upon political 
                                                          
201 As noted in the first footnote to Chapter 3, even if there are general racial differences, they are at most 
statistical only, and therefore just give a chance of variation, certainly not the justification for a categorical 
inductive judgement about what “all” members of a given racial group could be. Thus, even if there were a 
slightly greater likelihood of a good basketball player being of African descent rather that than Caucasian, it 
would not justify such categorical assertions. 
202 Some followers of the social model, such as Newell, Darke and Swain, intrinsically believe that the social 
definition of disability is one made up entirely of negatives for this reason. 
203 Christopher Newell.  
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correctness, have tried to straight-out deny this fact by using phrases such as “differently 
able” or the even more confusing “handicapable”, however, as governmental surveys show, 
such rebranding isn’t usually taken well by the general public, and despite its use by some 
social model advocates, such as Swain and French, I personally, along with Titchkosky, am 
more inclined to believe such obfuscations are at best unhelpful, at worst actively damaging 
since they often serve to confuse rather than clarify the problems disabled people experience, 
after all saying, “A paraplegic person is able to walk with a wheel chair”, is simply factually 
untrue, whereas saying, “A paraplegic person is able to be mobile with a wheelchair”, makes 
far more sense and is a much more useful statement in any discussion of fulfilling a 
paraplegic person’s desires.204 
As noted in Chapter One, when discussing the definition of the word “disability”, 
there is no getting away from the fact that disability is primarily and fundamentally a 
negative state, and therefore some beliefs concerning disabled individuals are inherently 
different from more irrational forms of prejudice, since, manifestly, presenting a walking 
person with paraplegia as a counter example to the belief that paraplegic people cannot walk 
would be logically impossible. Basically, a disabled individual simply will take more time, 
trouble and effort engaging in activities which are affected by their disability because they are 
disabled with respect to those activities.  
The problem, however, is that the perception of difference mentioned in the previous 
section, whether positive or negative, affects not only those activities that a disabled 
individual’s biological inhibitions preclude, but also many others as well, which is why, as 
noted in Chapter One, disability is a term of judgement, since even though under the 
definition I am proposing judging a person as “disabled” should theoretically only refer to 
that person’s biological inhibitions with respect to certain desires, in practice when a person 
is  said to be “disabled” the term bears significantly more social weight in the form of the 
perceptions others hold of that person as inherently “different”. This is a facet of disability 
often commented upon, for example, Paul Darke notes that disabled individuals in western 
society, even when their disability is physical, are often believed to have impaired mental 
abilities or the emotions of a child rather than an adult, and thus are incapable of engaging in 
adult relationships or in aspects of society which are deemed to have an advanced intellectual 
content, like studying at the same level as those without disabilities.205,206,207 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Also: Paul Darke.  
Also: John Swain, Sally French and Colin Cameron, “Chapter 3”.  
204Ini Grewal, Sarah Joy, Jane Lewis, Kirby Swales, and Kandy Woodfield.  
Also: John Swain, Sally French and Colin Cameron.  
Also: Tanya Titchkosky, “Chapter 6”. 
205 Paul Darke. 
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On a more basic level, I have noticed myself that often people will assume that 
activities, such as climbing a flight of stairs or unwrapping a plastic wrapper, which do not 
implicitly involve the use of vision, are held to be more difficult because I have a visual 
impairment. This is I believe a direct consequence of the perception of difference, that 
because a disabled individual is fundamentally a “different type of person” everything they 
do must be in some sense different. Indeed I’ve often noticed that there is a very distinct 
moment when people stop treating me as “a blind person” which is usually also characterized 
by a cease of concern for how I will perform various everyday tasks.  
One of the single most damaging effects of this perception of difference on the lives 
of disabled individuals is when a non-disabled person is required to assess the capabilities or 
attributes of a disabled individual in some way, such as a job interview or a decision on 
allotting tasks when working towards a mutually beneficial goal, or engaged in a cooperative 
effort. For example, I have often found myself refused positions in stage productions since it 
is assumed that my ability to sing and act is somehow adversely affected by my sight,  despite 
counter examples of a number of blind performers, and of previous experiences I’ve had 
performing myself.  
Still more problematically, when the task involved does impinge upon the disabled 
individual’s biological preclusions, the assessor may be unfamiliar with methods which a 
disabled individual will use to get around such prohibitions. For instance, my brother (who is 
also visually impaired) when applying for jobs was three times refused due to the job 
requiring travel, and the interviewer’s belief that such travel would not be possible without 
the ability to drive a car.  
Of course, in these situations a straight question on the part of the assessor to the 
disabled individual would seem to be a simple and logical solution since obviously it can be 
expected that, while the interviewer may be more familiar with the requirements of whatever 
task he or she is interviewing a person for, the disabled individual themselves will be likely 
(if they are competent) to be the most well-informed about their own capabilities. However, 
such questioning is rarely, if ever undertaken, either because the assessor is afraid such 
questions would be offensive, or,  ironically, would violate laws concerning disabled access, 
or still more worryingly, because the assessor  believes themselves to be a better judge of the 
disabled individual’s capacities than the individual themselves. Such a belief can again be 
traced back to the perception of difference and the belief in intrinsic, disabled incompetence. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
206 Murphy offers a shocking, but realistic example of this when a colleague of his, though accepting that 
Murphy himself as a professor in a wheelchair was okay, stated that his university should not accept disabled 
students because they should go to another university “which has the facilities to handle them”. This, as well as 
being a clear example of the perception of difference, also showed a distinct belief that disabled students 
couldn’t for some reason be expected to participate on a similar intellectual level to non-disabled students in a 
“normal” university, and thus required some sort of specialist institution to “care for them”. 
207 Robert Murphy. 
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Surprising as it might be, this attitude is more common than perhaps many people 
involved with disability relations would like to think. I was, for instance as mentioned above 
once told by a disabilities adviser straight out that, “Disabled people aren’t always the best 
judges of what they can and cannot do,” and stories of disabled individuals being refused jobs 
and similar positions by non-disabled assessors are worryingly common. Of course, a 
disabled individual, if indeed they are an adult and therefore responsible for their own 
disability, does need to acquire the necessary competency to understand exactly what 
measures they may need to take themselves to fulfil their desires which differ from those 
desires’ normal fulfilment, and perhaps what desires to give up due to too great a cost of 
effort.  
It is also equally true that a disabled individual may simply be lacking information on 
how to perform a certain task, and may require information from others upon how such a task 
could be performed, and how the costs in effort could be minimized, for example, as noted 
previously, a quadriplegic person who cannot use a computer would possibly be unaware of 
devices like head and eye trackers that might enable them to do so, simply by virtue of lack 
of information. This means that the simplest answer and the answer that I’d imagine many 
disability advocates would give, that such decisions should always be left in the hands of the 
disabled individual, will not suffice, since, after all, if a totally blind person offered to drive a 
taxi, there should be legitimate grounds for stating that such a skill was not (even with 
extensive assistance from others) within their purview. Thus, when a disabled person’s 
abilities are assessed there is often a clear conflict of interest between a disabled individual 
who may or may not be competent and informed, and an assessor who may or may not be 
prejudiced or informed. Even though, as we would allow, the opinions of a disabled person 
would always hold more weight in making such a decision, in practice, unfortunately, usually 
the majority of the power is on the side of the non-disabled assessor. This is particularly true 
given that, as noted in the first chapter, “disabled” is a term with an intrinsically judgemental 
overtone, and that if a person is held to be “disabled” their ability to make decisions about 
other areas of life not affected by their disability, including their ability to assess their own 
capabilities is often brought into question due to the perception of them as intrinsically 
different. 
The current governmental solution, having laws that state a disabled person cannot be 
excluded upon grounds of disability, clearly does not succeed, since this just means (as 
happened with my brother’s application for a job) there is a refusal to discuss the situation 
and often the assessor will simply think of another, unrelated (and frequently flimsy) excuse 
for refusing to deal with the disabled person so they can deal with a non-disabled person 
instead. Still worse, the assessor might agree, but minimize the role played by a disabled 
person in fulfilment of a task or in a job I was once, as mentioned above, told that while I was 
allowed to be on stage in a production, I could only do so if I stood at the back and sang, and 
so I was never seen by the audience. Difficult though this problem of assessment is, however, 
I do believe there is a solution. 
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Section D: Independent adjudication  
In western culture for thousands of years, it has been established that when a dispute 
arises between two parties that impinge upon both parties interests, a third party with 
knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the disagreement may act as adjudicator. For 
example, if two next door neighbours argued about the legal boundaries of their property and 
where a fence should be placed, the decision would be taken to Civil Court and, if no 
settlement was directly possible between the two neighbours’ solicitors, ultimately would be 
left up to a judge. We would assume that the judge would be themselves both impartial with 
respect to the disagreement, i.e. not in favour of the interests of either neighbour, and also 
possess the appropriate specialist knowledge of property law to make an informed decision. 
We would also suppose that being a qualified judge, a person would have some degree of 
experience, moral integrity and practical wisdom, and thus would be able to think of the 
solution that best fitted the problem in question, using both the law’s general 
recommendations of what should be done in such a situation, and their own experience with 
similar matters they, or other judges, may have previously encountered. 
Various professions, vocations and organizations have adopted similar practices when 
it comes to adjudication. In employment for instance, A.C.A.S., the Adjudication, 
Conciliation and Arbitration Service, exists to mediate in professional disputes between   
workers and employers, while in the British National Health Service, P.A.L.S., Patient 
Advisory and Liaison Services, exists to handle complaints made against the health service 
by patients. Similar bodies exist within the field of social care, and even with respect to 
activities such as sports, where general regulatory bodies such as the British Archery 
Foundation may be contacted to make independent decisions on disputes of the rules or 
management of those sports and those who play them. Like a civil judge, it is supposed these 
agencies are independent of the interest both of the ruling authority of the organizations they 
are concerned with (when such central authorities do exist as with the National Health 
Service) and the parties making complaints of them. It is therefore hoped this independence 
of influence, as well as a familiarity with the circumstances of the occupation involved even 
when not being intrinsically part of that occupation, plus a certain amount of life experience, 
will enable them to make reasonable, unbiased decisions which best serve the interests of 
both parties, or at least where they serve the interests of one party in particular, do so because 
one party’s position is held to be the more reasonable.  
As noted previously, though British law states that a person cannot be discriminated 
against directly on grounds of disability, this is more frequently a course for denial of 
disability related dialogue, since an assessor is not forced to discuss disability at all, and can 
still claim any other grounds or excuses for rejecting the disabled person’s input, however 
competent that disabled person happens to be, even regarding knowledge of themselves and 
their own circumstances. Since the subjective nature of any disability and its possible 
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consequences means that the correct judgement of such an assessor, or (likely in less 
common cases) the disabled individual themselves, may not be objective, it would seem that 
a third party, a knowledgeable body to adjudicate and mediate disputes concerning disability, 
would be a logical answer.  
Of course, such a body would need expertise in living with disabilities and fulfilling 
desires on a very practical level, and also in multiple types of disability given that the 
experiences of people with different forms of disability may be extremely contrasting. I once 
encountered a disabilities adviser who, while skilled in certain fields, had little to no 
experience of visual impairment and yet still sought to advise me on what I could or could 
not do (a fact not helped by said adviser’s more general attitude of paternalism towards all 
disabled people). Also, such a body would seem to need to have its members gain their 
experiences of disability via a competency within life, as well as a purely academic study, 
and a competency which also would mean a respect for others’ interests rather than simply a 
promotion of the interests of any disabled individual over those of an assessor. This is 
perhaps where certain current organizations for specific groups of disabled individuals may 
be less than successful, since their focus is upon political freedom for their specific brand of 
disabled people, rather than a more basic, or individualistic, examination of each disabled 
person’s life and desires with respect to the expectations of those around them.  
A further problem with the advocacy of individual groups for disabled people when 
applied to specific cases of discrimination is that it can be too easily dismissed by the non-
disabled assessor as an incompetent judgement, since if an assessor is inclined to believe the 
capabilities of one disabled person are lacking, they are unlikely to believe better of groups 
representing that person’s disability, whereas an agency which dealt with disability on a 
general level is less likely to be perceived as either biased in favour of one group, or less than 
competent themselves. One primary advantage of such an adjudication agency as well, is 
simply that they will start a dialogue with the assessor about the nature of disability, and 
therefore allow the assessor to become more familiar with the field of disability in general, as 
well as the particular needs of the disabled person in question. This is where so often the anti-
discrimination laws currently in force tend to fail, since they reinforce the idea of disabled 
people as intrinsically different beings and discourage any discussion of disability, whereas  a 
direct focus and dialogue concerning the needs and expectations of the disabled person and 
the assessor is much more helpful over all, both to the specific case in terms of simply 
discussing, rather than avoiding, any questions of disability, and in general in terms of getting 
non-disabled people to consider matters from a wider viewpoint. Indeed I can confirm myself 
that generally I have found it far easier when people address issues connected with my sight 
directly with questions I can answer, rather than avoid them, and indeed avoid me.   
A further problem connected with institutions is that frequently an institution might 
simply not be willing to alter a given process to include the needs of a disabled person, and 
choose to reject that disabled person entirely instead, believing that it is the disabled person 
who is at fault for not following “the system” rather than “the system” which should itself be 
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adjusted in some way. This again is where the perspective of someone from outside that 
given institution who doesn’t have a vested interest in keeping the status quo of “the system” 
could be invaluable, since rather than being seen simply as one person’s objection which can 
be overridden as, “Well that person doesn’t fit our system”, they can represent a larger field 
of interest and thus encourage more fundamental changes. My brother, for example, was on 
one occasion refused use of his adapted laptop to take notes in a meeting with social services 
because it was held that “laptops were not secure”, however, allowing my brother to use his 
laptop would also leave room for anyone with any form of specialized writing needs, or 
indeed anyone who preferred to type rather than take notes by hand. This indeed is, I believe, 
close to what Goering intends with her talk of changing “the ableist paradigm”. Though it 
seems more likely this change would be achieved with dialogue and negotiation rather than 
with political rhetoric, neither does it seem fair to assign any inconveniences disabled people 
encounter in interacting with pre-existing systems as exclusively “ableist”, rather than simply 
a consequence of the disability itself, given that, as already argued, the source of the 
restriction is not directly located within society’s general practice. 
Of course, some institutions, such as universities, already possess disabilities advisers. 
Such advisers, however, since they are attached to a given institution do risk becoming 
simply an adjunct to that institution, and, in a position of “giving advice”, are not literally 
empowered to enact changes, even assuming that such an adviser would be willing to go 
against the institution which employs them to the extent of recommending that changes be 
made. Of course, as my brother and I found when applying to university, there is a huge 
amount of variation in such services, dictated by the personality of the individuals involved 
and how much those individual advisers would put the interest of disabled people against 
their overall institutions. However, with an implicit tie to a given institution and therefore an 
interest in maintaining that institution’s good will, and the fact that the institution is not 
beholden to take any given advice from an adviser, the system seems less than effective. 
This is where an independent agency with responsibility for only those categorized as 
disabled, and which was not specifically attached to a given institution, would have an 
advantage and though the problems of deciding who was qualified for such a position may be 
difficult, they are not insolvable. Independent adjudicators in other bodies exist and are 
trusted in many walks of life to make major decisions, particularly when mediating between 
individuals and larger organizations. I believe, only under the auspice of such an agency, one 
which possesses the power to enact a dialogue with those who attempt to assess the 
capabilities of disabled people in society and with the disabled people themselves, or their 
representatives in cases where the disabled person is not able to represent themselves (such as 
temporal impairments), that we will truly see large scale changes in the social treatment of 
any and all forms of disability.  
Indeed, given that under the definition established in the first chapter and the concept 
of disability competency, disability may be seen primarily as an individual misfortune and the 
development of necessary skills and competencies to cope with that misfortune, such an 
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agency is not merely an anti-discriminatory body required for smoothing the relationship 
between two politically opposed groups, but a definite necessity for dealing with the 
temporary or permanent disability of any particular person related to a given institution’s 
activities, after all if an employee with a broken ankle could discuss changes in the mobility 
requirements of their job through the interventions of such a disability adjudication agency, it 
would be to the benefit of everyone involved. I would model the workings of such a 
mediation agency on the mediation of sports bodies or other groups concerned with very 
specialist acquired skills, rather than with a legal avoidance of racism or sexism. 
A.C.A.S., however, does provide a very good idea of the duties and positions 
undertaken by such a body, since (as a discussion I had with A.C.A.S. myself on their 
activities revealed), their chief responsibility is one of promoting dialogue and mediation, and 
eventually coming to solutions of disputes. This is possible because in any dispute between 
employer and employee, A.C.A.S. represents neither, but has the skills and experience to 
understand the positions of both and thus can promote discussion and, where necessary, 
forceful arbitration. Such an agency, like A.C.A.S., would ideally be government funded 
rather than being a charity, to both give it credit with the general public, and also maintain its 
financial, as well as literal independence from any specific group of disabled people. 
Membership would be by assessment rather than by specific qualification to ensure that 
members’ individual experience and knowledge of disability was examined, much the same 
way that members of the judging committees of various sporting organizations are appointed 
based on their experience and knowledge of the sport as well as their character. 
Disability, as noted previously, is an unfortunate circumstance that requires the 
gathering of a set of skills and competencies in order for it to be dealt with successfully. As 
with any other skilled position, judgements from those already skilled, with such judgements 
having social backing, seem to be the way forward, and would represent a social and political 
melding of the interests of disabled people with society, rather than another form of 
segregation enhancing the perception of difference.  
As such an independent body would promote, rather than stifle, dialogue concerning 
disability, it is also hoped that over time society’s perceptions of disability would change. In 
the current situation the law actively prevents disability competency being recognized within 
the public consciousness by prohibiting dialogue and general interest in disability. With more 
decisions being openly made about the skills of disabled individuals, it is hoped social 
attitudes would improve, and that the perception of difference would no longer play such a 
major role in people’s thinking concerning disability, which would in turn enhance the ability 
of disabled individuals to fulfil their desires with the minimum of social hindrance, and the 
maximum of cooperation from others. 
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Section E: Conclusion  
Even when we define disability exclusively as an unfortunate circumstance caused by 
a medical condition, that does not remove the problem of the attitudes both of a disabled 
individual and those within society whom that individual interacts with. On the part of the 
disabled individual, it is necessary, if they are indeed recognizably and cognitively adult, for 
them to acquire a certain level of competency and understand the effects of their disability, 
how it relates to the fulfilment of their desires, and what those effects are upon others around 
them. Such recognition will allow disabled individuals to approach the fulfilment of their 
desires and how such fulfilment impacts upon others in a cooperative, rather than passive, 
manner, which will benefit both the disabled individual and those around them, and more 
broadly through the medium of social prejudice, other individuals with a similar disability. 
Equally, however, for whatever reason, social attitudes towards disability nearly 
always imply a form of difference, that a disabled individual will, by the nature of their 
disability, be a different kind of person from the rest of society, a difference which extends 
well beyond just the influence of the disability upon a person’s ability to fulfil desires. 
Because this difference affects anyone in society’s ability to accurately assess the capabilities 
of a disabled person, there would seem to be a need for an independent agency, not 
immediately under the auspice of any one disabled group, to be created. Such an agency 
would be skilled in the idea of disability competency, to assist in such judgement and 
promote dialogue concerning disability, rather than avoid it. While such an agency would by 
no means be an easy solution to adopt, requiring administration and funding from the 
government, the current status of disability and its provision under the law, as well as the 
current narrow recognition of disabling conditions, is in no way an adequate response to 
disability by society, and is the reason why disability discrimination still exists.  
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Conclusion: The benefits of a desire based definition 
Introduction 
The definition of disability which I have proposed here, is not merely one which is a 
restatement or clarification of the previously mentioned social or medical views, it is a new 
definition, and may be used to counteract some of the problems associated with disability as 
it is currently conceived; problems which the social and medical models have not been able 
to adequately address such as effort and fluidity of classification. It is also hoped the model 
can introduce new ways in which disability may be understood, and through that 
understanding, attempt to foster better and more moral social attitudes and practices in the 
future, based on a clearer and more flexible type of language and dialogue.  
The desire based definition may also be able to provide more immediate ethical 
considerations connected with disability and the treatment of those experiencing it, whether 
on the local scale of access interventions, such as what factors should be considered when 
putting up ramps to a building for providing wheelchair access, to the larger scale modes of 
policy and decision-making and the ways in which social attitude towards previously 
identified disabled groups may be improved over time. It also gives an idea of how any new 
medical conditions should be assessed, as well as clarifying the disabling effects of existing 
temporary conditions such as broken bones, indeed the idea that such conditions should be 
considered disabling at all, rather than forms of illness or malady is one further benefit of a 
flexible and adaptable concept of disability grounded upon conceptions of well-being. 
Therefore, to conclude the discussion I will first examine the benefits of the system I 
have proposed, and then discuss how those benefits interact with our existing social and 
ethical framework, finally, I will conclude by discussing the concept of suffering and the 
overall existential benefits that may be had from a far more diverse theory of disability than 
the monolithic or partisan examples we have previously experienced.  
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Section A: Alterations in theory and practice  
The medical model as proposed rarely states why disability is a bad thing (as noted in 
Chapter 1), indeed on those occasions in which medical ethicists have proposed why we 
consider disability bad, they mostly argue (as Boorse does) that disability is a dysfunction as 
compared with an overall perfect standard for humanity, whether that is some notion of 
evolutionary design or cultural norms.208 It does not seem, however, that whether a body is 
“performing its function as designed by evolution” (even if evolution can be said to “design” 
anything)is as significant a concern as to whether a person could live aneudaimon or happy 
life. After all, simple survival and reproduction rarely has much bearing on the way we think 
of our well-being and the satisfaction of most of our desires. For example, a person who did 
not want children would probably care little about whether they were fertile or not.  
The cultural idea which Wakefield uses might have more merit, however, it still runs 
into the problem of exactly what a culture considers a good life, and, more problematically, 
what a culture considers “a good life” for given members of society.  Emmeline Pankhurst, 
the famous suffragette, was not, according to the standards of her early 20th century British 
culture, being mistreated given how that culture viewed women, however the lack of overall 
freedom, the freedom to vote and participate in the process of democracy, clearly had an 
adverse effect upon her well-being, and that of many other women at the time. Less  
drastically, would we see an introvert in a culture which saw extraversion as the norm as 
being mentally abnormal if they were indeed happy with their own company?  
Both of these notions lead to a tyrannical standard of  normalcy, a notion that 
statistically abnormal deviations from the ideal, whether that ideal is cultural or evolutionary, 
are in some way bad only because they deviate from that standard, irrespective of what actual 
suffering they may cause. It is for this reason that theorists in the social model (quite rightly) 
wished to setup a system where disability was characterised as the mistreatment of various 
groups, and where a disabled individual could be said to be “suffering” simply by virtue of 
those goods, freedoms or considerations which members of those groups did not receive.  
The problem here however, as previously noted, is that firstly there are many 
disabilities which do not fall into a quickly quantifiable “group,” and secondly this method 
sees disability purely as a group identity, and assesses the lives of disabled people only 
according to their identification with that group, rather than an individual’s desires or well-
being. It also perceives reality as purely and distinctly conceived of as a group experience, 
and the experiences of lone disabled people are seen only as the internalising of  beliefs they 
have picked up from society (as Jones and Titchkosky, to name but a few, argued).209 
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Disability, however, is not just a group experience. Whether it is the experience of a 
person suffering clinical depression alone and friendless, or an individual with a bone or 
muscle complaint knocking their teacup to the floor while making tea at home, disability has 
effects that exist over and above those individuals’ experience as part of society, and 
likewise, can be said to encompass many groups, such as those with mental illnesses or 
P.M.L.D. (temporal impairments as I have characterised them). There are thus many who do 
not fall into the vision of an easily identifiable group whose mistreatment comes entirely 
from the perceptions, cultural norms or paternalistic practices of a larger society.  
It was for this reason that I believe the idea of effort and of desire has to be part of 
disability: that a disability can mean a person’s own individual struggle to live their own life 
and attain their own well-being on a day to day basis, not merely the ways in which they 
relate to others or to society; that in fact a person with an allergy who must carefully plan out 
their meals and take considerable time making certain to avoid food groups can still count as 
disabled, albeit their disability may be less serious than someone with a more wide ranging 
form of impairment or a condition with far more drastic effects upon life such as  blindness, 
paraplegia or agoraphobia. 
This, however, does create a problem, since while we would want to say that an 
agoraphobic is disabled, the same is not true of someone who is simply too drunk to leave the 
house. Neither would we wish to say that someone who finds performing complex 
mathematical calculations difficult is in the same category as a dyscalculic child struggling 
with basic arithmetic.  
Thus, the notions of voluntary states and of the castaway test need to be part of a 
theory of disability, so that a disability could be said to be an involuntary state of a person,  
something which bad luck, injury or genetics had caused them to experience. Second, 
however, a disability must still relate to the concept of normality, but a normality composed 
not of a set of expectations or structuring of the world, but a normality based on a specific 
question: how would the majority of humans perform at this same task if society were no 
longer involved?  
This makes disability both relativistic but also highly flexible, a state of relation to the 
act of desire fulfilment and well-being which will touch most humans throughout life, rather 
than a monolithic category into which a person simply falls. Disability is a relation between a 
person and the world, a faculty of their fitness, and as such is something which can  be 
applicable in many situations, not the least to that overlooked group of disabled individuals, 
those who are utterly unconscious of their own status, by comparing their experiences and 
levels of responsibility to those of children, and categorizing them on a sliding scale not as 
some homogenous group, but as people trapped in a certain state of development, but 
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nonetheless worthy of consideration with respect to that state in the fulfilment of their desires  
and their well-being within it. 
This more flexible definition of disability therefore opens up a far more critical 
method of discussing factors such as accessibility and assistance, since when effort and desire 
enter into the discussion of accessibility, it is far easier to quantify the functionality of aids 
and assistance, and their relationship to an individual.  
An aid, such as a wheelchair ramp or audible announcement of written information, 
can be judged as functioning correctly according to how well it fulfils the desires of the 
disabled individual who uses it, and whether it does indeed decrease the effort costs to those 
of a non-disabled person. 
Of course, this is where disability ceases to be an individualistic matter, and  touches 
upon  interactions between people, since in fulfilling desires, a disabled individual must 
interact with those around them, and such interactions must be more than just those of agent 
and patient, oppressor and oppressed, or server and patron.  
This is also where disability touches upon the possibility of animal assistance to aid in 
the fulfilment of desires, though the use of animal assistance also comes with its own set of 
problems and relationships given that a person must stand in the role of steward to their 
animal and be responsible for their animal’s well-being as much as their own. 
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 Section B: Disability and social relations  
Since a disabled individual under the proposed definition will have desires that 
interact with others, whether as bystanders or assessors,  it is necessary that a theory of 
disability address the questions of a person’s relations to those others, whether the disabled 
individual is having their capabilities assessed by another person, or asking another person 
for assistance.  
It is here that an individualistic assessment of disability can be helpful, since it can  
separate out  beneficial relations between the disabled individual and those around them, and 
note that such relations must be cooperative, rather than exploitative, and just as a disabled 
individual, as primary arbiter and judge of their own desires, stands in the best position to 
identify what desires might need to be disregarded or altered in their fulfilment conditions 
due to possession of a disability, so a disabled individual also has an inherent social duty 
upon them by virtue of the recognition of that disability to develop self-knowledge and 
competency.  
This competency is more than merely a person’s politeness, it is a recognition of the 
cooperation of others, and that others are people with their own desires and well-being which 
are just as worthy of respect.  Developing this form of competency will be of benefit both to 
the disabled person  themselves, and to others, since it will foster good attitudes on all sides 
and promote cooperation, both in the fulfilment of a disabled person’s desires on the part of 
the non-disabled person, and in the disabled person’s recognition that they are requiring such 
cooperation from others.  
Of course, unfortunately, given that even if we divorce disability from society’s 
expectations, it does not mean such expectations and attitudes don’t exist, there is still a 
question of how non-disabled members of society regard disabled individuals and their 
capabilities. This  attitude, whether it is one of admiration, contempt,  enmity or simple 
avoidance, will often contain the  factor identified by social theorists that  those categorized 
as disabled are fundamentally different sorts of humans, with different capabilities even over 
and above those affected by their disability.  
This is also where, it is hoped, a freer definition of disability may be helpful, if 
adopted over a longer period, since if a person who goes into hospital with a broken leg and 
has their leg in plaster is told,  “Now you are disabled,” it means that maintaining attitudes, 
such as those identified by many social theorists, of disabled people as a completely different, 
somewhat distant form of humanity will be far less likely, given that most people will then be 
categorized as disabled themselves.   
Unfortunately, however, we are not at that point yet, and it was in recognition of this 
that a final recommendation was made, that of an independent adjudicator, an authority 
which, not being tied to the needs of a specific group or individual, could decide rationally 
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upon matters concerned with disability, just as other arbitration services function in other 
walks of life, from legal disputes to sports.  
Again, in acknowledging that disability is a state at which an individual can be 
competent, a circumstance of life (albeit an unfortunate one) rather than a singular, 
homogenous difference, it is hoped that social attitudes would alter over time, and that the 
actively perceived phenomenon of difference be lessened by familiarity, and “being disabled” 
would eventually have the same bearing upon life as “being sick” or “being lost.”  
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Section C: Disability, vulnerability and suffering 
In this thesis I have attempted to formulate a new definition of disability, based on the 
idea that a disability is any condition which adversely affects a person’s ability to fulfil 
desires and life aneudaimon life, as compared to someone without such a condition. 
Ever since it was claimed disability was more than the monolithic, irreducible concept 
which medical science held it to be, the chief emphasis of the dialogue upon disability has 
been that of freedom. Personal freedom, such as that sought by Tanya Titchkosky, political 
freedom, as Germon and Swain argue in favour of, or freedom to use language and labels as 
noted by Harris.210 
This is unsurprising, given that, at rock bottom, disability involves restriction, indeed 
in German the term for disability is behindert, a word which translates directly as “hindered” 
or “hampered”. However, in most dialogues on the subject, it is always believed this 
restriction, this hindrance, is purely and simply social. Indeed, some authors such as Germon 
claim that disability by itself is an utterly neutral state and that, were society setup differently, 
a person wouldn’t be disabled. It is interesting that the vast majority of actual examples they 
use for evidence for this come from people with hearing impairments, such as the famous 
cases of deaf parents who attempt to stop their children having cochlea implants.211 Myself, I 
am not convinced these examples are that of “positive experience of disability” so much as 
desire to value a specific culture and language, one which (as the case of Martha’s Vineyard 
shows) is also open to individuals with normal hearing if they wish (particularly since often 
those examples are given by writers who are not themselves disabled). Yet, a person who is 
deaf is still not free to have a complete audio experience of music, the sound of water, or any 
other sonic based experience, for all that a person with normal hearing may learn sign 
language and visual communication.  
Still more problematically are the cases of thousands of disabling conditions that are 
not characterized by their own language and culture like deafness. Is the elderly person who, 
due to extreme pain, is now unable to perform a simple activity having a neutral experience? 
Or is the person with depression, so paralyzed by the sense of their own worthlessness that 
they cannot even walk to the shops to buy basic necessities, having a “neutral” experience? 
These are undoubtedly experiences intrinsic to the nature of disability, experiences I face 
myself on a daily basis. I would agree with Derek Parfit here, that attempting to claim any 
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experience of suffering is neutral is categorically incorrect.212 And therefore, in the same 
way, to try and suggest “disability” involves some kind of neutral experience, is also simply 
illogical. Indeed, more than this, it is a straight-out denial of the intrinsic nature of what 
experiencing the world as being “hindered” by a disability really involves, albeit a denial 
fuelled often by the very real desire for social equality. Disability, however, is not a political 
cause, an existential limit, or a conspiracy of medical professionals. Disability is, as the 
German term directly states, simply and fundamentally, a hindrance. It is not something to be 
dealt with by the vast machinations of political campaigns or over-optimistic exegesis about 
“different” experiences of the world. It is humble, raw, and far more basic than that.  
It would seem to me that the defining characteristic of disability is not isolation, lack 
of political freedom, or even an experience of illness. It is purely and simply the experience 
of suffering: suffering loss of freedom, increased effort in daily life, and unfulfilled desires. 
Of course it is equally true that living with a disability and coping with such suffering 
will help an individual develop skills and relations to the world that are unique and beneficial, 
however to claim (as Elizabeth Barnes does) that such benefits automatically justify the 
suffering of disability would seem arrogant in the extreme, not to mention hugely 
insensitive.213 Even in the lives of those experiencing cognitive disability, the nature of this 
“temporal impairment” means that, however happy they are in a temporary sense, they will 
not experience or appreciate more than they currently have. It is purely and simply a shame 
that I will never be able to discuss my thesis with my sister, or that she will never have the 
chance to develop her own intellectual expressions, valuable though her life is to her.  
There are two possible responses to the suffering of others. Elizabeth Barnes claimed 
that though people were unequal, the neutrality of this experience means that we should 
essentially not do anything to change this inequality.214 I, however, would see the correct 
response to suffering to be one of empathy, and a desire to alleviate it, and to give as many 
people as possible the chance to live anormal life.  
I have therefore tried to formulate a definition of disability which shows that being 
“disabled” is not a state of permanent illness, membership of a special club, or a state 
imposed by society, but a unique relation between a person’s intrinsic biological experience, 
their desires, and their environment. This is a relation which will affect most people at some 
point in life, even to a very minor degree. As such, the concept of “disability” and how it is 
treated needs to undergo a radical change, so that it is no longer an abstract partisan 
movement, but a common place state which we recognize and understand and will encounter 
on a daily basis. Thus concepts like “accessibility” are not optional extras to life, or only 
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applicable to specific sorts of people, but necessities for all, which should be as basic and 
crucial to our understanding of a person’s relation to the world as “illness” or “location.”  
Unfortunately, such a change in public and individual consciousness is a long way 
off, and would require considerable shifts in both our day to day understanding, and overall 
social or governmental structures for dealing with disability. It is, however, my belief that 
such a shift would benefit everybody, disabled and non-disabled or (as would be the case 
with most people) potentially disabled. 
I have lived all my life with a visual impairment. It is a static and unavoidable fact of 
my existence. On one level it has taught me much and allowed me to develop skills of 
valuing others, of memory, and appreciation of different senses. However, none of these are 
skills which I would have been barred from were I not born with a visual impairment. Most 
of the time, being visually impaired is purely and simply annoying, since while it might not 
ultimately stop me doing what I want, it does make a huge number of things more difficult, 
and not just because most people in the world are not themselves visually impaired. After all, 
while it would be great if all food items had Braille labels and people no longer avoided me 
because I cannot make eye contact, that would not give me the experience of seeing a 
butterfly or stop me frequently walking into doors and hitting my head because I have failed 
to judge their position correctly. 
Writing this definition and re-evaluating my own experiences, as well as the 
experiences of my sister and other disabled people, I have come to the conclusion that 
whatever benefits can be gained from disability, it is purely and simply an obstruction, but 
not an insurmountable one. It is a negative state, and one that requires experience and 
perseverance to cope with, one which society and the attitudes of others can either alleviate or 
exacerbate but can likely never remove entirely.  
I therefore offer this definition: disability is an everyday, common place relationship 
to the world based on desire, effort and misfortune. I hope that it will be used and understood 
and that, eventually, we will form a society which recognizes disability for what it is, a state 
of misfortune, but one which occurs to beings that are fundamentally like ourselves. When 
we encounter someone who suffers, if we are ethical beings we respond with compassion and 
attempts to alleviate their suffering.  
Such attempts may not remove the suffering of disability, but will serve hugely to 
improve the lot of many people throughout the world, people who must live day to day with 
the hindrance of disability. Furthermore, in recognizing the universality of disability and 
treating it as a common place problem, we recognize something human, fallible and vital in 
ourselves and our own ability to fulfil desires, after all, there is no knowing when the whims 
of fate may place us into a disabled relationship with the world since nobody, except for 
super heroes, is invincible. 
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Section D: Epilogue 
Since the initial completion of the main text of this work in 2013, five years have 
passed and the dialogue concerning disability has of course progressed, particularly with the 
changes in the global situation with regard to factors such as economic recession, austerity 
and the greater prevalence of the concept of diversity as a driving political and social force. 
Therefore in this epilogue I would like to consider some of that further discourse in the light 
of the desire based definition of disability I have proposed. 
One of the most important papers published in this time is Michael Oliver’s “the 
social model thirty years on”215 in which Oliver addresses some of the main thrust of the 
criticisms of the model, reassesses its scope and notes  the model’s status in a post-recession 
world. A time in which economic pressure has caused governments to increasingly turn to 
“individual impairments” to assess stratified provision of disability benefits on a scale of 
perceived severity, governmental policies which Oliver believes are partly founded upon 
criticisms previously levelled at the social model, (like many proponents of the social model 
in Britain Oliver is heavily concerned with economic inequalities). 
Oliver addresses critiques of the social model that focus on its lack of completion as 
regards explaining disabled people’s experience and its inability to encompass many aspects 
of disability by simply stating that the model was never intended to be a comprehensive guide 
to all types of disability experience, nor to entirely replace the language of individual 
impairments, but to function simply as an ethical tool used to help improve the lot of disabled 
peopleby placing discussion of disability on the same footing as discussions concerning 
discrimination against other minority groups. It is interesting however that even as he 
espouses this softer more pragmatic approach, Oliver still talks exclusively in a language of 
“us” (the disabled), as opposed to “them” (everyone else), and speaks of the problems 
disabled people encounter in life only as “barriers” i.e. as obstacles imposed extrinsically 
upon a person by their environment, rather than as being in any sense contingent upon the 
intrinsic fact of possessing a disabling condition in the first place. 
Thus, even as he apparently repudiates the hard line interpretation of the social model 
with which he is so often associated, Oliver still seems to be tacitly accepting that it provides 
the only way of discussing disability and disability related experiences, namely as the 
experiences of a discrete, exploited social minority and their opposition to the majority with 
their opposing “ableist” world view. 
Part of my project in proposing an alternative approach to disability based upon the 
individual fulfilment of desires was to create a more universal platform upon which the 
experiences of people who are normally categorised as “disabled”; as well as those who may 
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be experiencing “disabling” states of affairs may be discussed. This would have the 
advantage of addressing the very problem which Oliver highlights, that of governmental 
assessment, need and resource allocation. Since in  making matters of disability more 
individualised rather than working on a blanket categorisation of disability we open the door 
way to using resources more effectively, and indeed of creating more opportunities 
(economic and otherwise), for disabled people. After all as noted in chapter 3, if there was 
provision to support disabled people who could undertake part time employment as opposed 
to either being fully employed and receiving nothing or entirely unemployed and receiving 
financial benefits, economic and social circumstances would considerably improvenot just for 
disabled people, but also for the government as regards provision of services and in another 
sense potential employers of disabled people too. Such assessments, and indeed the 
administration of such benefits would by necessity need to be made on an individualistic 
basis, rather than by blanket social reforms as I discussed in chapter 4. 
It is also significant that Oliver, even as he acknowledges the lack of scope of the 
social model only addresses this lack as far as the model’s inability to discuss other social 
groups such as age, gender or ethnicity, rather than the individual desires of any given 
disabled person. Again however, a language of disability which included the notion of effort 
and desires would more easily let us address occasions where a person’s identity and defining 
characteristics were not what social group they belonged to, but the desires they had and the 
goals they wished to achieve, and “disability” could be understood in the light of how it 
frustrates those goals. There should after all be room in our discussions about disability to 
address the plight of a nut allergic gourmet, as much as a paraplegic dancer, not to mention 
cases of disabilities with less rigidly defined social groups attached to them such as mental 
illnesses or chronic fatigue syndrome. Generally, I am deeply suspicious of the practice of 
many sociologists and political advocates to wish to categorise (and more often than not 
simplify), people’s identity and life experience to merely how they exemplify intersections 
between different sets of social demographics, assumptions which may or may not reflect a 
person’s actual life experiences, hopes and desires. After all, just because having children is 
frequently held to be an intrinsic part of “the female experience”, the decision of whether to 
actually have children or not is one which ultimately should be left up to each individual 
woman’s desires and how those desires intersect with her circumstances and relationships. 
Any discussion concerning her desires etc would not therefore be merely a microcosm of a 
discussion of the cultural status of women and the perception of women’s desires more 
generally. 
This idea of singular group experience is one I have found worryingly prevalent in 
much of the literature concerning disability and society, particularly in more recent 
discussions both academically and in the popular media. The intensively adversarial tone of 
such thinking, its assumption of an umbrella category of “disability” and its inability to 
distinguish between biological and social obstacles in the lives of disabled people, or yet to 
determine ways in which people who might be disabled but outside the usual cultural boxes 
of disability, including those with unconscious temporal impairments might interact with the 
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world means it is a less than subtle instrument, and more often than not one  used to promote 
emotional rather than rational responses. This is why I would prefer if discussions of a 
“disabled experience”, i.e. a unique category of experiences and relations to the world shared 
by all disabled people were employed with extreme caution. 
I also believe (as I mentioned in chapter 4) that it would greatly aid discussion of 
cases in which prejudices do occur, if we could discuss these prejudices as a separate entity 
from the particular disabling conditions that incited them and thus have a clearer 
understanding of how to combat them, rather than trying to assume that all or even the 
majority of the negative effects of a disabling condition are in fact “barriers” erected by such 
prejudices, since a taxi driver who refuses to pick up a person with a service dog, exemplifies 
a vastly different state of affairs to a taxi driver who cannot fit a paraplegic person’s wheel 
chair into their car. Both are undoubtedly problematic circumstances, but the nature of the 
problem and any discussion of its solution will take a wildly different path as I outlined in 
chapter 3. This is where I also would hesitate in using heavily loaded, and emotive terms such 
as “ableism” despite the term’s common usage in disability studies (especially in the light of 
the pragmatic discussion of the term “ability” I employed in the first chapter of this thesis. 
Simon Hayhoe216 also criticizes the monolithic nature of the social model in his 2016 
article through the case study of theories of blindness and morality. As he explains, he works 
from the perspective of an epistemological model of the study of disability. This model 
focuses on the fact that theories concerning disability and “the disabled” are themselves 
constructed by authors with their own socio/economic biases and assumptions concerning 
disability and the experiences of disabled people. It is through these theories and their 
frequently unrecognized effects upon the disabled and how disabled people are perceived 
morally that discrimination may occur not only actively, through directly discriminatory 
legislation and practices but also passively, with supposedly moral efforts to “help the 
disabled” producing the opposite effects. 
He illustrates this by examining the case of blindness and education in the 18th and 
19th centuries, and notes how in the past there was an intrinsic link between a person having a 
disability and their basic moral nature, especially blindness, with “the blind” seen either as 
morally backward, lacking in reason or (in extreme cases), cursed by god, and frequently 
blind people were themselves involved in the establishment of so called “asylums for the 
blind” in the belief that segregation, and the encouragement of “hard work”  was intrinsic to 
the promotion of good moral character. 
Having experienced myself (if briefly), some time in a “boarding school for the blind” 
and having been told that it would not be of benefit to me to be at school with sighted people 
                                                          
216Hayhoe, S. (2016). “The epistemological model of disability and its role in understanding passive exclusion 
in eighteenth and nineteenth century Protestant educational asylums in the USA and Britain”. International 
Journal of Christianity & Education, 20(1), pp49-66. 
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who “did not understand what it was like to be blind”, despite the fact that  clique ridden 
environment was one I found if anything harder to adjust to than a normal primary school, I 
am in sympathy with Hayhoe’s argument here.  
That being said, while I see the value of categorising disability based theories 
according to the intentions of writers to construct reality about impairments, I am less certain 
that the essential reality of “disability” on a conceptual basis stripped of all external prejudice 
is a quintessentially neutral one, or in fact that it should be as per my castaway example 
mentioned in Chapter 1. Indeed, this is likely where my own attempt to codify and redefine 
disability likely comes into conflict with many theories and disability advocates especially in 
the social model, since while I agree with Hayhoe that the construction of moral reality plays 
a large part in the idea of disability as a whole and how disabled people are perceived by the 
general public, at the same time I maintain the belief that “disability” is an intrinsically 
negative state and were it not a negative state a person would not be disabled, albeit that “the 
disabled” be they “the blind”, “the deaf” or any other pre-existing category of persons with 
disability are not themselves in any sense literally inferior or any the less worthy of being 
treated as Kantian ends in themselves than anyone else, though their lives will probably be 
rather more difficult simply by the nature of possessing that disability. 
A more extensive examination of Hayhoe’s position is found in his 2015 book on 
blindness and education217 which expands both his epistemological model of disability, and 
further historical information on the development of theories of blindness following the 
enlightenment.  
He begins by noting the inadequacy of the current system of education, and how that 
system is itself based on prior contentions concerning disabled people. By taking blindness as 
a paradigmatic example of disability and charting the development of concepts of blindness 
through history, Hayhoe attempts to show the philosophical origin of many assumptions 
about “the blind” which are central to both educational theories and social practice, and thus 
be in a better position to question these theories more generally. He begins by examining the 
construction of the concept of “blindness” and its place in the history of ideas, and how 
passive, as well as active exclusion has occurred through culturally practiced beliefs about the 
capacities of blind people and the “appropriateness” of certain artistic, aesthetic or vocational 
experiences, he then expands upon his idea of the epistemological model of disability 
(mentioned above), as applied to blindness, explaining the model, the relationship of 
categories of disability to impairment and reality, and the inadequacies of assuming both an 
objective reality for disability in general and blindness in particular following the thinking of 
Foucault, noting that theoretical construction of disability has often been based upon lopsided 
power relations, though he repudiates the basic idea that disability is simply analogous to 
racism or sexism. 
                                                          
217Hayhoe, S. (2015). Philosophy as disability & exclusion: the development of theories on blindness, touch and 
the arts in England, 1688-2010. IAP 
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Of course, Hayhoe’s project differs markedly from what I am attempting here, 
particularly since his book is partly intended to question the currently existing pedagogy for 
teaching blind students, thus where my own efforts in this thesis have been to try through 
both clarification and linguistic analysis to provide a more useful definition of disability that 
aides in equalitarian ethical discourse, Hayhoe’s work is more a matter of examining the 
historical and theoretical routes of our existing concepts, how those concepts were used in the 
past and what theoretical frameworks they may have contributed to, and how those 
frameworks might fall short due to this load of frequently unrecognized epistemological 
baggage.  
Hayhoe begins with a detailed examination of the concept of blindness in the 
enlightenment, how it became a tool of epistemological enquiry into the theory of knowledge 
for Locke and Newton, and Diderot, and how the corollary of the “man blind from birth” was 
used in discussions of aesthetics, morality and even Christian theology.This gave the 
definition of blindness a heavily political slant in the politics of the reformation since the 
“man blind from birth” was used as an archetypal example of acquired rather than innate 
knowledge, which lead (along with the real world example of many people who’d become 
blind through contracting syphilis), to a conception of “the blind” as inherently inferior on a 
moral, intellectual and even spiritual level due to a flawed ability to apprehend knowledge 
and moral teaching. 
Hayhoe therefore contends that it is the ontology of blindness created by this 
philosophical discussion which then led to the uniform categorization of blindness as a 
singular set of symptoms analogous to a mental disorder. “Blindness” constituted a 
breakdown in perception which could only be treated in a stratified environment with a 
specifically tailored pedagogy, a pedagogy derived from the very philosophical enquiry and 
political power playing which created the ontology of blindness in the first place. The 
antecedents of this ontology Hayhoe contends continue to affect both the study and cultural 
perception of blind people to this day. 
Hayhoe continues by making a comprehensive study of much of the psychological 
work on the aesthetic perceptions of blindness and assumptions underpinning such 
psychological research, many of which can be linked back to the previously detailed 
enlightenment theories about moral knowledge. 
Having experienced the practical effects of some of these perceptions myself, I 
definitely agree with Hayhoe’s historical construction here.  Indeed even in philosophical 
circles I recall a good natured debate in an aesthetics class about the representative quality of 
smell in which the lecturer claimed that it was my lack of visual sense which let me attribute 
aesthetically representative qualities to other senses which they did not necessarily possess, a 
discussion which mirrors several of Hayhoe’s findings about the insistence of psychologists 
even in the twenty first century on perceiving lack of sight as automatically translating into 
lack of artistic understanding.  
Disability, Desire and Society: The Establishment of a New, Individualistic Definition of Disability and 
its Practical Uses in Everyday Life 
By Luke Hewitt 
 
149 
 
It is also possible that the “Arm’s length” reaction I mentioned in chapter 4, whereby 
people tend to perceive me as an exclusively different being and at least unconsciously avoid 
me might be partially due to a lingering legacy of this ontology. 
Hayhoe then extensively charts the development of educational establishments for the 
blind, noting the link between blindness and immorality and how throughout the 19th and 
even into the mid 20thcenturiessuch institutions promoted repetitive handicraft and docility as 
a way of avoiding the supposed immorality in blindness. Even when institutions for the blind 
did include creative arts like music, this was usually done in a mechanical, rather than 
theoretical form emphasising rote learning as opposed to detailed knowledge, though he does 
note the different methodology of Worcester college and its higher level of creative learning 
due to its catering to blind sons of gentlemen from the upper classes.  
Interestingly enough, Hayhoe’s findings about music mirror experiences I had at the 
specialist school I attended for two years in the early nineties, where music was presented 
exclusively as a set of tasks or exercises to be accomplished on a rote basis, where any 
theoretical teaching was presented only in a subordinate manner to accomplish those tasks, 
and failure at those tasks was seen as being literally immoral (I was once told if I could not 
conform to the rules in musical practice I was destined to go to prison). I find it significant 
that despite two years music tuition at specialist school (including their abortive attempt to 
teach written braille music), I only learned about matters such as time signatures, musical 
dynamics and indeed any sense of artistic expression from a sighted flute teacher with no 
exclusively specialist training. Indeed I suspect had it not been for her I would likely still 
regard the practice of music as systematic drudgery. 
Hayhoe then explains the founding of the famous disability education act of 1981, and 
how this act’s composition and implementation was heavily influenced by the political 
climate of the day, including a notable financial crisis and the opposition of certain elements 
of the House of Commons to inclusion of disabled students in mainstream schools. 
Hayhoe is of course here primarily focused upon historical detail (particularly in 
matters of education), while my focus has been upon the ways in which barriers to desire 
fulfilment may be used as a way to more ethically discuss and categorise disabilities. It is 
significant however that Hayhoe’s  exhaustive examination of the construction of the concept 
of blindness  frequently highlighted  inadequacies in discussing the desires of blind people, 
inadequacies which I naturally found interesting on both a personal, as well as a 
philosophical level having daily experience of them myself. 
For instance, Hayhoe notes that having a degree of usable vision is often outside 
people’s concept of what being “blind” involves, so desires of blind people who do want to 
appreciate things in methods other than touch or audibly are frequently forgotten, yet if the 
question is asked according to desire fulfilment, for example my desire to “watch”; or at least 
experience a film is more readily met by a DVD which includes audio description of the 
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action, than by just providing an audio described soundtrack devoid of visuals as is the more 
common practice of organisations for the blind in the United States.  
This is also a clear example of the tension that can arise when attempting to establish 
a singular form of experience and methodology for a given disabilityand the individual 
desires of a group of disabled people, particularly when the historical construction of that 
methodology is itself of questionable provenance. Indeed it is interesting that so many of 
Hayhoe’s criticisms of the construction of the concept of blindness are directly linked to 
tangible inadequacies in the education system in dealing with blind people through passively, 
or actively exclusionary practices, i.e. practices which directly affect the individual desires of 
blind people through say inadequate provision of teaching tools for conveying knowledge. 
Similarly, I was amused by the fact that such a lot of philosophical heavy lifting and 
conjecture had gone into mythologizing concepts about which myself and other blind people 
are quite familiar such as two dimensional representation, indeed Hayhoe’s examination 
again unfortunately proves the point that I mentioned in chapter three, that disabled people 
are  often deliberately placed in a position where not only their desires, but also the necessary 
steps requisite to the fulfilment of those desires are dictated by others. For example, I recall 
an occasion in which a teacher at my specialist school severely berated me for saying I’d 
“read” a book through audio, since according to her I was incorrect to speak of having “read” 
a book unless I’d done so in braille. 
One issue I did find in Hayhoe’s discussion however is that frequently I have noticed 
myself a tension between main line policies of disability inclusion and the personality of 
those on a practical level who implement those policies. 
This indeed is why I included an extensive discussion of human assistance in chapter 
3 and spoke of cooperation in desire fulfilment, since frequently even when an intrinsic 
environmental barrier exists, an adequately ethical human assistant can make a direct positive 
difference to the fulfilment of that desire, or less happily, even when a policy exists to 
adequately aid in a disabled person’s desire fulfilment if those who implement that policy on 
a practical level are basically disinterested the entire process is likely to fail. 
Hayhoe offers a characteristically detailed discussion concerning access for blind 
people to museums and the theoretical underpinnings of that discussion based on the idea of 
touch as representation. He notes that when accessibility measures were in place, staff would 
be trained in their implementation, yet I remember a stark contrast between my experience at 
Blenheim palace and at Luxor in Egypt.  
Blenheim had obviously attempted to implement a policy for blind people. The tour 
guide had a list of items which could be handled and historical information to impart. Yet, 
what actually happened is that in each room, the tour guide consulted a clip board, pointed at 
an object and said “you can touch that” before reeling off a historical description of the room 
in general which did not mention the history or prominence of the object in question. Had I 
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not been there with someone sighted I am not sure how I would have even  knownwhat 
objects were available for tactile examination, let alone got more from the experience than a 
general audio tour which I might as well have done electronically at a distance for all its level 
of interaction with the historic location. 
This contrasts markedly to my experiences in Luxor, where there clearly was no 
specifically tailored or implemented policy to cater to blind visitors, but a tour guide who was 
more than willing to carefully guide myself and several other visually impaired visitors 
around the site, explain intricate details of what was visible of the ruins and walk distances in 
space to estimate the Hight of objects or the features of maps to give an idea of scale. The 
tour guide even helped in a carefully limited tactile examination (which given the age of the 
stone work was quite an honour), and presented a narrative of the time of the Pharaohs, 
involving myself and other blind visitors in an explanation of Egyptian history so enthusiastic 
that it verged on improvised theatre. 
This is one reason why I would like to see “desire fulfilment” become part of our 
usual discourse on disability, since in the promotion of disability as inherently a state of 
misfortune and those experiencing disability as intrinsically similar to other humans, we are 
far more likelyto be in a position where we would be able to engage with desire fulfilment 
cooperatively alongside an assistant, rather than being at the mercy of a policy which presents 
accessibility as something which is “given to” disabled people. 
Of course, such a state of social acceptance is a long way off. Still it would have been 
appreciated if the training of the staff at Blenheim was more focused on giving blind visitors 
an analogous experience of learning history interactively, than a tick list of predetermined 
access requirements which in the end proved anything but satisfactory.  
Hayhoe finally reaffirms the basic tenet of his epistemological model, that the 
construction of the concepts of disability is intrinsically linked to the background 
assumptions of those who formulate such definitions which frequently colour their estimation 
of the capacities, capabilities and moral status of disabled people. Such definitions are then 
utilised by those in power who may not themselves even have the good of disabled people as 
an end itself, and may be motivated by political or other interests in their formulation of 
disability related policy.  
This conclusion I do agree with, indeed in one sense Hayhoe’s intensive study of the 
history of the concept of blindness and its application in education very much supports both 
my arguments on the perception of “the disabled” as exclusively different types of beings 
outlined in chapter 4, and also the problem of the dictation of desire fulfilment noted in 
chapter 3. Indeed Hayhoe’s epistemological model and detailed historical analyses serve as a 
complement to the desire based definition of disability I propose in this thesis,  it provides a 
unique theoretical platform from which to analyse and critique the beliefs, practices and 
social status of various disabilities on a broad cultural and political level without needing to 
subscribe to umbrella categorizations of disability or try to give exclusively social 
Disability, Desire and Society: The Establishment of a New, Individualistic Definition of Disability and 
its Practical Uses in Everyday Life 
By Luke Hewitt 
 
152 
 
interpretations to the experiences disabled people have in their daily lives, and also allow 
room for the classification of different types of disability with alternative epistemological 
antecedents. 
Education was also the focus of a 2014 article by Lasidu,218 in particular she attempts 
to address why disabled students are underrepresented in educational institutions. She details 
her belief that the reason disabled students are not participating in higher education is due to a 
focus on special educational needs and a pathologizing of disability. As an alternative, she 
recommends “inclusion” and a “social justice” dialogue concerning disability which could be 
used to create a universally designed generic curriculum. As with much of the dialogue 
concerning “ableism” however, Lasidu’s points are not so much argued theoretically as stated 
in a broadly categorical fashion, and one which furthermore seemed to focus upon concepts 
with little to know sense of practical definition, or (somewhat ironically), much idea of the 
experiences of disabled people. 
For instance, on the one hand she castigates universities for not being “accessible” 
and then on the other states that methods to provide assistance to disabled students are 
contributing to their negative self-perception and trouble accepting their disability. 
Her one attempt to provide any practical evidence of this is to repudiate the practice 
of disabled students being given extra time or a separate room for exams which (according to 
Lasidu), singles them out as “different”. 
I myself had both a separate room and extra time during exams due to the need to read 
a braille exam paperand to print my own answers afterwards. I can only imagine how the 
loud clank of my printer  through a silent examination hall would have contributed to “social 
justice” between myself and other students, and I know exactly how “different” I would have 
felt if I’d constantly been having to pick up a braille exam paper due to it falling off a 
standard sized desk. I don’t imagine such factors would have contributed positively to my 
final marks either. Lasidu’s blanket assertion regarding exams also does not take into account 
students whose very disability might be directly impacted by the examination environment, 
such as autistic or agoraphobic students whose stress levels would be directly served by being 
treated as “different”, indeed Lasidu is so mired in a strictly us/them notion of disability she 
barely acknowledges that different forms of disability may even exist, which makesher 
constant invocation of terms like “accessibility” less than clear. 
In terms of ability generally, Lasidu asserts both “disability has no effect on the 
ability of disabled people in higher education”, and also rather incongruously that “disabled 
people require support services”, indeed she makes much of the fact that students with 
invisible disabilities are frequently slow to utilise those services for fear of being recognized 
as disabled. Yet if abilities are simply “different” rather than negative, why exactly would 
                                                          
218Liasidou, A. (2014). “Critical disability studies and socially just change in higher education”. British Journal 
of Special Education, 41(2), pp120-135 
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disability services be needed in the first place, and why, to return to the example of an exam, 
would a student require any “different” adaptations such as extra time, more space or even 
just breaks if their disability had no negative impact on their performance. 
While I appreciate Lasidu’s attempt to recognize that social inclusion by non disabled 
students can contribute to the experience of higher education, her vague proposal of 
“promoting social justice programs” does very little to explore why in fact disabled students 
might have social issues, or indeed any of the beliefs or practices inherent in them, similarly, 
if her assertions about no difference in ability are true, how exactly would we solve such 
inequalities if they do arise.  
For instance, it would seem that providing a student with mobility difficulties some 
accessible form of transport would do more to facilitate their participation in university 
activities than imposing a “social justice program” which might even have the opposite 
effect. I am also not convinced by Lasidu’s argument that the chief reason for disabled 
students dropping out of university is lack of “inclusion” rather than say the extra effort 
required by a student with disabilities in completing the course, or more critical and 
substantive lacks in practical access arrangements, such as access to reading material, getting 
around the campus etc; lacks which would seem more in need of straight off pragmatic 
solutions based around discrepancies in a disabled student’s ability to achieve basic 
constituent desires in education than some vague overarching plan of promoting “social 
justice”. 
Lasidu does acknowledge that financial reasons might have a part to play in disabled 
students not attending higher education institutions in the first place, especially with the 
dramatically increased tuition fees introduced in the 2012 education act and the fact that 
many disabilities naturally incur financial costs, however she does not explore this avenue, 
preferring to side with the rhetoric of how disabled students are “devalued” by the “able 
bodied order” rather than offer any sort of detailed analyses. 
There is also a direct inconsistency in the way Lasidu deals with disability. She states 
early on that disability should be part of “social justice” and directly references the social 
model, and yet later, in the discussion of her idea of a generic curriculum she asserts that the 
disabled/non disabled dichotomy is itself a product of the “able bodied order” and the 
glorification of normalcy. Indeed, her notion of a “universally generic curriculum” in itself 
seems deeply problematic since if indeed as she asserts all knowledge in educational 
establishments is in some way value driven and built on unequal power relations, how exactly 
would a universally generic curriculum actually decide what to teach? With her repeated 
desire for a pedagogy which focuses on the social justice of disabled people, and her veiled 
assertions about educational establishments being exclusively involved with the capitalist job 
market and being products of the “able bodied order”, Lasidu appears to be suggesting that 
the only valid matter of study would itself be disability studies. 
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It is exactly this sort of abstracted rhetoric that highlights the need for a desire based 
analyses of disability which can focus on factors such as effort, after all if a person’s desire 
when attending a higher education institution is to acquire knowledge, any discussions of 
“accessibility” must be understood in light of that desire, as the example of the examination 
paper shows. Likewise “inclusion” in a social sense would mean very little  if a disabled 
student’s individual problems involving effort and access were not met, indeed this is 
something Lasidu herself recognizes, albeit her assertion of inclusive teaching methods 
incorporating accessibility seems more an attempt to include the notion of individual access 
and provision for a disabled person’s needs by another name. 
The idea of disability as an interaction between a person’s basic physical or 
psychological state and the external environment has recently been noted by the world health 
organisation219, who in a recent report strongly emphasized the problems associated with 
environmental access to services and social interactions experienced by disabled people. 
However, just as with Oliver’s work again the main focus was upon “medical conditions that 
cause impairments” and environmental factors that affected those impairments, thus making 
the report not only heavily based around existing and recognized categorisations of disability, 
but also slightly begging the question of what features of disabling conditions made them 
disabling in the first place. Indeed, The WHO report seemed to be more formulated as a tick 
list of currently understood disabling conditions with a handful of generalised bad effects 
such as lack of access to services than anything strictly definitional. 
The WHO also manifestly take a rather strict “black and white”, “us and them” 
mentality analogous to Oliver’s, as regards “the disabled” as opposed everyone else, thus 
making their definition more a hymn to the status quo than a method for actually defining or 
discussing disability itself more directly, much less being able to discuss cases that did not fit 
as readily into the usual culturally predefined “disability” boxes.  
This is likely why Hayhoe criticises the WHO definition for its reliance on a singular, 
monolithic concept of disability as impairment and notes its basis on prior ontologies of 
disability with their own historical and cultural bias. 
Not all writers have adhered to standard definitions of disability however. Karren 
O’Connell220 attempted to question the scope of the concept of disability by asking whether 
the category of “eccentricity” might provide a bridge between disability and normality in 
more complex legal cases.  
                                                          
219 WHO (16 Jan 2018) Disability and Health, WHO Factsheet, [online], Available at URL 
[http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs352/en/] 
220 O'Connell, K. (2017). “Eccentricity: the case for undermining legal categories of disability and normalcy”. 
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She gives two case studies, the one of a man with a mental illness whose constant 
vociferous complaints to his local authority caused so much major upheaval and upset he was 
taken to court, the other of a woman who was evicted from her housing estate due to her 
extreme psychological dependence upon her dog.  
These however would seem to be exactly the sort of cases in which a more wide 
ranging definition of disability than the strictly us/them based criteria which has dominated 
social thinking up until the present time wouldbe of use, especially in codifying the voluntary 
or involuntary nature of disability itself and addressing such cases with respect to the virtue 
of disability competency which I mentioned in chapter 4. O’Connell defines eccentricity 
solely as being that class of behaviours and attitudes which is outside of social norms. She 
does not call these disabilities, yet is at lengths to point out that such behaviours or attitudes 
are both necessary parts of the identity of the individual who engages in them and so are 
behaviours which said individual cannot relinquish, and yet also behaviours which can affect 
that individual and those around them in adverse or harmful ways.  
What is odd, however, is that if one adopts a desire based definition of disability there 
seems no need for such an extra category at all. On a basic legal level if the lady with the 
extreme dependence on her dog were classified as disabled, and thus her dog defined as a 
disability aid or “therapy dog” then the case would be quickly and easily solved. Indeed it is 
strange that O’Connell takes considerable time pointing out said lady’s generalised distress in 
her life and extreme loneliness and depression and how such feelings are alleviated by her 
dog, yet does not acknowledge that the lady might be disabled simply because she has not 
seen a mental health professional and been diagnosed as having a mental illness; i.e. a 
disability. This would seem however, to be more a failure of the mental health services in her 
local area in not diagnosing her correctly, and the law in O’Connell’s native Australia in not 
allowing mental health assistance dogs than the legal categorisation of disability more 
generally. Indeed in the United States assistance dogs for people with a mental illness already 
have the same legal status as guide dogs and other forms of assistance animals for disabled 
people and thus could not be forbidden by a landlord, and a campaign is currently in progress 
to have them accorded a similar legal status in Britain. 
Even in the second case, that of a man who felt it his moral duty to so harass his local 
council with abusive phone calls and letters that they took him to court, it still does not seem 
a specific category of “eccentricity” is necessary to discuss his behaviour. If indeed (as he 
claimed), the man’s behaviour towards his local council was in fact involuntary, then clearly 
he needs to be regarded as having desires which are affected by that involuntary state and is 
therefore disabled, just the same way a profoundly frightened agoraphobic who screams at 
any visitor to leave them alone is suffering a similar disability. It is also worth noting that if 
this man was indeed both unconscious of the harmful effects of his own behaviour upon 
others, and unable to refrain from such behaviours, then it would seem quite legitimate to 
categorise him as “unconsciously disabled” and therefore need to have another person engage 
as his proxy with regards to his interactions with the local council (a state of affairs which 
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would also alleviate the situation since the man’s proxy could engage with the council 
without said man’s intense anger or abusive manner). I found myself wondering why nobody 
had actually asked this man “If the council annoy you so much why don’t you have someone 
else ring them for you?”, the engagement of such a proxy and having the man himself 
understand his own mental illness would also be a chance for him to exhibit disability 
competency, just as a phobic might avoid contact with others when in a stressful or phobic 
situation to reduce the risk of harming others through their panicked reactions. 
If however on the other hand the man was indeed conscious of his need to engage in 
harmful behaviour but simply did not care about the feelings of those at the council he upset, 
then he might well simply be a free agent engaged in abusive behaviour and thus both 
morally and legally culpable. 
Indeed, O’Connell’s equating the voluntary and harmless behaviour of eccentric 
artists and poets or those who choose to dress in an outlandish fashion, with behaviours that 
directly harm others such as the man in her second case study is not a corollary I find 
convincing, particularly since frequently those engaged in simply out of the ordinary 
eccentric behaviour might well moderate their actions if indeed they do cause direct harm to 
others. For example, on the occasion I myself participated in a choral concert singing John 
Williams music from Star Wars and chose to dress in Jedi robes even though nobody else 
dressed that way, something which people apparently found eccentric, even if just on a 
temporary basis, I did turn the sound of my light sabre off so as not to interfere with the 
music. It is also worth noting that while O’Connell describes eccentric behaviour as out of the 
ordinary behaviour people feel the need to engage in, she does not distinguish those who 
voluntarily engage in eccentric behaviour due to a strong personal desire to do so, such as an 
overriding sense of identity (as was the case with my temporarily dressing as a Jedi), and 
those who engage in eccentric behaviour involuntarily, i.e. are compelled to do so even 
though they do not wish to. Though an extensive discussion of the nature of voluntary vs 
involuntary behaviour would be out of place here, it is perhaps enough to note that a person 
who wears an odd hat because they feel it to be an integral part of their personal self-image 
and doesn’t care what others think, is in a vastly different position to a paranoid person who 
is quite aware that wearing a tinfoil hat makes them appear odd to others, but is too afraid to 
go about without it due to an overwhelming fear caused by their mental illness, indeed in the 
cases of many paranoid people it might be that they are directly incapable of apprehending or 
correctly evaluating the feelings of others  in respect to their behaviour at all. 
The subject of “disabled identity” in general has become something of a major one in 
recent discourse, both in the public and academic spheres.  
In 2013, Curwood221 conducted an extensive survey of young adult literature with 
respect to the representation of disability. Curwood argues that it is important that younger 
                                                          
221Curwood, J. S. (2013). “Redefining normal: A critical analysis of (dis) ability in young adult literature”. 
Children's Literature in Education, 44(1), pp15-28 
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adults are introduced to positive portrayals of “disabled identity”, and recommends several 
works of literature on this subject. This is a project I do initially have sympathy for, 
particularly given the work I myself have done as staff reviewer on the site 
“fantasybookreview.co.uk”, a site devoted to works of speculative fiction where naturally I 
take a specific interest in authors’ portrayal of disabled characters.  
What is interesting to note about Curwood’s project however, is that he rigorously 
contrasts the idea of “disabled identity” as opposed to “normal” or “able” identity, and those 
five works he recommends are all themed around the idea of a disabled young person 
achieving their goals and triumphing despite the prejudices of others, often affirming their 
own selfhood along the way.  
I find it significant however that all of these protagonists firstly possess disabilities 
which have an identifiable social group attached to them such as autism or deafness, and also 
tend to not affect a person’s physical appearance. It is also notable that most of the 
“obstacles” which the protagonists of such works contend with are therefore social in nature, 
for example a deaf girl who becomes a band manager whose father refuses to learn sign 
language, or an autistic boy whose thought processes and modes of behaviour cause problems 
with relating to colleagues and the established procedures during his time working at a law 
firm. 
As I noted in the conclusion to this work, identification with a specific community, 
(such as identifying as part of the deaf community), and the problems  associated with 
disability are not necessarily identical, and literature that attempts to pretend the two of them 
are and thus form a “positive disabled identity” based on an individual’s conscious 
identification with a specific community seems to be side stepping much of what actual 
disabled experience involves, after all, much of the experience of disability, such as my 
pouring a glass of water at home is not based on prejudice or social expectations or 
“triumphing over adversity” it is often just experiencing the direct, simple and quite literal 
frustration of desires. Any work attempting to represent “disabled experience” (if such a 
unified animal could be said to exist at all), that does not cover this fact is at the least 
misleading, if not actively detrimental to public perception due to minimising the real impact 
that a disability has on a person’s life. 
This is particularly true in cases where the disability itself manifests on an individual 
basis, for instance the autistic, animal loving son of a friend of mine was denied a school trip 
to a zoo because it was held to be against his interests as “an autistic person” to go into a 
crowded environment by the school authorities, irrespective of either his love of animals or 
measures he himself could take to control his stress levels in that environment such as 
wearing earphones, a clear case in which the focus on the boy’s “autistic identity” was 
mistakenly used both to deny his desires, and also deny him equal participation in the school 
alongside non-disabled children. 
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I have also been aware myself in my interactions with many groups specifically billed 
as “for the blind” that the emphasis of promoting a radically specific “disabled identity” often 
has the opposite effect, that of promoting differences and thus increasing the “different 
human being” paradigm I mentioned in chapter 4, as well as obfuscating the actual issues I 
encounter in my life. After all it is far more helpful to me if people ask me whether I want to 
receive reading material in braille or whether it would  be helpful for me to do so, rather than 
automatically assuming that as part of my “blind identity” I demand material in “blind 
language” something which is directly addressed by Simon Hayhoe in his notes on the 
inadequacy in responses to provide accessibility for blind people, since only some blind 
people read braille and of those who do there are occasions when braille is less useful as with 
the example of my bank’s provision of a braille bank statement in chapter 3. 
This question of celebrating disabled identity is also addressed quite uniquely by 
Davis222 who contrasts the concept of disability with “diversity” as the new alternative to 
normality. Davis notes that the media is quick to emphasise people’s choice of identity 
whether this be ethnic, racial, gender or even just the choice of product, but that an identity 
that is enforced by biology, that of being “disabled” is rarely included in this idea of 
diversity.  
This is a unique perspective on the portrayal of disability and its relation to capitalism 
and one with which I have a distinct personal sympathy,  though Davis again however relies 
upon existing social categorisation which conflates the relationship between how a person is 
“perceived” and what a person does.  
It may be true that I cannot “choose” whether or not to be visually impaired, however 
as I noted in chapter 4 as a disabled person I can choose my desires and how to fulfil them, in 
as far as I am competent in dealing with my own disability, can choose how and in what ways 
to enlist the aid of others to fulfil my desires.  Similarly, while I cannot choose how others 
perceive me (though of course my attitude and abilities can alter that perception), I can 
choose how important those perceptions of others are to me. If I am performing on stage for 
instance, I do not care whether the audience perceive me as “Blind” or not. While, as part of 
my performance I do not usually take my guide dog or other visible mobility aides on stage 
with me, I equally do not remove my glasses, alter the appearance of my eyes or make any 
deliberate effort to disguise the fact that I have a visual impairment. My concern when 
performing is not “do people see me as blind”, but “do people see me as a good performer.”  
This is another reason I believe it is of such major importance to separate the 
biological limitations upon desire fulfilment caused by any disabling condition, and the social 
attitudes attached to it, so that the importance of social judgements or any community based 
identity (such as the deaf community), to which a disabled person might wish to belong to 
can be separated and considered independently of a person’s less favourable life experiences. 
                                                          
222Davis, L. J. “The end of normal”. University of Michigan Press, (University of Michigan Press, 2013) 
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This separation would also help in actually achieving what Curwood hopes the works of 
“inspirational literature” would achieve, namely showing the rest of society that having a 
disability, inconvenient though it often might be, does not fundamentally change the type of 
human any human is, or the moral, ethical and social status that would be accorded to any 
human.  
Davis continues his analysis by discussing the construction of identity by the liberal 
media and the concept of diversity replacing that of normality, then uses that concept of 
disabled identity to discuss ideas such as media portrayal, sexuality and depression. Again 
however, Davis analysis is so heavily based on an existing cultural construction of what 
constitutes “disabled” and so completely divorced from actual disabled experience, that 
frequently his discussion becomes so rarefied as to lose any and all focus, particularly since 
Davis arguments concern “disability” as a whole and often rest on exclusively generalised 
assumptions about say, the nature of images or the provenance of media. For example, he 
spends considerable time discussing how the concept of “the disabled body” fits into post-
modernist philosophy, however never once does he actually mention disability stopping a 
person doing something or having a practical effect on what a person does in theirlife, indeed 
Davis frequently gave me the strong impression that the “disabled” he speaks of were a 
mythical species. In this he contrasted markedly with Hayhoe who grounded his more 
specific examination of the ontology of “blindness” in a detailed historical narrative. Davis 
even categorically rejects the notion that depression as a form of disability has any significant 
difference from concepts such as sadness or melancholia, and airily dismisses actual practical 
discussions of matters such as “insomnia” as some sort of conspiracy by drug companies, 
despite a note at the beginning of the chapter that he has apparently talked to people with 
depression. His lackadaisical assertion that “depression did not exist before the 1950’s” and 
his contention that the artistic melancholy of Victorian poets was some sort of pre-diagnoses 
depression seems simply incorrect according to the actual phenomenology of the experience. 
After all any person who has suffered depression will recognize literary figures such as 
Sherlock Holmes, Dr.Manette in Tale of Two Cities or even Conan the Barbarian as suffering 
it through the basic description of their mental state’s debilitating affects despite the fact that 
all such characters existed before the term “Depression” became one of general medical 
usage. 
Davis constant discussion of “the disabled body” as some strange artefact of a cultural 
perception so theoretical that it appeared nearly divorced from experience was at a stark 
contrast to other accounts of the body, and in particular embodied experience such as Carells. 
Indeed I found myself wondering how exactly the “disabled body” as cultural artefact, a 
notion which Davis expends considerable theoretical time and effort on actually contrasted to 
those who have a disabled body, especially when said “disabled body” is not immediately 
obvious as being disabled as is the case with many conditions from mental illness to dyslexia.  
I suspect this focus on “the disabled body” is possibly a rhetorical tool which authors 
like Davis have borrowed from gender politics, however where having a female or male body 
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is something easily demonstrable as per a set of basic physical characteristics which can be 
discussed independently of a person’s actual gender identity, or yet how the perceptions and 
expectations of others of those physical characteristics impinge upon that identity; as the 
“disabled body” is something whose characteristics are far more nebulous and far harder to 
identify unless one focuses on a tangible quality such as life experience one wonders what 
“the disabled body” actually is? After all a person with ME (chronic fatigue syndrome), is not 
disabled as per a definable fact of their physical body which is immediately comprehensible 
to others, but by a state of their body which impinges directly upon their life experience, 
energy levels and desires, indeed a chief issue for sufferers of “invisible disabilities” is the 
very fact that they do not display a visible sign of disability, making it far harder for them to 
receive assistance or even basic sympathy for their circumstances. 
It is also demonstrable as per the intensive epistemological analysis Simon Hayhoe 
makes of the term “Blindness” and how this differs from other commonly understood 
disabilities such as mental illness or deafness, that each physical manifestation and group 
categorisation of disability comes with its own slightly different cultural ontology, ontologies 
which do not seem easily reduced to a singular category of embodied experience or even 
cultural perception.  
Even as far as the basic so called “visible” disabilities go, there seems to be a 
qualitative difference in the type of experience involved in a paraplegic wishing to see 
“people like them” depicted in the media, and their need to make all the complex 
arrangements necessary to catch a train as per my example in chapter one, qualitative 
differences which cannot be exemplified by the simple notion of “having a disabled body”. I 
believe here authors such as Davis might be making a category mistake based upon their 
perception of the conflict between the medical model and the social model, confusing a 
“diagnosis” of disability with the immediate social and cultural “perception” of disability, 
both of which have a tangential relationship to the actual lived experience of possessing a 
disability. 
It is with reference to discussions such as Davis’ that I see a desire based definition of 
disability having a major advantage in focusing academic discourse by allowing a practical 
and realistic examination of the experiences of disabled people, and the ways in which the 
lives of disabled people can be improved in basic and fundamental ways since, (as I observed 
in chapter 3), questions of accessibility, effort, assistance, and the conditions of fulfilled 
desires tend to be central to life with a disability, indeed in many ways far more than the 
notions of “A disabled body as cultural artefact”.  
Separating out the idea of disability as the biological prohibition of desire fulfilment 
would also have the advantage of allowing discussions about concepts such as “depiction of 
disability in the media” to be far more narrowly focused on the issue at hand. For example, 
while I fully agree with Davis conclusion that narratives of disabled people in the media tend 
to show disability as the main defining character trait of any character, and usually are either 
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forcibly inspirational or tragic (though as a disabled performer myself I strongly disagree 
with his complex and rather unfalsifiable account of why disabled people must be played by 
able-bodied actors). It would be far better if we asked for fiction to pay more attention to real 
people and the problems they encounter in life, disability included, than to ask for some sort 
of token representation of some disabilities. After all a complex character with loves, desires 
and experiences all their own who equally happens to be disabled is a generally better 
representation in fiction than simply an endless bundle of positive character traits and sound 
bites sitting in a wheel chair. Though I disagreed with the rather convoluted way he 
approached the subject, I did agree with Davis conclusion that having disability simply be 
“present” without being a focus of any specifically intentioned depiction would be an 
extremely good thing, in my capacity as a book reviewer I do note such instances on the sadly 
rare occasions they do occur within speculative fiction.  
A definition of disability based on desire fulfilment which allowed for the separate 
discussion of the cultural perception of disability would also allow comparisons between 
depictions of different forms of disability. For example I often myself find it disheartening 
that while authors such as Davis are eager for a “positive portrayal of disability” this 
portrayal  (as those works sighted by Curwood shows), often restricted to very specific types 
of disabilities such as autism, deafness or paraplegia, and blindness, along with many other 
physical and temporal impairments, remains something of an afterthought at best.  
This is where historical analyses of the epistemological status of various disabilities of 
the type Hayhoe has provided for blindness would prove helpful, especially if such could be 
made to highlight the ways in which the cultural construction of various forms of disabilities 
have contributed to the perception of people with those disabilities as radically different and 
“special” forms of human being. 
Obviously in this thesis I have focused heavily upon the satisfaction of desire as an 
essential ethical principle. This is similar to the treatment given to freedom by Amartia Sen in 
his 2013 article concerning sustainability223. Sen details the Brundellant report on 
sustainability which defines sustainability as a state where the needs of the current members 
of society are met without compromising the needs of future generations, and that the most 
expedient way of achieving this is focusing resources on the “poor” of each generation. Sen 
argues however, that while this model’s focus on the poor is both admiral and necessary on a 
global level concerning matters such as environmentalism and population growth, in its 
characterisation of humans as simply foci of individual needs which can be satisfied via 
resources, it misses both a fundamental aspect of human experience, and one which itself 
contributes to promoting overall sustainability. 
                                                          
223Sen, A. (2013). “The ends and means of sustainability”. Journal of Human Development and Capabilities, 
14(1), pp6-20 
Disability, Desire and Society: The Establishment of a New, Individualistic Definition of Disability and 
its Practical Uses in Everyday Life 
By Luke Hewitt 
 
162 
 
Sen argues that freedom rather than need should be the basis of any macro discussion 
of long term sustainability and that ultimately the promotion of the maximization of human 
freedom will itself  lead to a net increase in that freedom, as well as a decrease in factors such 
as resource consumption and population growth. He illustrates this by an appeal to reason as 
a chief defining factor in determining human freedom itself, and supports his argument by 
showing direct correlations between the level of women’s education and literacy in third 
world countries, with an increase in women’s power and autonomy and subsequent decrease 
in population growth. He therefore argues that thinking of people as having a basic patient 
relationship to needs is damaging to sustainability, and rather we should consider human 
populations as agents in determining their own freedom. He also uses this stance to repudiate 
hard line social controls or compulsions upon populations to decrease consumption, and 
indeed speculates that shared property rights and a greater freedom in the ownership of the 
means of producing resources would result in a decrease in consumption and a beneficial 
status for the environment. 
There is a lot which is appealing in Sen’s analyses. In particular the notion that 
people, even on the country wide level populations should be treated as agents rather than 
patients, and that the maximization of freedom could also lead to a greater prevalence of 
freedom, a hypothesis which supports the definition of disability as based upon desires. After 
all, if a public building had ramps, this would not only allow paraplegic people to enter, but 
also offer an alternative method of ingress to people who might not wish to use the stairs, e.g. 
people with walking problems. In addition, in allowing access to paraplegic people to the 
building, it is trivially true that paraplegic people then have the choice to enter the building or 
not, for example to attend or not attend a play in a theatre and thereby over all greater cultural 
visibility and so avoid contributing to damaging stereotypes which in turn aid the overall 
position of paraplegic people in the future. 
It is also significant that Sen directly equates reason and education with the 
maximization of freedom, indeed this is similar both to Griffin’s concept of second order 
desires, and the problems which frequently occur with disabled people having the fulfilment 
conditions for desire determined by others that I outlined in chapter 3. 
One problem I do have with Sen’s analyses, is that while his model of freedom might 
serve as a way of maximizing sustainability, at the same time it appears to miss a 
fundamental factor about the nature of human suffering and power. 
Sen speaks of “freedom from hunger” and “freedom from ill health” as basic 
freedoms and notes the importance of promoting these to people who do not have them, 
however it seems needlessly convoluted to couch what are very basic types of human 
suffering in the language of freedom, since it seems there is far more to the actual experience 
of hunger than merely the static recognition of a lack of nourishment, nor would a person 
who is starving simply note their starvation like a decreasing stat counter in a computer game. 
This is because humans suffer. A person who is starving is not merely lacking, they are 
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enduring a tangible state of pain and also, eventually, a direct risk of death. Therefore, efforts 
to alleviate the hunger of a population take on far more significance than simply the gross 
allocation of resources. Alleviating hunger, even on a macro-analytical level is a uniquely 
ethical goal and end in itself. Of course, in Sen’s context of simply providing a critique of 
sustainability this probably does not matter; although it probably would in the practical 
application of Sen’s principles, however the question of suffering is a fundamental one in 
disability. 
Just like hunger, unfulfilled desire may be seen as a direct source of suffering and one 
I have tried to highlight in this thesis, indeed as I previously noted it is frequently unfulfilled 
desire that provides the most fundamental critiques of basic cultural assumptions concerning 
disabilities. Disability therefore represents not only a set of assumptions, medical diagnoses 
or even specific virtues, it represents a source of suffering, through increased effort, through 
prohibited desires, even directly through restricting freedom as to what types of desires or life 
choices may be possible. Thus I would argue that while Sen’s freedom based approach to 
sustainability provides some exceptional ways of examining disability on a macro and 
societal level, and perhaps theoretical principles for matters concerning resource and 
provision of assistance, at the same time it is not merely the promotion of freedom, but 
decreasing of the suffering humans feel through the restriction of freedom which should be 
the goal of such a model. So, it is not merely enough to provide a disabled person with 
accessible transport that fulfills their desire to get somewhere, but that transport be available 
according to the wishes and life choices of the disabled person who uses it. 
Unfortunately, another point mentioned by Sen is the notion of power, and the fact 
that increasing the amount of power in decision making for those with restricted freedom 
promotes greater freedom. Here, Hayhoe’s epistemological analyses shows up some major 
problems with the way that disability and power are discussed, since as long as the discourse 
on disability remains bound by cultural perceptions tied to intrinsically flawed historical 
notions, it is open to misconstruction and the depredations of self-interest. This indeed is one 
reason for my suggestion of the creation of “experts” in disability mentioned in chapter 4 as 
an attempt to directly equalize the power relation of disabled people, and why I attempted to 
create an alternative schema for understanding human and animal assistants which (like Sen’s 
contention about sustainability), did not denigrate people to the status of patient.  
As articles such as Liasidou’s show, with an increasing focus on partisan politics and 
the radical separation of groups of human experience into separate camps, it seems that the 
need for a desire based definition of disability is greater than ever. Though discussion 
concerning disability has certainly progressed, it has not yet managed to overcome the 
intrinsic problems with the purely social model, or yet provide anything more than rarified 
notions divorced entirely from the practical experience of disability to combat these 
problems, and yet as ever more detailed critiques of the currently flawed cultural construction 
of disabilities show, a  conception of what “disability” means, of how the “challenges” of 
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living in the world as a disabled person may be conceived, and of the ways in which any 
disabling condition causes human suffering is now more necessary than ever. 
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